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Abstract
Fiscal policy can be considered as a key driver of economic growth. The
government can either provide for the public good used in firm’s production
process, or invest in public education that improves the abilities and skills of
workers. In term of the public good and public education, the growth rate of
economy is undoubtedly enhanced. However, the magnitude of growth also
depends on how the government levies the distortionary tax to finance its
spending. Since different kinds of taxes contribute to the different states of
economy, as well as the long-run growth, the main purpose of this thesis is to
examine the effect of the fiscal policy on economic growth in various
theoretical frameworks, particularly the representative-agent approach and the
three-period overlapping generations model.
The theoretical analysis reveals a number of interesting findings. Firstly,
the productive externalities from public investment and procyclical
endogenous consumption tax creates the multiplicity of balanced growth paths
(BGPs) in the representative agent framework. Two BGPs arise due to the
existence of the Laffer curve. In addition, local indeterminacy may occur
around the lowest balanced growth path if consumption tax is mildly
procyclical. As a result, there is no trade-off between growth and volatility.
Secondly, the growth-maximising tax rate is investigated in the three-period
overlapping generations economy in which altruistic parents provide private
tuition for their children and the government subsidises public education.
When the government misconceives of the existence of private tuition, public
education is over-provisioned. This leads the economy to the growth-reducing
area of the Armey curve. Finally, in the presence of stochastic productive
government expenditure, the economy experiences a higher growth rate than it
does in the perfect foresight economy when households are risk-averse agent.
The inverted-U shape relationship between economic growth and permanent
income tax disappears in the stochastic growth context; nevertheless, the
condition of growth-enhancing tax rate remains valid. Furthermore, the
first-best fiscal instruments are explored based on the difference between
centralised and decentralised economies in the case of proportional congestion.
To prevent the welfare loss, the initial capital should be sacrificed in the
interest of the higher level of consumption. For this reason, the trade-off
between growth and welfare is unavoidable in a decentralised economy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the reference to the neoclassical growth theory, Solow (1956) and Swan
(1956) illustrated that economic growth is completely independent of the
capital accumulation in an economy in which the diminishing marginal
product of capital (MPK) takes place. With the diminishing MPK, the capital
will stop accumulating when the MPK is equal to the inverse of discount factor
(Jones and Manuelli, 1990). As a result, the consumption is constant over time
and the long-run growth is equal to zero. To avoid a zero growth rate, the
neoclassical growth theorists add some exogenous factors such as population
growth and technological progress as the sources of economic growth.
However, the concept of exogenous growth is challenged by endogenous-growth
economists who argued that economic growth should be a result of the
interactions or decision making of the economic agents. By allowing
endogenous growth to exist, the assumption of diminishing MPK is adjusted to
ensure that the economy will experience a positive long-run growth (Barro and
Sala-i Martin, 2004).
In the absence of population growth and technological progress, the
literature on endogenous growth can be classified into two groups. The first
group is the endogenous growth model that incorporates convex production
technology in which the diminishing MPK still exists, but with a bound. This
bound prevents the MPK from approaching zero when the capital is hugely
abundant. In one-sector endogenous growth model1, Barro and Sala-I-Martin
(1992) addressed three possibilities that could lead to convex production
technology and a constant rate of return on aggregate capital, namely learning
1Rebelo (1991) and Jones et al. (1993) also confirmed that the diminishing marginal product
of capital with bound can be obtained in the two-sector model.
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by doing, public services with taxes, and a variety of capital goods in an
imperfect market.
The other group is the endogenous growth model with non-convex
production technology where the diminishing return on capital disappears.
The main factor contributing to the non-convexity of production technology is
the externalities that occur on the individual level but have an impact on the
aggregate level. For instance, the externalities created by new knowledge may
cause an increasing return on aggregate capital (Romer, 1986). Similarly, the
externalities generated by human capital could potentially result in an
increasing return in the production of output (Lucas, 1988). Thus, these two
groups can be differentiated by production technology. While the former group
applies the constant return on aggregate capital, the latter group provides the
opportunity for an economy to experience an increasing return on aggregate
capital. Despite the challenges and interesting implications of non-convex
technology, this thesis employs the convex technology as a central analysis
throughout all the chapters because it is more likely to satisfy the standard
welfare theorem and to ensure a positive growth rate in the economy2.
Although there are many sources of endogenous growth, this thesis
emphasises on public investment, productive government expenditure and
taxation as the drivers of economic growth. Despite the existence of different
forms of productive government spending, it raises the rate of return on
private capital, and thus stimulates private investment and economic growth in
the long run (Aschauer, 1989; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Age´nor, 2007).
According to the paper by Barro (1990), the government invests a flow of
productive government spending in the public good that is used in the
production process. As a result of an inelastic labour supply, a balanced
budget rule and a constant income tax rate, the impact of fiscal policy on
endogenous growth can be analysed by focusing on the Euler equation. Given
a sufficient level of technology, a unique balanced growth path exists and the
economy experiences a positive growth rate.
Unfortunately, the model proposed by Barro (1990) has no transitional
dynamics because productive government spending is a flow variable. To
understand the transitional dynamics together with the long-run growth,
public investment should be considered in the way that public capital stocks
2As explained in the work of Jones and Manuelli (1997), an economy with non-convex
technology is more likely to have a negative growth rate.
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can be used as the inputs in the firms’ production process (Futagami et al.,
1993; Irmen and Kuehnel, 2009). In addition, the method of financing public
expenditure is also important to analyse the local stability of the long-run
growth path. The government can levy various kinds of distortionary tax rates
such as labour income tax, capital tax and time-varying consumption tax to
finance government spending and to balance its budget in each period3. For
example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) illustrated the conditions of global
and local indeterminacy when a government levied labour income tax to
finance exogenous government spending. Park and Philippopoulos (2004)
confirmed that the combination of public services and capital tax generated
two balanced growth paths, and the lowest balanced growth path was locally
indeterminate under certain conditions. Therefore, it seems that labour
income tax and capital tax may not be a preferable choice since they
undoubtedly create the indeterminate equilibrium in the economy. By
contrast, the effect of time-varying consumption tax on the aggregate economy
is still a puzzle to economists. Giannitsarou (2007) found a unique steady
state and its transitional dynamics was locally determinate when exogenous
government expenditure was entirely financed by time-varying consumption
tax. On the other hand, Lloyd-Braga et al. (2008) and Nourry et al. (2013)
proposed the condition of the multiplicity of steady states and the condition of
aggregate instability for economies in which the countercyclical consumption
tax was an important financial instrument and the different types of
households’ preference are considered.
The role of countercyclical consumption tax is even more robust in the
paper of Bambi and Venditti (2016). When productive government spending is
considered together with endogenous consumption tax, the authors found the
condition of global indeterminacy if consumption tax were countercyclical.
Moreover, local indeterminacy arises if purely extrinsic uncertainty is
introduced to the economy. Since procyclical consumption tax may prevent
aggregate instability, it is then recommended to policymakers.
Should procyclical consumption tax policy be implemented? The answer to
this question is much more complicated than it seems because procyclical
taxation has been criticised by economists in several ways. For instance,
procyclical fiscal policy can lead to the misuse of fiscal resources during period
3The possibility of having public debt is ruled out in this thesis for reasons of simplicity.
For papers that allow public debt, please see Minea and Villieu (2009) and Groneck (2010) for
their model setup.
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of financial upswing in favour of the political partisans (Talvi and Vegh, 2005).
Furthermore, following the standard Keynesian wisdom, procyclical fiscal
policy may amplify the business cycles and the economy may suffer from a
long period of recession. Thus, the scepticism about procyclical consumption
tax provides the opportunity for the second chapter to explore the effect of
public investment and procyclical consumption tax on the aggregate economy
in the endogenous growth model. Accordingly, there are two contributions in
this chapter. Firstly, public capital is considered as the input for the firms’
production function. An inelastic labour supply, private capital and public
capital result in the convexity of production technology and a constant return
on aggregate capital. Secondly, the role of government is constrained by two
rules, namely the balanced budget rule and the fiscal policy rule. In term of
the fiscal policy rule, endogenous consumption tax is determined by the
state-contingent variables and the time-invariant fiscal instruments, as
described in Persson and Tabellini (2002). This fiscal rule makes this paper a
significant departure from the work of Bambi and Venditti (2016) in which
consumption tax depends on detrended control variable.
In the continuous-time framework, the Hamiltonian objective function is
set and the equilibrium conditions satisfy the definition of balanced growth
path (BGP). As it is common in the literature on endogenous growth, a unique
BGP is found when a level of technology is sufficiently high. However, the
sufficient condition for the existence of two BGPs, namely the lowest BGP and
the highest BGP, is discovered. The inverse elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, as well as a degree of procyclicality should be sufficiently large in
order for the detrended public investment line and a non-monotonic function
of detrended tax revenue (a Laffer curve) to be intersected twice. For the
lowest BGP, it is locally indeterminate when purely extrinsic uncertainty is
introduced and consumption tax is mildly procyclical. As a result, there is no
trade-off between output growth and output volatility due to the existence of
aggregate instability around the lowest BGP. For this reason, policymakers
should implement the procyclical consumption tax policy with caution when
the economy has a low growth rate.
Despite the fact that the effect of public investment and endogenous
consumption tax in the representative agent framework potentially leads to the
multiplicity of balanced growth paths and aggregate instability, the impact of
productive government spending and distortionary taxation on economic
13
growth remains unclear in the context of the heterogenous-agent model.
Therefore, in the third chapter, the three-period overlapping generations
model is employed to study the impact of fiscal policy on the intergenerational
transfers and economic growth.
The first purpose of the third chapter is to find the growth-maximising tax
rate in the economy where public education and private tuition have an impact
on human capital accumulation and intergenerational transfers. In fact, there
are many theoretical and empirical papers that have investigated the value of
the growth-maximising tax rate. For the theoretical literature, Glomm and
Ravikumar (1997) argued that the growth-maximising tax rate was equal to
the elasticity of output with respect to public eduction when there was an
absence of private tuition in an economy. Blankenau and Simpson (2004)
attempted to incorporate both private and public education systems; however,
they could not prove the existence of growth-maximising tax rate due to the
complexity of the model. Furthermore, the evidence of Armey curve indicates
the relationship between economic growth and the size of a government across
countries. The empirical evidence shows that the growth-maximising tax rate
is around 20%-30% according to the work of Rezk (2005) and Facchini and
Melki (2011). To differentiate our model from other papers, the impure
altruistic motive and the Cobb-Douglas human capital function are employed
to explore the growth-maximising tax rate. Consequently, it departs from the
work of Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) and of Blankenau and Simpson (2004)
because altruistic parents will obtain the direct utility from the act of giving4.
Based on this model, at least one growth-maximising tax rate is found within
a feasible range between zero and one in which the sufficient conditions for the
local maximum are also satisfied.
The second purpose of this chapter is to observe whether the public
education is over-provisioned. When the government misperceives the ability
of impurely altruistic parents to provide private tuition for their children, it is
likely that the government may exaggerate the benefits of public education.
Therefore, the growth-maximising tax rate is reinvestigated in an economy in
which the misperception of private tuition take places. In such an economy,
the analytical proof shows that there is a corner solution that allows the
4Andreoni (1990) labelled this direct utility as impure altruism in the sense that a warm-
glow giver will experience a positive feeling from the act of giving. The interpretation of
warm-glow giving is also similar to the ‘paternalistic altruism’ proposed by Michel and Pestieau
(2004), and the ‘joy of children receiving income’ addressed by Grossman and Poutvaara (2009).
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government to levy labour income tax rate by 100% to finance the public
spending on education. In other words, the over-provision of public education
does exist in the economy where the government misperceives the existence of
private tuition. Subsequently, over-spending on public education may lead the
economy into the growth-reducing area of the Armey curve.
In the second and third chapters, the impact of public investment, public
education and distortionary taxation on economic growth is clearly
demonstrated via the perfect foresight model. However, the perfect foresight
assumption does not reflect the real economy, which is usually affected by
many random factors. Such random shocks will risk one economy, and will
have an impact on the decision-making processes of economic agents. Once the
economy is subject to uncertainty, the household decisions regarding
consumption and saving depend on the degree of risk aversion (Carroll, 2001).
In the stochastic environment, the deterministic endogenous growth model is
therefore incapable of analysing the effect of productive government spending
on economic growth and social welfare. Consequently, the stochastic
endogenous growth framework is employed in the fourth chapter.
Although the sources of uncertainty may vary across countries, the
substantial amount of literature on the one-sector stochastic endogenous
growth framework exploits the fact that the production process is affected by
random shocks5 (Gokan, 2002; Clemens, 2004; Clemens and Soretz, 2004).
However, none of them considers productive government expenditure as the
input in the production function, with the exception of the paper by
Turnovsky (1999). By considering productive government spending that is
devoted to the public good, Turnovsky (1999) found that economic growth and
social welfare were determined by congestion and a degree of risk aversion
when output was affected by technological shocks. In addition, the difference
between centralised and decentralised economies was also determined by a
degree of congestion. Nevertheless, such a difference disappeared in the case of
proportional congestion.
The finding of Turnovsky (1999) that the solutions for a centralised
economy and for a decentralised economy are identical in the case of
proportional congestion is indeed limited in some respects. For example, the
capital risk is the only source of uncertainty when the stochastic output is a
5In neoclassical growth theory, Merton (1975) was the first to introduce uncertainty in
population growth, while Eaton (1981) allows a technological shock to affect the output.
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linear function in capital. Subsequently, the solution of decentralised economy
can replicate the social planner’s outcomes. Moreover, the role of government
transfer has not been studied. In fact, it is an important factor that has an
impact on the volatility in households’ income paths, precautionary saving and
the growth rate. To overcome these limitations, the fourth chapter provides
the alternative source of uncertainty by introducing a random shock to
productive government expenditure to enable it to follow the stochastic
process6, and allows government transfer to have an impact on households’
income paths. The impact of stochastic productive government expenditure on
economic growth and social welfare in decentralised economy is also discussed
in order to achieve the first-best outcomes by employing fiscal instruments.
The equilibrium of a decentralised economy is analysed by using the
dynamic programming method that leads to the stochastic Bellman equation.
The first finding is that an economy that has a stochastic environment
experiences a higher growth rate than it does in a perfect foresight economy in
which households are risk-averse agents and government transfer is allowed.
This is because the intertemporal substitution effect is completely dominated
by the income effect. Risk-averse households will increase precautionary saving
against the risk of the uncertain income flow caused by the volatility of
government transfer. Secondly, the numerical example suggests that the
inverted U-shaped relationship between economic growth and permanent
income tax disappears when the degree of risk aversion is sufficiently high.
Nonetheless, the condition of the growth-maximising permanent income tax
rate that the marginal benefit of providing for the public good should be
greater than the marginal cost thereof is still valid.
Thirdly, the saving and growth rates of a decentralised economy are too
high when compared to a centralised economy. Thus, our result contradicts
the findings by Turnovsky (1999), which indicates that both economies have
the same resource allocations when the public good is subject to proportional
congestion. In fact, in our case, the resource allocations in both economies are
different due to the capital risk and the income risk. Furthermore, the difference
between centralised and decentralised economies provides an opportunity for the
decentralised government to achieve the social planner’s outcomes by employing
the first-best fiscal instruments. Finally, the welfare loss is calculated based
6The stochastic productive government expenditure is not a new concept. Instead, it has
been employed in the Neoclassical work of Baxter and King (1993), and in the New Keynesian
paper of Linnemann and Schabert (2006).
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on the excess amount of the initial capital in the decentralised economy when
compared to the centralised economy. For this reason, the trade-off between
economic growth and welfare is undoubtedly unavoidable7. In addition, the
comparison of welfare in a risky and in a riskless economy is also characterised
in term of the initial capital variation. A risky economy will experience greater
welfare loss when the degree of risk aversion and the volatility of stochastic
productive government expenditure are extremely high.
This thesis is organised as follows. The second chapter explains how the
combination of public investment and procyclical consumption tax can be a
source of global and local indeterminacy. The third chapter illustrates the
existence of growth-maximising tax rate in an impurely altruistic economy that
has both public education and private tuition. In addition, the over-provision
of public education is highlighted when the government misperceives private
tuition as the input for human capital accumulation process. With regard to
the stochastic setting, the impact of productive government expenditure on
economic growth and social welfare is measured in the fourth chapter. The last
chapter contains the conclusion and possible avenues for future research.
7Unlike Barro (1990), the growth-maximising problem is not the same as welfare-maximising
problem in our case.
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Chapter 2
Procyclical Endogenous
Taxation and Aggregate
Instability
Co-authored with Dr.Mauro Bambi
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2.1 Introduction
Several contributions in the literature have shown that the balanced-budget
rule, together with endogenous distortionary taxes may lead to aggregate
instability once embedded in a neoclassical growth model.1 Endogenous labour
income taxes and capital income taxes are responsible of aggregate instability
if they are sufficiently countercyclical with respect to output growth
(Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 1997). Although endogenous consumption taxes
are preferred in such a setting because they reduce the range of parameters
leading to an indeterminate steady state and therefore to sunspot equilibria
(Giannitsarou, 2007), this specific result cannot be extended to more general
utility functions such as those proposed by Jaimovich (2008) and by Jaimovich
and Rebelo (2009). In fact, local indeterminacy is guaranteed only if the
consumption tax is assumed to be countercyclical and the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption is sufficiently large (Nourry et al.,
2013). A common characteristic of these models is that government spending
is never productive. Investigating the same issue in the endogenous growth
model a` la Barro (1990) in which government spending is productive leads to a
global form of indeterminacy when the consumption taxes are endogenous and
countercyclical (Bambi and Venditti, 2016). In their paper, global
indeterminacy is characterised by a unique stationary equilibrium and a
continuum of non-stationary equilibria. This depends on the consumers’ belief
in the value of countercyclical consumption tax. Once extrinsic uncertainty is
introduced, sunspot equilibria and aggregate instability emerge in this context.
In general, the existing literature points out that procyclical endogenous
taxes are the appropriate policy to rule out aggregate instability in models where
the government balanced its budget in each period. Such a policy suggestion is
relevant for at least two reasons. Firstly, the balanced budget rules have been
advocated and implemented as constitutional requirements in several European
countries after the 2008 crisis (for example, Article 81 of Italian Constitutional
Law 1/2012). However, from 2009 to 2013, 16 European countries had a budget
deficit of less than 3% as a percentage of GDP. Secondly, a great number of
OECD countries have adopted the countercyclical taxes with respect to output
growth (Lane, 2003)2. For example, Figure 2.1 shows how consumption taxes
1Aggregate instability emerges due to the existence of (stationary) sunspot equilibria.
2Consistently with the previous literature, we state that taxes are countercyclical if the tax
rate expands when output shrinks, and vice versa. See footnote 5.
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were adjusted countercyclically in EU countries during 2009-2013, specifically in
those indicated by red and grey circles. It is interesting that eight of them had
a budget deficit of less than 3% as a percentage of their GDP3 in 2013. For this
reason, these countries could benefit from switching to procyclical fiscal policy
as the existing literature predicts that the stabilising role of procyclical taxation
should reduce the output volatility.
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Figure 2.1: Evidence on Countercyclical VAT
The aim of this paper is to investigate the robustness of this prediction in
the endogenous growth model. To make the contribution, our setting differs
from that in the previous literature according to two dimensions. Firstly, the
government finances ‘public investment’ by levying endogenous consumption
taxes. The term public investment reflects the nature of public infrastructure,
which is the accumulated stock rather than the current flow (Turnovsky, 1997;
Fisher and Turnovsky, 1998). Using this term is also a significant departure
from the work of Barro (1990) and of Bambi and Venditti(2016) since it justifies
how public capital stock can be a productive input to private production. In
addition, consumption taxes are considered instead of other types of taxation
because it is more difficult to generate local indeterminacy even if it has been
countercyclically adjusted with respect to output growth4.
3According to Eurostat, these countries are the Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania and Finland. Moreover, the countries gradually adjusted
the consumption tax during 2009-2013.
4Endogenous growth as a result of public investment financed by flat income taxes was
originally investigated by Futagami et al. (1993).
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Secondly, the government sector is characterised by two equations: a
balanced budget rule and a fiscal policy rule. The reason for the latter is that,
in our context, both public investment and the consumption tax rate are
endogenous. Therefore, we need to specify a fiscal policy rule along with the
balanced budget rule to avoid a trivial form of global indeterminacy. This
setup is another departure from what usually done in the exogenous or
no-growth models. In such models, the government spending is exogenously
given and the tax rate is endogenous because it has to adjust period by period
to balance the government budget5. By contrast, the aggregate instability does
not exist in the economy if only government spending is endogenous while
keeping a constant tax rate6.
To design the fiscal policy, we follow Persson and Tabellini (2002) that a
state-contingent and time-invariant fiscal policy are considered and specified
by a functional form that guarantees the existence of a balanced growth path.
The different fiscal policy rule literally differentiate our paper from the work of
Bambi and Venditti (2016).
The main finding of this article is that our economy may admit two
balanced growth paths; the lowest and highest growth. The lowest balanced
growth path can be locally indeterminate even though the consumption tax is
procyclical with respect to output growth. Consequently, procyclical taxation
may lead the economy into a poverty trap characterised by all aggregate
variables that fluctuate around the lowest balanced growth path. This finding
warns policymakers that the procyclical taxation policy should be
implemented with caution. Furthermore, in the presence of multiple balanced
growth paths, there is no trade-off between output growth and output
volatility in our setting since the aggregate instability may emerge around the
balanced growth path with the lowest growth rate.
In this model, the existence of multiple BGPs depends on the existence of
a Laffer curve type of relationship between the tax rate and the (detrended)
tax revenue. More precisely, two balanced growth paths exist regarding the fact
5For example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997, p. 80) considered the balanced budget rule
G = τtwt`t with G exogenously given; the tax rate is endogenous because it has to adjust in
each period to compensate for the changes in labour income tax and to balance the government
budget. Similarly, in a model without growth, Giannitsarou (2007) considered the balanced
budget rule G = τtct; the tax rate is again endogenous because G is exogenously given and
the budget is balanced by varying the consumption tax.
6Guo and Harrison (2004) could not find the aggregate instability when maintaining a
flat-tax rate but adjusting the endogenous government expenditure.
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that there might be two intersection of the detrended public investment and the
Laffer curve. Although the existence of the Laffer curve was recently found by
Nourry et al. (2013), the reason for its existence is very different from ours.
In their case, the existence of the Laffer curve depends on the specification
of preferences while, in our case, it depends on the shape of the fiscal policy
rule and a standard CES utility function. Hence, multiple BGPs exist in this
context due to a sufficiently large income effect, together with a sufficiently large
procyclical taxation7.
Similarly, our result on local indeterminacy has been proved for a sufficiently
large income effect, together with mild procyclical taxation. It is indeed shown
in the numerical examples that the economy can be characterised by both global
indeterminacy and local indeterminacy around the lowest balanced growth path
for reasonable values of the parameters.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2.2, the economy is fully
described by the two key equations which determine the intertemporal
equilibrium. Section 2.3 focuses on the existence of a balanced growth path
and the sufficient conditions for global indeterminacy are found in Proposition
2. The existence of a Laffer curve is discussed and explained via figures and
numerical examples. In the case of global indeterminacy, the transitional
dynamics around the balanced growth path at the lowest balanced growth
path are investigated in Section 2.4. Particularly, in this section, the sufficient
conditions for local indeterminacy are found in Proposition 3. The numerical
examples are also proposed to support that this dynamic behaviour is not only
analytically possible, but also reasonable from a quantitative perspective.
Section 2.5 emphasises the role of procyclical taxation in our setting and a
comparison with existing results is proposed. Finally, Section 2.6 is a
conclusion for this paper. The logical steps of the proofs appear in the main
text while the details and the rigorous version of the proofs can be found in
the Appendix A.
7It is worth remembering that there is no Laffer curve in flat-rate consumption taxes.
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2.2 The Model Setup
In this section, we present the decision-making problem faced by the households,
by the firms, and we also describe the role of government in the economy through
its budget constraint and fiscal policy rule. The model setup is similar to the
one proposed by Futagami et al. (1993) with the exception that the fiscal policy
rule consists of endogenous and time-varying consumption tax.
Households – The economy is populated by a continuum of identical
households distributed on the interval [0,1], and they are endowed with private
capital stock (k) and a unit of labour in each period (l¯ = 1). They will
inelastically supply this unit of labour to firms’ production process and receive
wage income (w) as a return. Since the identical households are an
infinitely-lived agent, there is no population growth, and the population size is
normalised to one (N = 1)8. Households will then choose the consumption
level that maximises the intertemporal utility function,
max
c
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt · c
1−σ − 1
1− σ dt
subject to the budget constraint,
k˙ = w +Rk − δk − (1 + τ)c (2.1)
c ≥ 0, k ≥ 0 (2.2)
where the initial condition of capital (k0) is exogenously given. All variables are
per-capita term. Gross income per capita is the sum of the return on capital and
a wage income, y ≡ (R− δ)k + w, while net income is y − τc where τ indicates
the consumption tax rate. Net income is allocated between consumption (c)
and gross investment i ≡ k˙ + δk. The intertemporal preference discount rate
(ρ) and the depreciation rate of capital (δ) are assumed, as usual, to be between
zero and one, while the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
consumption (σ) is strictly greater than one9.
The present-value Hamiltonian of this problem is
H ≡ c
1−σ − 1
1− σ · e
−ρt + λ[(w + (R− δ)k − (1 + τ)c]
8The size of labour force in this economy (L) is equal to one since L = Nl¯ = 1
9Following the seminal paper by Barro (1990), σ < 1 may lead to the unbounded utility.
For σ = 1, Giannitsarou (2007) showed that the global and local indeterminacy cannot occur.
Thus, these two cases are eliminated from our study.
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whose first-order conditions are:
∂H
∂c
= 0 ⇔ c−σe−ρt = λ(τ + 1) (2.3)
∂H
∂k
= −λ˙ ⇔ λ(R− δ) = −λ˙ (2.4)
Differentiating (2.3) and substituting it into (2.4) leads to the Euler equation;
c˙
c
=
1
σ
(
R− δ − ρ− τ˙
1 + τ
)
(2.5)
and a standard transversality condition must also hold.
lim
t→∞λk = 0 (2.6)
Firms – There is a continuum of identical firms distributed on the interval
[0,1]. Each firm produces a homogeneous product that can be consumed or
invested in the economy. A unit of labour supply (l¯), private capital (k) and
public capital (g) are used as the inputs in the production process. With regard
to the production technology, the production function is characterised by the
Cobb-Douglas specification:
y = Akα(l¯g)1−α (2.7)
where a constant level of technology is always greater than zero (A > 0). Indeed,
public capital can be measured by the ratio of aggregate public capital to the
size of labour force (g = GL )
10. Since l¯ = 1, the production function can be
rewritten in the following form:
y = Akαg1−α (2.8)
Firms will then maximise their profit subject to the production technology, the
total revenue and the total cost. By choosing the amount of capital, the rental
rate (R) and the wage rate (w) are determined by the following two conditions:
R = αAkα−1g1−α (2.9)
w = (1− α)Akαg1−α (2.10)
where the condition (2.9) is directly obtained from the first-order condition.
The condition (2.10) can be derived from the perfectly competitive market
assumption in which firms receive zero profit.
10Due to the fact that L = 1, g = G in our case.
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Government – The government devotes public investment in the public
good, such as a public infrastructure, that is used to enhance private
productivity. This public investment consists of a change in public capital (g˙)
and a depreciation of public capital (δg) at each point in time11. Public capital
is a productive input to individual firm’s production function while the
depreciation of public capital refers to the cost of maintaining the public good
in each period.
To finance public investment, consumption tax is preferred to other types
of taxation. Since income tax or capital tax may affect the decisions on
consumption and savings indirectly via income streams and the rate of capital
return, it is difficult to observe the direct impact of taxation on households’
decisions. Therefore, consumption tax is imposed in order to study how
households adjust their consumption/savings plans in response to taxation12.
Assuming that the government balances its budget in each period, the public
investment (Ig) should be equal to the consumption tax revenue (T ):
Ig ≡ g˙ + δg = τc ≡ T (2.11)
where the initial public capital stock (g0) is an exogenously given and positive
constant. The depreciation rate of private capital and of public capital (δ) are
also assumed to be the same for the sake of simplicity.13
Since we want to allow both public investment and the consumption tax
revenue to be endogenous and (possibly) time-varying, we need to specify not
only the government balance budget constraint (2.11), but also a fiscal policy
rule to avoid a trivial form of global indeterminacy. Following Persson and
Tabellini (2002) (see Chapter 11, p.279), we assume a state-contingent and
time-invariant fiscal policy rule:
τ = Ψ(k, g) ≡ τc
(g
k
)η
(2.12)
where τc > 0. The elasticity of the consumption tax with respect to the public-
private capital ratio (η) can be a positive or negative constant.14 The chosen
11The definition of public investment is indeed consistent with the paper by Futagami et al.
(1993), despite a zero depreciation rate (δ = 0) in their case.
12Park and Philipopoulos (2004) mentioned that the consumption/saving decision is driven
by the rate of capital return which determines the income stream, and is not directly dependent
on capital taxation itself.
13In this assumption, we depart from the setting presented by Futagami et al. (1993) in
which public investment does not depreciate over time.
14A time-invariant policy rule means that its functional form does not change over time.
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functional form for the fiscal policy rule implies two important characteristics
of the tax rate: i) it will be constant along any BGP since gk will be constant;
and ii) it is predetermined since it is a function of two state variables, k and g.
This is indeed consistent with the fact that taxes are typically set in advance,
as discussed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997). This specific functional form
differs from the case studied by Bambi and Venditti (2016) because the tax rate
does not depend on a control variable, but rather on a state variable, namely
the public-private capital ratio. Accordingly, the different fiscal policy rule may
result in a different policy suggestion.
Furthermore, our specific fiscal policy rule provides a new characteristic of
consumption tax rate. Using the fact from (2.8) and (2.12), the relationship
between the tax rate and the output can be easily established:
τ = τcA
η
α−1
(y
k
) η
1−α
which implies
y˙
y
=
k˙
k
+
1− α
η
τ˙
τ
where the tax growth rate ( τ˙τ ) is procyclical (countercyclical) with respect to
output growth ( y˙y ) if η > 0 (η < 0). Therefore, the elasticity of the consumption
tax with respect to the public-private capital ratio is a key parameter that
determines the procyclicality or countercyclicality of consumption tax rate.
The definition of an intertemporal equilibrium for this economy is
subsequently described as follow:
Definition 1 – Intertemporal Equilibrium: Given the initial
condition of private capital (k0 > 0) and of public capital (g0 > 0), an
intertemporal equilibrium is any path (c(t); k(t); τ(t); g(t)) that satisfies the
system of equations (2.1), (2.5), (2.9), (2.10), (2.11) and (2.12), with respect to
the inequality constraints; k > 0 and c > 0, and the transversality condition
(2.6).
As a common feature in the literature on endogenous growth, the dynamics
associated with such an equilibrium can be described by combining these
equations to obtain a system of two ordinary differential equations (ODEs):
x˙
x
= (τcx
η−1 + 1 + τcxη)y −Ax1−α (2.13)
y˙
y
=
1
σ
[
αAx1−α − δ − ρ− τcηx
η
1 + τcxη
x˙
x
]
− [Ax1−α − δ − (1 + τcxη)y] (2.14)
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in the state-like variable x ≡ gk and the control-like variable y ≡ ck . The
interested reader may refer to Appendix A.1 for further details regarding the
derivations leading to system (2.13)-(2.14).
2.3 Balanced Growth Paths
In this section, the existence and uniqueness of a balanced growth path is
investigated in this economy. Two main results are proved in the followings.
Firstly, a unique balanced growth path always exists within reasonable
parameter choices, particularly the level of technology and the tax rate.
Second, multiple balanced growth paths possibly occur in the economy under
the plausible choices of parameters.
A balanced growth path (hereafter BGP) is a particular intertemporal
equilibrium in which consumption, public capital and private capital grow
exponentially at the same positive rate, γ:
c = c0e
γt, g = g0e
γt and k = k0e
γt
Along a BGP, the public-private capital ratio and the consumption-capital ratio
are constant and their value x∗, y∗ is a steady state of the system (2.13)-(2.14).
In particular, along a BGP, these two equations are rewritten as follows:
y∗ =
Ax∗1−α
τcx∗η−1 + 1 + τcx∗η
(2.15)
x∗ =
(
σγ + δ + ρ
αA
) 1
1−α
with (2.16)
γ = Ax∗1−α − δ − (1 + τcx∗η)y∗. (2.17)
The existence and uniqueness of a BGP can be explored by examining at the
roots of the following equation when γ ∈ (0,+∞):
T˜ (γ) ≡ Aτc
τcx∗α−1 + x∗α−η + τcx∗α︸ ︷︷ ︸
detrended tax revenue
= γ + δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
detrended public investment
≡ I˜g(γ) (2.18)
This equation can be obtained by solving (2.17) for y∗ and substituting it into
(2.15). It is worth mentioning that x∗ is a one-to-one function of γ taken from
(2.17). Alternatively, (2.18) can be obtained by combining equation (2.15) with
the government budget constraint (2.11), and evaluating it along BGP. Without
loss of generality, we can assume g0 = 1. The left hand side of (2.18) is then
known as the detrended tax revenues, T˜ ≡ T e−γt, while the right hand side
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is called the detrended public investment, I˜g ≡ Ige−γt. Consequently, on the
BGP, equation (2.18) is employed for our analytical illustration as it represents
the government’s balanced budget rule.
All the preliminaries are now ready to prove the conditions under which a
unique balanced growth path would exist in this economy.
Proposition 1: A unique balanced growth path exists if
A > A and τc > τ c (2.19)
where Γ ≡
(
δ+ρ
αA
) 1
1−α
, A ≡ δ1−α(δ+ρ)
[(1−α)δ+ρ]1−ααα > 0 and τ c ≡ δΓ
α−η
A−(Γ−1+1)Γαδ > 0.
Proof: A unique BGP exists as long as T˜ (γ) intersects only once on the
straight line γ+δ. If T˜ (0) ≥ δ then there is always at least one intersection since
limγ→∞ T˜ (γ) = limx→∞ T˜ (γ) = 0+ and T˜ (γ) is continuous and differentiable in
its domain. The rigorous proof is shown in Appendix A.2.1:
T˜ (0) ≥ δ ⇔ A > A and τc ≥ τ c (2.20)
Finally, there is only one intersection when T˜ (0) > δ because the function T˜ (γ)
has at most a unique critical point when γˆ > 0 as shown in Appendix A.2.2.
Consequently, equation (2.19) implies the existence of a unique BGP in this
economy. Q.E.D
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Figure 2.2: Existence and Uniqueness of the BGP
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A discussion of these conditions is in order. To have a positive growth rate
of the economy, the level of technology (A) and the tax rate (τc) should be
sufficiently large. In particular, the condition on A is similar to the one required
in the AK model. Besides, the condition on τc tells us that economic growth
can be sustained only if the government provides a sufficient amount of public
investment in the public good. These conditions are indeed fairly similar to
those found in Bambi and Venditti (2016).
Note that, although the conditions for the parameters identified in this
Proposition 1 are sufficient but not necessary for the existence and uniqueness
of a BGP, the set of parameters that has a measurement of zero is excluded in
our model. In fact, it is the set of parameters for which the function T˜ (γ) is
tangential to the straight line γ + δ. Accordingly, for any positive value of γ
both x∗ and y∗ are positive and all the inequality constraints are respected.
The transversality condition along the BGP is always satisfied as long as
(1− σ)γ − ρ < 0, since we have assumed σ > 1. Indeed, σ > 1 ensures that the
attainable utility is bounded and the economy can start from a positive value
of the initial consumption (c0 > 0)
15.
A numerical example is now proposed to show that the parameter values to
create a unique BGP are plausible. Considering the standard value of
parameters in on a yearly basis, an intertemporal discount rate (ρ) is equal to
0.0101 and the elasticity of output with respect to private capital (α) is 0.3316.
Suppose that a depreciation rate (δ) is 0.1, a unique BGP exists in this
economy when (A, τc) = (0.94, 0.2). In fact, the two conditions in (2.19) are
both respected given that (A, τ c) = (0.19, 0.1477). Assuming σ = 3, the
resulting growth rate is 3.28%, i.e. γ = 0.0328, and the public-private capital
ratio is x∗ = 0.5527 while the tax rate is 17.24%, i.e. τ∗ = τcx∗η = 0.1724. The
numerical example is clearly illustrated in Figure 2.2. The growth rate of the
economy has been found at the intersection of the detrended tax revenue curve
and the detrended public investment line.
The next step is to find sufficient conditions, if any, that could lead to global
indeterminacy.
15For the case of σ < 1, there are two additional conditions in the Proposition 1 for the
bounded utility and a positive value of the initial consumption. See Appendix A.2.3 for the
further explanation.
16With regard to our production function (2.7), public capital enhances the productivity of
labour as it is a labour-augmenting process. Thus, the capital share of income is approximately
1/3 while the labour share of income is around 2/3.
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Proposition 2 – Global Indeterminacy: Two balanced growth paths
exist if the following parametrical conditions hold:
A > A, τ c −  < τc ≤ τ c, η > η and σ > σ (2.21)
with  > 0 sufficiently small real number,
η ≡ ραA
A− (Γ−1 + 1)Γαδ > 0 and σ ≡
α(1− α) [(Γ−1 + 1)τc + Γ−η]2 Γ
τc{τc[(1− α)Γ−1 − α] + (η − α)Γ−η} .
Proof: Given the properties of the function T˜ (γ) found in Proposition 1,
two BGPs exist as long as the following two conditions hold:
a) δ − ε ≤ T˜ (0) < δ, for any ε > 0 sufficiently small real number;
b) dT˜ (γ)dγ
∣∣∣
γ=0
> 1
In fact, condition a) means that the curve T˜ (γ) is slightly below the straight line
γ + δ at γ = 0, but it is steeper than it is in condition b). Therefore, the curve
must intersect the straight line twice since T˜ (γ) is continuous, has a unique
critical point and limγ→∞ T˜ (γ) = 0+. The proof for the subset of parameters
that makes these two conditions hold can be found in the Appendices A.3 and
A.4. Q.E.D
In the case of τc = τ c, the BGP with lowest growth rate, the so-called BGP`,
is characterised by a zero growth rate (γ` = 0) while the other, called BGPh,
is characterised by a strictly positive rate (γh > 0). For the condition; η > η
and σ > σ, the Proposition 2 suggests that global indeterminacy possibly arises
in an economy in which the consumption tax rate is sufficiently procyclical and
the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution is sufficiently high. The latter
condition also implies that the income effect should be sufficiently large to allow
a multiplicity of BGPs to exist. In fact, the condition σ > σ can be written as
σ > max{σ, 1} to satisfy the transversality condition17.
Remark 1: Proposition 2 uses a continuity argument to prove that two
BGPs may exist for an open set of parameters. The set of parameters found in
Proposition 2 is clearly not the largest set that allows global indeterminacy to
emerge. In particular, the lower bound for τ c, namely τ c − , can be
computationally enlarged.
17The case of σ ≤ 1 does not alter the sufficient conditions of Proposition 2.
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To illustrate the last point in more details, the numerical example is
proposed to show that global indeterminacy may arise for plausible values of
the parameters.
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Figure 2.3: Existence of two BGPs when conditions (2.21) hold.
As in the previous numerical exercise, we assume a depreciation rate δ = 0.1,
an intertemporal discount factor ρ = 0.0101 and the elasticity of output with
respect to private capital α = 0.33. Global indeterminacy is then revealed for
(A, τc, η, σ) = (0.9, 0.2, 0.5, 7) when all the conditions in (2.21) are satisfied.
In particular, we have obtained the constrained values which are (A, τ c, η, σ) =
(0.20, 0.22, 0.004, 1.72). As shown in Figure 2.3, the economy has two BGPs due
to two points of intersection. The lowest BGP is characterised by the growth
rate γ` = 0.008, implying the public-private capital ratio x
∗
` = 0.4201 and the
tax rate τ∗` = τcx
∗η
` = 0.13. The highest BGP is characterised by the growth
rate γh = 0.033, implying the public-private capital ratio x
∗
h = 1.22 and a tax
rate τ∗h = τcx
∗η
h = 0.22. Therefore, the reasonable growth rates of 0.8% and
3.3% are associated with admissible values of the consumption tax rates of 13%
and 22%, respectively.
Remark 2 – Futagami et al. (1993) case: Consider the case of acyclical
taxation (η = 0) which corresponds to the economy described by Futagami et
al. (1993), public investment is financed by levying a constant consumption tax,
τ = τc, instead of an income tax. By employing the same parameters’ values
as in the previous exercise, we found a unique BGP in Futagami et al.’s (1993)
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economy. The growth rate of their economy was in between γ` and γh, precisely
equal to 2.67%, i.e. γ = 0.0267.
We now conclude this section with some considerations regarding the
existence of a Laffer curve in this economy. The existence of a Laffer curve can
be observed and investigated from equation (2.18) after rewriting it as a
function of τ . This can be done easily by using equations (2.15)-(2.17) to write
x, y and γ as functions of τ . Equation (2.18) can then be rewritten as:
I˜g(τ) ≡ γ(τ) + δ = τ · y(τ) ≡ T˜ (τ).
As can be seen in Figure 2.4, the detrended tax revenue always has an
inverted U-shape. This means that the Laffer curve exists, both under the
assumption of a unique BGP and under the assumption of two BGPs.
Remarkably, Figure 2.4 has been obtained using the numerical choices for the
parameters suggested previously, but allowing the tax rate (and therefore the
growth rate of the economy) to change. Considering the result of Proposition
1, Figure 2.4a shows that a unique BGP emerges when the detrended public
investment, in other words the red curve, has only one positive intersection
with the detrended tax revenue, namely the black curve. With regard to the
numerical exercise proposed following Proposition 1, the consumption tax rate
at the intersection point in Figure 2.4 is slightly higher than 17%, which
implies a 3.28% growth rate of the economy.
0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.3
0.1
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.2
Consumption Tax Rate (τ)
 
 
Detrended Tax Revenue
Detrended Public Investment
(a) A Unique BGP
0 0.4 0.8 1.2
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Consumption Tax Rate (τ)
 
 
Detrended Tax Revenue
Detrended Public Investment
(b) Multiple BGPs
Figure 2.4: Existence of a Laffer Curve
On the right side of Figure 2.4b, two BGPs emerge when the detrended public
investment, the red curve, has two positive intersections with the detrended tax
revenue, the black curve. This indicates the case of the global indeterminacy
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that is a result of Proposition 2. The numerical example demonstrates that,
at these intersections, the consumption tax rates are 13% and 22%, implying a
growth rate of the economy equal to 0.8% and 3.3% respectively.
Considering Figure 2.2 2.3 and 2.4, and taking into account the proof of
Proposition 2, it can be observed that the consumption tax rate depends on
the parameter τc, the elasticity of the consumption tax with respect to the
public-private capital ratio (η), and the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption (σ). These parameters play a fundamental role
to generate global indeterminacy. Particularly, global indeterminacy emerges
when the detrended tax revenue is initially lower than the detrended public
investment at a low lever of tax rate, while η and σ are sufficiently high. This
is because the variation in the detrended tax revenue within a small range of
the tax rate, namely from τ` to τh
18, should be sufficiently larger than the
detrended public investment to allow global indeterminacy to exist. Under these
circumstances, the detrended tax revenue curve intersects the detrended public
investment curve twice; once when the tax rate is very low and once when tax
rate is very high (see Figure 2.4b), with regard to the existence of a Laffer curve.
2.4 Transitional Dynamics
In this section, the transitional dynamics around the steady state(s) are
analysed. Linearising the system of ODEs (2.13) and (2.14) around a generic
steady state (x∗, y∗)19 gives us:(
x˙
y˙
)
≈
(
a b
c d
)
·
(
x˜
y˜
)
(2.22)
where
a =
[
τc(η − 1)x∗η−1 + τcηx∗η
]
y∗ − (1− α)Ax∗1−α (2.23)
b = τcx
∗η + x∗ + τcx∗η+1 > 0 (2.24)
c = y∗
[
− 1
σ
(
(1− α)(σ − α)Ax∗−α + τcη
x∗1−η + τcx∗
· a
)
+ τcηx
∗η−1y∗
]
(2.25)
d = y∗
(
1 + τcx
∗η − 1
σ
· τcη
x∗1−η + τcx∗
· b
)
(2.26)
18τ` and τh are corresponding to γ` and γh respectively.
19Both equations have a form z˙ = f(z, w)z whose first-order Taylor approximation around
the steady state (z∗, w∗) is z˙ ≈ z∗ ( ∂f
∂z
(z∗, w∗) · z˜ + ∂f
∂w
(z∗, w∗) · w˜). Note that, the tilde sign
indicates the deviation from the steady state.
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In general, the stability of a steady state (x∗, y∗) can be revealed by observing
the sign of the determinant and trace of the Jacobian matrix, J ≡
(
a b
c d
)
.
Long and tedious computations, summarised in the Appendix A.5, lead to the
following the determinant and the trace of the Jacobian matrix:
det(J) ≡ y∗2x∗2η
{
τcx
∗−1 [(1− α)τcx∗−1 − τcα+ (η − α)x∗−η]− (1− α)α
σ
(
τcx
∗−1 + x∗−η + τc
)2}
tr(J) ≡ y∗
{
x∗ητc
[
(η + α− 2)x∗−1 + η + α]+ α− 1
σ
· τcη
(
τcx
∗η−1 + 1 + τcx∗η
)
x∗−η + τc
}
The focus of this section is on studying the local stability properties of
the BGP with the lowest growth rate in the case of global indeterminacy. In
other words, the trade-off between growth and volatility is investigated in the
presence of endogenous consumption tax. If the consumption tax induces the
aggregate instability (i.e. one of the steady state is locally indeterminate) around
the lowest BGP (BGP`), a poverty trap characterised by low growth and high
volatility may exist in our model. On the other hand, one may argue that the
aggregate instability is the price to pay for a high growth rate if the endogenous
fluctuation emerges around the highest BGP (BGPh).
To avoid the confusion of terminology, the steady state that corresponds to
BGP` is denoted by (x
∗
` , y
∗
` ). Using a continuity argument, we simplify our
analysis by studying the aggregate instability around BGP` that is sufficiently
close to zero (γ` = 0) where the steady state is (x
∗
` , y
∗
` )
20. We begin presenting
an intermediary result that is crucial for explaining the transitional dynamics
around (x∗` , y
∗
` ). The next Lemma finds some sufficient conditions for the
parameters in order for the Jacobian matrix evaluated around (x∗` , y
∗
` ) to have
a positive determinant and a negative trace.
Lemma 1: Considering the case of (x∗` , y
∗
` ) with γ` = 0, the following results
then hold:
i) if A > A¯, η > α and σ > σ then det(J) > 0;
ii) if −α < η < 2− α, A > Aˆ and τc > τˆc then tr(J) < 0;
where Aˆ ≡ δ+ρα
(
η+α
2−η−α
)1−α
and τˆc ≡ αΓη [Γ−1(2−η−α)−η−α] .
Proof: See Appendix A.6.
20Based on a continuity argument, such results still hold for any growth rate that is
sufficiently close to zero.
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Next, the two conditions found in this Lemma are combined with the
conditions on parameters found in Proposition 2 in order to explore the set of
parameters that leads to global and local indeterminacy. The next proposition
shows that the intersection of these different sets of parameters is non-empty;
therefore, we may have global indeterminacy when the lowest steady state is
locally indeterminate.
Proposition 3 – Local Indeterminacy: The steady state (x∗` , y
∗
` ) with
γ` = 0 is locally indeterminate if
A > Aˆ, 0 < ρ < , α < η < η◦, τc = τ c, and σ > σ (2.27)
with  > 0 sufficiently small real number and η◦ ≡ δ−ρδ(1+Γ) .
Proof: The proof consists of the open set of parameters that satisfies the
conditions of global indeterminacy and of local indeterminacy, det(J) ≥ 0 and
tr(J) < 0, where the Jacobian Matrix is evaluated at the lowest BGP. The
completed proof can be found in Appendix A.7. Q.E.D
For the existence of global indeterminacy and local indeterminacy around
the lowest BGP, the elasticity of consumption tax with respect to public-private
capital ratio as known as a degree of cyclicality (η) is the important parameter
that should be crucially discussed. In the global indeterminacy case, there
is the lower bound (η) but no upper bound value for η. This means that two
BGPs exists in the economy when the consumption tax is sufficiently procyclical
(η > η). However, it is not necessarily true that such a procyclical consumption
tax can generate the aggregate instability around the lowest BGP. In fact, both
global and local indeterminacy can emerge only in the case of a mild procyclical
taxation (α < η < η◦)21.
Remark 3: Based on continuity reason, the results stated in Proposition 3
hold for any τc lower than, but still sufficiently close to τ c. This is indeed shown
computationally in the following numerical exercise.
The numerical exercises is now examined to show that the lowest BGP can
be indeterminate for reasonable choices of the parameters. Suppose that the
parameters are set exactly as in the numerical exercise proposed to show the
possibility of global indeterminacy. The only difference is that now τc = 0.208.
Then, the growth rate on the lowest BGP is 0.43% and the corresponding steady
21The condition η < η◦ can be rewritten as η(1+Γ) = 1− ρ
δ
. Since ρ
δ
is small, we can observe
that η < 1
1+Γ
. Thus, in our case, local indeterminacy arises when the degree of procyclicality
is not too strong, i.e α < η < 1.
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state is locally indeterminate. Specifically, there are two negative eigenvalues
because det(J) = 0.0055 and tr(J) = −0.0027. Furthermore, the conditions in
Proposition 3 are also respected, since (Aˆ, η◦, σ) = (0.265, 0.678, 3.55).
Comparing the numerical value of parameters between Proposition 2 and
Proposition 3, a greater value for the level of technology (A) and for the inverse
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (σ) are required to allow this economy
to experience the aggregate instability at the lowest BGP. Once again, it implies
that the income effect should be sufficiently large in this economy22. In contrast
to the case of global indeterminacy, local indeterminacy will arise if and only if
the consumption tax is mildly procyclical (0.330 < η < 0.678). Further details
regarding the degree of cyclicality for both cases will be substantially discussed
in the next section.
2.5 Procyclical versus Countercyclical Taxation
In the introduction, we observed that the existing literature on the time
varying endogenous taxation has often argued in favour of procyclical taxation
or procyclical government spending. It was indeed shown in the different
settings that procyclical taxes should be preferred to countercyclical taxes
because they guarantee the local determinacy of the steady state. Examples of
this result include Nourry et al.’s (2013, p. 1989 bullet point v) work where it
could be observed that consumption tax has to be countercyclical with respect
to output growth to have a locally indeterminate steady state. Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (1997, p. 977) explained that “the rational expectations equilibrium
is more likely to be indeterminate...the less procyclical government
expenditure.” More recently, Bambi and Venditti (2016) confirmed that
procyclical taxation should be implemented to stabilise the economy in which
productive government spending and endogenous time-varying consumption
taxes play a crucial role in determining balanced growth paths.
In our framework, this issue has been raised and re-addressed in order to
create the awareness of procyclical taxation policy. According to Propositions 2
and 3, as well as the numerical exercises presented throughout the paper, there
is evidence that multiple BGPs and aggregate instability around the lowest
BGP may arise when consumption tax is procyclical. In particular, one of the
sufficient conditions for having two BGPs is that the consumption tax growth
22For the case of 0 < σ < 1, the numerical example shows that the aggregate instability does
not exist since the condition σ > σ is violated.
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rate has to be sufficiently procyclical, as the elasticity of consumption tax should
be greater than its lower bound (η > η ≡ 0.004). While it is true that this is
not a necessary but only a sufficient condition, our numerical exercises based on
the conditions (2.21) show that multiple BGPs emerge as a result of procyclical
taxation, specifically η = 0.5. However, global indeterminacy is not always
generated by procyclical taxation alone. By reducing from 0.5 to 0.4 but keeping
other parameters unchanged, we found a unique BGP in this economy. This is
because one of the conditions (2.21) is violated, namely τc > τ c = −0.97.
With regard to the local stability, the numerical example shows that both
BGPs are locally determinate when the parametrical values from the global
indeterminacy case are chosen. As mentioned in the previous section, this
implies that the conditions for global indeterminacy may not necessarily lead
to the indeterminate equilibria since the sufficient conditions (2.27) of local
indeterminacy for the lowest BGP might be violated. On the other hand, a
slight increase in τc from 0.2 to 0.208 changes the stability properties of the
lowest BGP, and local indeterminacy arises. Therefore, the aggregate
instability around the lowest BGP possibly occurs once extrinsic uncertainty is
introduced into the model and all conditions of Proposition 3 are satisfied.
Figure 2.5: Aggregate Instability and Consumption Tax Rates
Although the role of procyclical consumption tax is required to generate
local indeterminacy around the lowest BGP, our analytical proof recommends
that the degree of procyclicality should not be too strong. In fact, the numerical
example suggests that the value range of η should be between 0.330 and 0.678
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based on the conditions of Proposition 3 and the feasible set of parametrical
values. Considering this value range of η together with the low growth rate
(γ < 1%), Figure 2.5 demonstrates the value of consumption tax rates that can
lead to aggregate instability. These consumption tax rates (τ) are characterised
by contour curves with the corresponding points (η, γ), whereby both global
and local indeterminacy conditions are satisfied. More precisely, if we choose
η = 0.5 to have τ at around 10%-14% in the low-growth economy and assume
the parameter choices of the public-private capital ratio are sufficiently close to
x∗` , this economy will converge towards the lowest BGP with an infinite number
of trajectories. Hence, procyclical taxation may lead the economy into a poverty
trap characterised by the volatility of aggregate variables and the low growth
rate. A fiscal-led growth policy is therefore not recommended for a low-growth
country in which consumption tax is mildly procyclical.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, public investment and endogenous consumption tax were
proposed as sources of endogenous growth in the economy. According to the
state-contingent and time-invariant fiscal policy rule, we can observe that the
combination of procyclical consumption tax and public investment has a
potential to generate the multiplicity of balanced growth paths. This finding is
also numerically supported by the existence of a Laffer curve. Two balanced
growth paths, namely the lowest BGP and the highest BGP, were derived from
the two intersections of the detrended public investment line to the detrended
tax revenue curve. When the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption is sufficiently greater than its threshold and the consumption tax
is mildly procyclical, there is a possibility for the aggregate instability to
emerge around the lowest BGP. Once the purely extrinsic uncertainty is
introduced into the model, our model predicts that the economy will
experience a poverty trap characterised by a high volatility of aggregate
variables and a low growth rate. Therefore, the procyclical taxation policy
should be considered carefully before implementation.
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Chapter 3
Growth-Maximising Spending
on Public Education and the
Role of Private Tuition
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3.1 Introduction
Since 1990, macroeconomists have debated whether economic growth is
generated by internal economic activities instead of by external factors.
Human capital has been mentioned as one of the key engine of endogenous
growth (Lucas, 1988), and it can be accumulated via the education system.
When people have a high level of education, a country will prosper and will
have a healthy growth rate. Consequently, the quality of the education system
for young generation should be focused, not only for economic growth, but also
for reasons pertaining to social welfare.
In the literature on endogenous growth, two separate education systems are
currently being analysed using the overlapping-generation model, namely public
education1 and private education2. Public education plays a role when parents
are unable to provide private education for their children. Since the young has
limited access to the credit market, the result is a shortage of human capital
stock and a low growth rate (Boldrin and Montes, 2005). Without doubt, public
schooling, which is financed by income tax from the worker generation, can be
used as a fiscal instrument that solves the inadequate intergenerational income
distribution (Fender and Wang, 2003). Furthermore, for a poor country that
is experiencing the poverty trap, Boldrin (2005) found that the investment in
private education was nearly zero despite a zero tax rate. One possible reason
is that parents were unable to appropriate their contribution to human capital
in the aggregate economy; thus, they might enjoy being a free rider. Therefore,
the provision of public education can solve a free rider problem and can help a
poor country start to its growth process.
In contrast to public education, private education allows the altruistic
parents to choose the optimal level of education for their children (Glomm,
1997). According to the empirical work of Luis Bernal (2005), Spanish parents
in Zaragoza believed that the quality of private education was higher than the
quality of free-public schooling since the massive enrolment in public schools
might result in a lower quality of education. Moreover, the performance of
students in private schools is statistically greater than it is in public schools,
particularly in Belgium and Brazil (Vandenberghe and Robin, 2004).
Accordingly, altruistic parents may choose to pay for private tuition rather
1Public education is covered by the government expenditure on education. No tuition fee
is paid by parents.
2Private education refers to any kinds of education that is paid by parents.
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than to send their children to public schools.
Altruistic motivation can be divided into two categories: pure altruism and
impure altruism. Pure altruism is the type described by Barro (1974) in which
parents take the utility of their children into account. Nevertheless, pure
altruism cannot explain the direct utility that parents obtain from their giving.
Such a direct utility is considered to be an impure altruism, which is
represented by different labels such as warm-glow altruism (Andreoni, 1990),
paternalistic altruism (Michel and Pestieau, 2004) and joy of children receiving
income (Grossmann and Poutvaara, 2009). In addition, the direct utility
obtained from the act of giving can also create the externalities among
intergenerational transfers that have an impact on economic growth in the
long run.
Although both public and private education offer different benefits to the
economy, most of the previous literature has treated them as perfect
substitutes. In reality, such a substitutability may not be perfect. For
example, Benabou (1996) emphasised the complementarity between public and
private education since both are inputs for the human capital accumulation
process. Blankenau and Simpson (2004) also proposed that the human capital
of the young generation is a combination of general skills gained from public
schooling and specific skills provided privately by universities and by firms
that offer on-the-job training. Similarly, Glomm and Kaganovich (2003)
claimed that an increase in public education expenditure increased the private
input in education when there was a public pension scheme.
The evidence of complementarity between public schooling and private
education can be observed across countries. For instance, 90 % of British
parents said they were likely to send their children to state schools3 during the
day (Department for Education, United Kingdom, 2014). At the end of the
day, a quarter of parents send their children to private tutors (Garner, 2013).
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, parents aim to provide more knowledge
or activities for their children in addition to the subjects taught by state
schools. The other reason is that the insufficient knowledge is obtained at
state school; thus, children may need additional help to understand the
materials. That’s why there are 130 private tuition institutions across the UK
(Tanner et al., 2009).
3The definition of state school includes direct grant nurseries, non-maintained schools,
academies and free-schools with alternative provisions.
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By considering both public and private education regimes, this paper aims
to study the effect of fiscal policy on economic growth and macroeconomic
variables when parents who exhibit impure altruism can provide private
tuition and bequests across generations. Due to its advantages, the
three-period overlapping generations model is employed to analyse the impact
of the labour income tax, which is considered as a proxy for the size of the
educational provision, on aggregate economy4. Our model replicates the
stylised facts from the paper by Samuelson (1958) and extends it in a similar
way to Grossman and Poutvaara (2009).
There are two main contributions of this paper. Our first contribution is to
find the existence of a growth maximising tax rate in the economy that is
driven by both public education and private tuition. This finding also fills the
gap in the work of Blankenau and Simpson (2004) because they could not
provide proof for the existence of a growth maximising tax rate when human
capital is accumulated via both types of education systems. Despite the
complexity of solutions, the growth-maximising tax rate will prevent the
economy from embarking on the over-provision of public education. The
second contribution is to create the policy awareness for the government that
misconceives of the existence of private tuition. In such an economy, the
over-provision of public education may occur because the government
overestimates the benefit of public education. Our analytical result illustrates
that the value of a growth-maximising tax rate is always greater than one,
which indicates the over-provision of public education.
This paper is organised as follows. The existing literature on a growth-
maximising tax is reviewed in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 is a basic model of the
three-period overlapping generations, while the effect of the labour income tax
on key macroeconomic variables is analysed in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, the
steady-state equilibrium is studied. The growth maximising-tax rate and the
argument about over-provision of public education are also discussed in this
section. Section 3.6 emphasises the importance of public education, and the
last section, Section 3.7, presents the conclusion.
4Wicken (2008) mentioned many advantages of the overlapping generations model in order
to analyse the impact of fiscal policy on an economy, such as there being no Ricardian
equivalence, and allowing for heterogeneous agents and intergenerational transfers.
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3.2 Literature Reviews
The relationship between economic growth and the optimal size of government
expenditure has been studied crucially for the last two decades. When the
government levies a distortionary taxation to finance its expenditure on the
public good, there are two opposite impacts on the economy. On the negative
side, levying a distortionary tax will discourage saving and investment
decisions. Consequently, the capital accumulation will decrease and the
economy will experience a low growth rate. By contrast, an increase in
(productive) government spending can raise the marginal product of capital
and enhance the growth rate in the long run. Hence, the overall impact of
fiscal policy depends on the compensation between the negative effect of
distortionary taxation and the positive effect of government expenditure.
Figure 3.1: The Armey Curve
The relationship between economic growth and the optimal government size
can be explained by using the Armey curve. Armey (1995) explained that
changing in government size should be associated with changing in output (or
in the growth rate of output). Once the economy begins to experience a state
of anarchy, output per capita is very low and there is no incentive for people
to invest. Consequently, the government is required to provide for the public
good, to build the economic infrastructure, and to enforce the rules of law. As a
result of the combination of government expenditure and private investment, the
output will be larger and will become the largest when the size of the government
reaches a certain point. After the government size exceeds this threshold, the
output will decrease because government expenditure will crowd out private
investment due to the distortionary taxation. For this reason, the Armey curve
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is a bell curve that illustrates a non-linear relationship between output and the
size of the government, as presented in Figure 3.1.
The remaining task for economists is to find the appropriate size of a
government to maximise the output growth. The growth-maximising size of a
government is indicated at the peak of Armey curve, where the marginal
benefit of government expenditure is equal to zero. According to the previous
literature, two economic variables are considered as proxies of government size.
One is the government expenditure and the other is the distortionary tax rate.
Empirically, there is a lot of evidence across countries showing that the
government should levy the average tax rate at around 20-30 % in order to
maximise the economic growth. For instance, in the U.S economy, Scully
(1994) estimated the growth-maximising tax rate and concluded that it should
be around 21.5-22.9 %. Rezk (2005) found an average tax rate of 30 % would
maximise the growth rate in Argentina, while Facchini and Melki (2011)
suggested the same figure of the growth-maximising tax rate in France.
The theoretical literature on endogenous growth with the representative
agent framework also supports the existence of Armey curve. Barro (1990)
explored the inverted U-shaped relationship between economic growth and the
income tax rate, in which the entire flow of income tax revenue is devoted to
the provision of the public good. The literature suggests that the
growth-maximising tax rate should be equal to the elasticity of output with
respect to productive government spending. This value of growth-maximising
tax rate is also supported by the work of Futagami et al. (1993), Turnovsky
(1997) and Tsoukis and Miller (2003), despite changing from a flow of
government spending to a stock variable.
Although the general conclusion for the growth-maximising tax rate is to
equate the tax rate with the government elasticity of output, this should be
done with awareness of how public capital contributes to the aggregate output.
Different forms of public capital formulation result in different values for the
growth-maximising tax rates. For instance, Baier and Glomm (2001)
introduced a degree of substitutability between public and private capital by
using the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. They
found that the growth-maximising tax rate depended on the degree of
substitutability, the public capital elasticity of output and the elasticity of
output with respect to aggregate capital. In the work of Age´nor (2007), the
production function consisted of three economic inputs, namely private capital,
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public infrastructure and labourers’ education level. Accordingly, the public
infrastructure elasticity of output and labourers’ education elasticity of output
significantly determines the growth-maximising tax rate in this economy.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the value of growth-maximising tax rate
depends on how public capital contributes to the aggregate economy.
In the context of overlapping-generation framework with public education,
the literature on growth-maximising taxation remains scarce and insufficient.
Using two-period overlapping generations model, Glomm and Ravikumar (1997)
found that the endogenous growth can be generated by human capital via public
education. They reached the same conclusion as Barro (1990), in that the
growth-maximising tax rate should be equal to the elasticity of output with
respect to human capital. However, the misperception of the existence of private
education may cause the over-provision of public education. Levying a high
labour income tax rate to finance public education may lead the economy into
the growth-reducing area of the Armey curve.
For the case in which both public education and private education play
roles on human capital in three-period overlapping generations, Blankenau and
Simpson (2004) investigated the determinants of growth-maximising tax rate
that varied along with tax schemes. In their model, the young generation can
borrow money to finance education at the tertiary level and thus acquire the
specific skills, while general skills are obtained at public schools at the primary
and secondary levels. Due to the complexity of the solutions, the
growth-maximising tax rate has not been explored in Blankenau and
Simpson’s (2004) paper. Instead, they considered the growth-maximising tax
rate in special cases, such as the case of unproductive spending on public
education, and of unproductive private investment in human capital.
Furthermore, the growth-maximising tax rate in the case of unproductive
private investment in human capital implies that the over-provision of public
education still remains unclear in term of the value range of the
growth-maximising tax rate. Thus, there are many unanswered research
questions in their work that should be discussed.
In addition, the impure altruistic framework with public education spending
and private tuition is another avenue that has not been investigated. There are
two important reasons that impure altruistic intergenerational transfers should
be considered. Firstly, it is very difficult for children to access to the credit
market. Secondly, private institutions to which parents can send their children
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to obtain additional knowledge do exist. For these reasons, it is reasonable
to estimate the growth-maximising tax rate and to re-address the issue of the
over-provision of public education in the economy in which impure altruism
determines the level of private tuition.
3.3 The Basic Model
The three-period overlapping generations model is employed to study the
impact of labour income tax on economic growth and macroeconomic variables
in an impurely altruistic economy with both private tuition and public
education systems. There are three economic agents in a competitive market
economy, namely households, firms and the government. Given wage and
rental rates, households will decide on optimal amounts for saving, investing in
private tuition and bequests for their offspring based on their after-tax income.
The government provides public education and levies labour income tax to
finance its expenditure on such education. This discrete-time model is built
based on a perfect foresight assumption.
3.3.1 Households
In one generation, individuals are homogeneous in term of preference and the
capacity to learn. There is no population growth due to the fact that the
population is the same across generations. Thus, the life-time utility of
individuals who born in period t-1 will be
Ut−1 = U(c2t) + βU(c3t+1) + βV (It+1) (3.1)
where β is a discount factor and its value is between zero and one. The quantity
of consumption on the part of adult and old generations are represented by c2t
and c3t+1, respectively. In the first period of life, the consumption by the young
generation (ct−1) does not take into account in utility function because they
live with their parents (Samuelson, 1958). Therefore, only the consumption on
the part of adult and old generations are incorporated into utility function. In
addition, altruistic parents show that they care about the economic situation
of their children by leaving them bequests in term of income, and gain the
direct utility from this action. This motivation is called ‘joy-of-giving’, which
is similar to the motivation of ‘joy-of-children-receiving-income’ addressed by
Grossman and Poutvaara (2009, p. 651). Similarly, this motive is closely related
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to the model by Michel and Pestieau (2004), in which bequests are considered
as consumption. Therefore, the direct utility derived from the joy-of-giving is
prevailed into the life-time utility in term of V (It+1), and its future value is
discounted by the same discount factor, β5.
It is worth mentioning that the joy-of-giving motivation is different from
the dynastic altruism asserted by Barro (1974). In fact, it is a kind of impure
altruism that parents are motivated by the direct utility from giving an income
(for education or as a bequest) to their children. Such an income creates
externalities among intergenerational transfers that lead the economy into the
second-best world.
Considering the altruistic parents who were born in the first generation at
period -1, the initial value of private tuition (e−1) is given, as it is innate. As they
become working age in the next period, the initial value of disposable income
(I0), together with the initial value of a bequest (b0), are also given. Assuming
that the preference is additive separable and has a natural logarithmic form of
consumption, the life-time utility becomes
Ut−1 = ln(c2t) + βln(c3t+1) + βln(It+1) (3.2)
where t indicates the period of being adult, or of parenthood.
With regard to the constraint on each generation, children will devote all
their time to study at state schools during the day and will study with private
tutor in the evening (or at weekends). Adults (parents) supply an inelastic
labour for work and receive disposable income. They then choose the optimal
amount to save (st) for retirement and will invest in private tuition (et) for their
offspring. When the adults become old, they will consume part of the return
from their savings as living expense and will leave part as bequests (bt+1) for
their descendants,
et−1 ≥ 0 (3.3)
c2t + st + et = It (3.4)
c3t+1 + bt+1 = (1 + rt+1)st (3.5)
c2t, c3t+1, et, bt+1 ≥ 0 (3.6)
where rt is denoted as the real interest rate. The net income of individuals
who were born in period t-1 at time t (It) is equal to an after-tax income plus
5In fact, a degree of altruism can be different from β. However, we continue to use β because
parents will obtain the utility derived from bequests as future consumption.
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bequests given by the old generation. That is,
It = (1− τw)wtht(et−1, Et−1, ht−1) + bt (3.7)
where ht(et−1, Et−1, ht−1) is human capital, which is a function of private tuition
(et−1), public education (Et−1) and parental education (ht−1). The bequests left
by the old generation, those who born in the period t-2, is indicated by bt.
3.3.2 Representative Firms
Assuming that the output is a homogeneous commodity and that the
production technology is linearly homogeneous, the per capita output (yt) can
be characterised as a function of physical capital (kt) and human capital (ht).
yt = Ak
α
t h
1−α
t (3.8)
Representative firms will maximise their profit, and the first-order conditions
will be
Rt = αAk
α−1
t h
1−α
t (3.9)
wt = (1− α)Akαt h−αt (3.10)
where Rt and wt are rental and wage rates respectively. Note that the
depreciation rate is assumed to be zero, and thus the rental rate (Rt) is equal
to one plus the real interest rate (1 + rt). The elasticity of output with respect
to physical capital (α) and the elasticity of output with respect to human
capital (1− α) are between zero and one.
3.3.3 Government
With regard to the balanced budget rule, the government levies labour income
tax and devotes its expenditure to public education. Public education (Et) is
an endogenous variable determined by labour income tax (τw), wage rate (wt)
and human capital (ht).
Et = τwwtht (3.11)
where 0 < τw < 1. It is worth mentioning that public education can be
considered as a pure public good as explained by Samuelson (1954), and it has
two important properties: non-excludability and non-rivalry. According to
non-excludability, the price mechanism in competitive market is incapable of
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controlling the access of public education efficiently6. Thus, the market has
failed and the government is justified in providing public education because it
is a social benefit7.
The relationship between public education and private tuition is a crucial
issue in this paper. Based on the work of Glomm and Kaganovich (2003) and
of Benabou (1996), the substitutability of public education and private tuition
might not be perfect, although they have access to the same educational
technology8. Consequently, the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) of the
human capital function is employed to study how human capital will
accumulate over time. Following Glomm and Kaganovich (2003), human
capital accumulation is determined by three components: private tuition (et),
public investment in education (Et) and parental education
9 (ht),
ht+1 = B(ae
ρ
t + bE
ρ
t )
z
ρ · h1−zt (3.12)
where h0 > 0 is given, as it is the basic knowledge humans have when they are
born. The private tuition elasticity of human capital and the public education
elasticity of human capital are denoted by a and b respectively, and their values
are between zero and one (a, b ∈ (0, 1)). To allow for a constant growth rate, the
human capital technology is assumed to be a constant return to scale. Thus, the
value of scale parameter (z) is also between zero and one (z ∈ (0, 1)). In addition,
a degree of substitutability between public education and private tuition (ρ) can
vary from −∞ to 1.
As in the work of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and of Blankenau and
Simpson (2004), the human capital accumulation function can be given a Cobb-
Douglas form, which is a special case of CES human capital function in which
an elasticity of substitution between private tuition and public education (σ) is
6According to the Samuelson’s rule, the sum of marginal rate of substitution between the
public good and individual private good of all households should be equal to the marginal
rate of transformation between the public good and individual private good to achieve the
Pareto-efficient allocation. This rule contrasts with the rule of efficient for two private goods
in a competitive market. See Myles (1995) for further details.
7One may argue that the competitive market equilibrium is efficient under Lindahl’s (1919)
equilibrium. However, there is no incentive for households to reveal their preferences. Thus,
no personalised price could be applied.
8Glomm (1997) explained that the accessibility of education technology for both public
and private education should be the same so that the input, which is essentially financial
expenditure, is transformed into output as human capital.
9Coleman et al. (1966) found a positive correlation between parental education and
students’ standardised test.
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equal to one. Thus, equation (3.12) can be rewritten as
ht+1 = Be
ϕ
t E
µ
t h
φ
t (3.13)
where ϕ = zaa+b , µ =
zb
a+b , z = ϕ + µ, and φ = 1 − ϕ − µ. The elasticity of
human capital with respect to private tuition (ϕ), to public education (µ), and
to parental education (φ) is between zero and one (ϕ, µ, φ ∈ (0, 1)). Notably,
B can be interpreted as the ability of each individual and it is the same in
one generation. This ability is a complementary input to private tuition and to
public education10; ∂
2ht+1
∂et∂B
= eϕ−1t E
µ
t h
φ
t > 0 and
∂2ht+1
∂Et∂B
= eϕt E
µ−1
t h
φ
t > 0.
Substituting government budget constraint (3.11) into (3.13), the function
of human capital accumulation depends partly on the labour income tax rate
(τw) as it refers to the level of public spending on education.
ht+1 = Be
ϕ
t (τwwt)
µhµ+φt (3.14)
3.3.4 Equilibrium
Households’ decisions regarding savings, education and bequests
The optimal decisions of households for savings (st), private tuition (et) and
bequests (bt+1) can be derived from the indirect utility function. By substituting
c2t and c3t+1 using adult (3.4) and old (3.5) budget constraints into the utility
function (3.2), the indirect utility function will be
Ut−1 = ln[(1− τw)wtht + bt − st − et] + βln[(1 + rt+1)st − bt+1]
+ βln[(1− τw)wt+1ht+1 + bt+1)]
(3.15)
where ht+1 is given by equation (3.13) or (3.14).
Given the wage rate and the rental rate, the first-order conditions are:
c3t+1
c2t
= β(1 + rt+1) (3.16)
It+1
c2t
= β(1− τw)wt+1 · ϕht+1
et
(3.17)
c3t+1 = It+1 (3.18)
Definition 1: Given the initial conditions of physical capital (k0), human
capital (h0) and bequests (b1), the equilibrium of the economy is fully described
by sequences of resource allocation {kt+1, ht+1, bt+1, et}∞t=0, sequences of price
10See Jacobs and Bovenberg (2010).
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{wt, rt}∞t=0 and sequence of government expenditure on public education {Et}∞t=0
that solve equations (3.9), (3.10), (3.16), (3.17) and (3.18).
Equation (3.16) is a standard Euler equation. Individuals will smooth their
consumption paths by making decisions concerning how much they consume
today against tomorrow. Thus, the marginal rate of substitution between
current consumption and future consumption is equal to a discounted rate of
return on savings. With regard to equation (3.17), the marginal rate of
substitution between current consumption and the future income of children is
equated by the marginal rate of return on an investment in private tuition for
their children. Finally, in equation (3.18), the marginal rate of substitution
between the future consumption and future bequests is one. This means that
the old generation will sacrifice one unit of their consumption to give one unit
of bequest to their offspring.
Since parents can decide whether to invest money in their offspring’s
education or to save it for retirement period, their decisions will not be
optimal unless the rate of return on private tuition is equal to the market rate
of return on savings. That is,
(1− τw)wt+1ϕht+1
et
= 1 + rt+1 (3.19)
Equation (3.19) is known as a no-arbitrage condition. This condition
makes altruistic parents feel indifferent about savings for retirement versus an
investment in private tuition. This no-arbitrage condition can also be
exploited to determine the dynamic movement of investment in private tuition,
bequests, physical capital accumulation and human capital accumulation.
Investment in private tuition and bequest functions
Investment in private tuition and bequests are two alternative ways for parents
to give an income to their offspring. Given the rental rate (3.9), the wage
rate (3.10) and the no-arbitrage condition (3.19), investment in private tuition
(et) can be rewritten as a function of future physical capital (kt+1) and other
exogenous parameters (α,ϕ, τw).
et =
(1− τw)(1− α)ϕ
α
· kt+1 (3.20)
According to equation (3.20), parents have to consider a trade-off between
the amount of future physical capital that they will consume tomorrow and a
joy-of-giving motive in terms of investment in private tuition.
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Considering another form of joy-of-giving motive, a bequest function can be
constructed from the optimal choice of households concerning bequests (3.18),
the old budget constraint (3.5) and the adult’s disposable income (3.7). After
substituting wt+1 and Rt+1 using firms’ first-order conditions (3.9) and (3.10),
the future bequest will be determined by future physical capital (kt+1), future
human capital (ht+1) and exogenous parameters (α,ϕ, τw).
bt+1 =
1
2
· [α− (1− τw)(1− α)]Akαt+1h1−αt+1 (3.21)
bt =
1
2
· [α− (1− τw)(1− α)]Akαt h1−αt (3.22)
Based on equation (3.21) and (3.22), a bequest is a function of capital and
human capital in each period. This means that the old generation will consider
future income and decide on the amount of bequests to forward to the adult
generation.
Physical capital and human capital accumulation
As physical capital and human capital are predetermined variables, it is
important to characterise the dynamic movement of these variables. The
dynamic movement of physical capital can be found from the Euler equation
(3.16). After substituting c2t and c3t+1 using households’ budget constraints,
the Euler equation will be
(1 + β)(1 + rt+1) = β(1 + rt+1)[(1− τw)wtht + bt − et] + bt+1
Using the firms’ first-order conditions (3.9)-(3.10), bequest functions
(3.21)-(3.22) and the market clearing condition (st = kt+1), the physical
capital accumulation function is a function of two predetermined variables: kt
and ht, as well as exogenous parameters.
kt+1 = γyt = γAk
α
t h
1−α
t (3.23)
where γ = [(1−τw)(1−α)+α]βαα(1+2β)+(1−τw)(1−α)(1+2βϕ) > 0.
Turning to the human capital accumulation function (3.14), it can be
rewritten as a function of future physical capital (kt+1), current human capital
(ht) and other exogenous parameters by substituting for private tuition (et)
using (3.20).
ht+1 = B
[
(1− τw)(1− α)ϕ
α
]ϕ
kϕt+1(τwwt)
µhµ+φt (3.24)
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Due to the fact that kt+1 is known from equation (3.23) and the real wage
(wt) is given by (3.10), the human capital accumulation equation is also driven
by two predetermined variables: kt and ht.
ht+1 = B
[
(1− τw)(1− α)ϕ
α
]ϕ
γϕ((1− α)τw)µ(Akαt )ϕ+µh1−α(ϕ+µ)t (3.25)
Since both future physical capital and future human capital are functions
of two predetermined variables, namely current physical capital (kt) and
current human capital (ht), the dynamic movement of this model is
characterised by a pair of first-order simultaneous difference equations, (3.23)
and (3.25). This dynamic movement is similar to the model proposed by
Boldrin and Montes (2005), which allows children to borrow from adult
generation for their education. Intuitively, the way that the children optimally
choose their level of education is the same as is the optimal choice of education
selected by impurely altruistic parents, except that the children do not need to
pay to their altruistic parents back. Thus, both optimal consumption and
private tuition choices that contribute to physical capital accumulation (3.23)
are the same.
3.4 Macroeconomic Variables and Taxation
The effect of labour income tax on the key macroeconomic variables in
equilibrium is studied in this section. Physical capital accumulation, human
capital accumulation, investment in private tuition and future bequest are the
main variables that have been focused because they can provide a broad
picture and economic intuition before analysing the steady-state equilibrium.
3.4.1 Physical Capital and Labour Income Tax
Since labour income tax distorts a decision on savings, it will unambiguously
reduce the physical capital accumulation. This statement is algebraically
confirmed in this impure altruistic economy with public education and private
tuition. By differentiating (3.23) with respect to labour income tax, it is
obvious that there is a negative relationship between the accumulation of
physical capital and the labour income tax rate, as indicated in equation
(3.26).
∂kt+1
∂τw
=
−2α2β2(1− α)(1− ϕ)
[α(1 + 2β) + (1− τw)(1− α)(1 + 2βϕ)]2 ·Ak
α
t h
1−α
t < 0 (3.26)
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The economic intuition is that levying a high level of labour income tax will
move the resource away from physical capital sector into human capital sector
via public education system. Subsequently, physical capital will be accumulated
slowly.
3.4.2 Human Capital Accumulation and Labour Income Tax
On the condition that government expenditure is exogenous, levying labour
income tax definitely decreases the investment in human capital (Grossmann
and Poutvaara, 2009; Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2010). However, in this model,
government spending on education is an endogenous variable. While the
revenue received from labour income tax that provides public schooling will
enhance the human capital of children, the labour income tax can distort
private tuition investment. Hence, the effect of labour income tax on human
capital accumulation depends on the balance of these two effects.
To clarify the effect of labour income tax, the first-order derivative of ht+1
in equation (3.25) with respect to τw is as follow:
∂ht+1
∂τw
= ht+1 ·
[
µ
τw
+
ϕ
γ
· ∂γ
∂τw
− ϕ
(1− τw)
]
(3.27)
where
∂γ
∂τw
=
−2α2β2(1− α)(1− ϕ)
[α(1 + 2β) + (1− τw)(1− α)(1 + 2βϕ)]2 < 0
The sign depends on the value in the square brackets, which can be either
positive or negative depending on the parameters’ value. Thus, an increase in
labour income tax has an ambiguous impact on human capital accumulation,
which is in contrast to the result found by Grossman and Poutvaara (2009), as
well as the result indicated by Jacobs and Bovenberg (2010).
With regard to the term in the square brackets, the first term reflects the
benefits of public education. If the human capital of children relies heavily on
state schools (high µ), it is worthwhile for the government to devote its tax
revenue for public education. The middle term refers to the indirect effect of
how labour income tax distorts physical capital accumulation. According to
the analysis in 3.4.1, an increase in labour income tax contributes to a lower
level of saving and less physical capital accumulation. Consequently, the
partial derivative of γ with respect to τw is negative because γ characterises
how physical capital evolves over time. Finally, the last term demonstrates the
direct effect of private tuition’s contribution on human capital accumulation.
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When the government increases the rate of labour income tax, parents will
reduce investment in private tuition, which affects the human capital of
children through the elasticity of human capital with respect to private tuition
(ϕ).
3.4.3 Private Tuition and Labour Income Tax
In the previous literature, an increase in labour income tax discourages parents
from investing in private education for two reasons. The first reason is that
collecting labour income tax wastes economic resources and distorts
investment in private education when government expenditure is an exogenous
variable (Grossmann and Poutvaara, 2009). The second reason is related to
the relationship between public and private education. If public and private
education were perfect substitutes, an increase in labour income tax would
surely dampen the investment in private education (Benabou, 1996).
In this paper, a new idea is suggested. Not only is government spending
considered to be an endogenous variable that is devoted to public education, but
public education and private tuition are not perfect substitutes in human capital
accumulation function. To see the relationship between private tuition and
labour income tax, the partial derivative of private tuition (3.20) with respect
to the labour income tax rate is taken.
∂et
∂τw
= −(1− α)βϕ
κ2
[α(1 + 2β)(2(1− τw)(1− α) + α)] · yt
− (1− α)βϕ
κ2
[
(1− τw)2(1− α)2(1 + 2βϕ)
] · yt < 0 (3.28)
where
κ = α(1 + 2β)(1− τw)(1− α)(1 + 2βϕ)
As the partial derivative is negative, it indicates that an increase in labour
income tax will discourage parents from investing in private education. The
economic intuition is the same way that labour income tax distorts physical
capital accumulation (kt+1). When the government increases the labour income
tax rate, this will decrease the after-tax income of households. Therefore, the
amount of savings and private tuition are reduced. This is commonly known as
the trade-off between public education and private tuition.
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3.4.4 Bequest and Labour Income Tax
Parents can give bequests to their offspring in term of income that can be used
for consumption. Such bequests work similarly to the model suggested by Michel
and and Pestieau (2004), which considered bequests as consumption. In general,
the source of bequests is the parental income, which depends on both physical
and human capital.
According to Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, an increase in labour income tax will
reduce the physical capital accumulation, while having an ambiguous impact on
human capital accumulation. Thus, one could expect that the effect of labour
income tax on bequest would also be equivocal. Taking the derivative of bequest
function (3.21) with respect to the labour income tax rate into account produces
∂bt+1
∂τw
=
1
2
(1− α)yt+1
+
1
2
(α− (1− τw)(1− α))yt+1
[
α
kt+1
· ∂kt+1
∂τw
+
(1− α)
ht+1
· ∂ht+1
∂τw
] (3.29)
where the relationship between future bequest and labour income tax depends
on the parameters’ values in the square bracket, which can be either positive or
negative.
3.5 Steady-state Analysis
The balanced growth path can be explored by a pair of first-order simultaneous
difference equations, (3.23) and (3.25). Following the analysis by Boldrin and
Montes (2005), the two predetermined variables, physical capital (kt) and human
capital (ht), are firstly transformed into a physical-human capital ratio (
kt
ht
) to
define a balanced growth path.
Definition 2: A balanced growth path is a particular solution of physical
capital accumulation (3.23) and human capital accumulation (3.25) such that
all economic variables have the same constant growth rate in the long run.
Let xt =
kt
ht
and dividing (3.23) by (3.25), the dynamic movement of physical-
human capital ratio (xt) can be demonstrated as follow:
xt+1 =
[
γ1−ϕA1−ϕ−µ
Bη
]
· xαφt (3.30)
where η =
[
(1−τw)(1−α)ϕ
α
]ϕ · τµw(1− α)µ > 0
At the steady state, the economic variables remain constant over time
(xt+1 = xt = x
∗). For all positive initial conditions of (k0, h0), the steady-state
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value of physical-human capital ratio (x∗) will define the ray of balanced
growth path. That is,
x∗ =
[
γ1−ϕA1−ϕ−µ
Bη
] 1
1−αφ
(3.31)
Let us assume that g∗ is a net long-run growth rate, the value of g∗ can
be found from the law of motion of physical capital accumulation (3.23) and
a steady-state value of capital ratio (3.31). According to the definition 2, two
capital stocks will grow in the same rate at 1 + g along the balanced growth
path.
1 + g∗ = γA
[
γ1−ϕA1−ϕ−µ
Bη
] α−1
1−αφ
(3.32)
To have a positive net growth rate (g∗ > 0), the value on the right hand
side should be greater than one. Hence, the necessary condition for a positive
growth rate will be
γ >
[
1
(Bη)1−αAµ+ϕ
] 1
αµ+ϕ
(3.33)
where all parameters are greater than zero.
3.5.1 Growth-Maximising Tax
In the previous section, endogenous growth and its necessary conditions were
determined by the labour income tax rate and other exogenous parameters.
Obviously, the different labour income tax rates chosen by policymakers
contribute to the different levels of growth rate. Choosing a high tax rate may
distort the saving and private tuition decisions, while the human capital may
rapidly accumulated via an increase in public education expenditure. Thus,
the effect of public education on economic growth may be ambiguous in the
sense that it can be either in the growth-enhancing area, or in growth-reducing
area of the Armey Curve. To avoid the growth-reducing area, it is important
to find the growth-maximising tax rate that indicates the appropriate level of
public education.
Proposition 1: According to the balanced growth path (3.32), there must
be at least one value of the labour income tax rate (τw) that locally maximises
the long-run growth rate given a specific set of parameters.
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Proof : From (3.32), the derivative of gross growth rate (1+g∗) with respect
to labour income tax (τw) is calculated and is set as equal to zero,
∂(1 + g∗)
∂τw
=
(1 + g∗)(1− α)
1− αφ · [Ω + Λ] = 0 (3.34)
where
Ω =
µ− τw(µ+ ϕ)
τw(1− τw)
Λ =
−2αβ(αµ+ ϕ)(1− ϕ)
[(1− τw)(1− α) + α][α(1 + 2β) + (1− τw)(1− α)(1 + 2βϕ)] .
When the necessary condition (3.33) for a positive growth rate holds, the
solutions of (3.34) could imply the growth-maximising tax rate of this economy.
In fact, equation (3.34) is equal to zero if, and only if, the sum of Ω and Λ is
zero. Rearranging the term in [Ω + Λ], the value of labour income tax rate that
leads to either the possible highest or lowest growth rate can be derived from
roots of a polynomial of degree three, namely a cubic function.
f(τw) = aτ
3
w + bτ
2
w + cτw + d = 0 (3.35)
where,
a = −(µ+ ϕ)(1− α)2(1 + 2βϕ)
b = (1 + 2βϕ)(1− α) · [(1− α)(3µ+ 2ϕ) + α(µ+ ϕ)]
+ α · [(µ+ ϕ)(1− α)(1 + 2β) + 2β(αµ+ ϕ)(1− ϕ)]
c = −2αβ(αµ+ ϕ)(1− ϕ)− (1 + 2βϕ)(1− α)[3µ+ ϕ− αµ]
− α(1 + 2β)[2µ+ ϕ− αµ]
d = µ · [(1− α)(1 + 2βϕ) + α(1 + 2β)]
Unlike a quadratic equation that may have no real solution, a cubic function
has at least one real root. This means that policymakers can find a value of the
labour income tax rate that maximises (or minimise) the economic growth in
the long run. Since a feasible range of values for labour income tax is between
zero and one, it is interesting to find whether the possible roots of the cubic
function lie within that range or not.
Considering the sign of coefficients, the positive value of d indicates the
intercept term on the y-axis when τw is set to be zero. The negative coefficient
a refers to the starting point of the graph that should begin from the second
quadrant and descend to the fourth quadrant. In addition, the positive
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coefficient b determines the curvature of the parabolic element, whilst the
negative coefficient c alters the slope of the cubic function. Using the
properties of coefficients and evaluating τw = 1, the sum of the coefficient
values becomes negative. That is,
a+ b+ c+ d = −α2ϕ(1 + 2β) < 0 (3.36)
(a) Only one root of labour income tax lies within
zero and one range
(b) Three roots of labour income tax lie within zero
and one range
Figure 3.2: Possible Roots of Labour Income Tax Rate within the Range between
Zero and One for the Cubic Function
From equation (3.36), together with a negative value of a and a positive
value of d, the value of the cubic function will lie in the fourth quadrant when
τw is equal to one. This implies that there are only two possibilities of a growth-
maximising (minimising) tax rate for this economy, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.
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In Figure 3.2a, there is only one real root of labour income tax that lies within
the range between zero and one. However, other two roots that lie outside (0, 1)
may be positive (see f11 ) or negative (see f
2
1 ). By contrast, in Figure 3.2b, it is
possible that three roots of the labour income tax rate are between zero and one.
Accordingly, the economy can have either one growth-maximising (minimising)
tax rate, or three growth-maximising (minimising) tax rates regarding a specific
set of parameters in one economy.
To clarify whether it is a local maximum or minimum rate, the second order-
derivative of gross growth rate (1 + g∗) with respect to labour income tax (τw)
is taken into account11,
∂2(1 + g∗)
∂τ2w
=
(1− α)(1 + g∗)
1− αφ ·
[
∂Ω
∂τw
+
∂Λ
∂τw
+
(Ω + Λ)2(1− α)
1− αφ
]
(3.37)
where
∂Ω
∂τw
=
−τ2w(µ+ ϕ)− µ(1− 2τw)
[τw(1− τw)]2
∂Λ
∂τw
=
1
(∆ ·Π)2 · {−2αβ(αµ+ ϕ)(1− ϕ)(1− α)[(1 + 2βϕ)∆ + Π]}
∆ = (1− τw)(1− α) + α
Π = α(1 + 2β) + (1− τw)(1− α)(1 + 2βϕ)
The sign of second-order derivative depends on the value in the square
brackets in equation (3.37). In the square brackets, the third component is
eliminated due to the growth-maximisation condition (3.34), Ω + Λ = 0. Since
the second component is always negative, the value of first component will
determine the sign of the second-order condition. To have a local maximum,
the first component should be negative. Thus, the sufficient condition will be
demonstrated in equation (3.38).
(µ+ ϕ)τ2w − 2µτw + µ > 0 (3.38)
According to the sufficient condition for the local maximum (3.38), the
positive coefficients, µ + ϕ and µ, indicate that this quadratic equation is a
U-shaped curve that crosses the y-axis at µ when τw = 0. To determine
whether the value of labour income tax rates lying in the a range between zero
and one satisfy the sufficient condition for the local maximum, the minimum
11See Appendix B.1 for the derivation
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point of the quadratic equation is firstly explored by differentiating (3.38) with
respect to τw and equating it to zero. The minimum value will exist at
τw =
µ
µ+ ϕ
(3.39)
which lies in the range between zero and one. Substituting (3.39) into (3.38),
it can be observed that the minimum value of the quadratic equation, ϕµµ+ϕ is
greater than zero.
Finally, the value of the quadratic equation at τw = 1 is evaluated. One
could easily find that its value will be ϕ when substituting τw = 1 into (3.38).
The possible coordinated points for different values of labour income tax rate
are depicted in Figure 3.3. Accordingly, the U-shaped curve implies that the
possible values of labour income tax that are between zero and one will satisfy
the sufficient condition for the local maximum. With regard to the fact that
the value of labour income tax satisfies the necessary condition (3.34) and the
sufficient condition (3.38) for the local maximum, there must be at least one
positive value of the labour income tax rate that maximises economic growth in
the long run. Therefore, Proposition 1 is proved. Q.E.D.
Figure 3.3: Quadratic Equation for the Local Maximum Condition
Despite the complexity of the roots of the cubic function of labour income
tax (3.35), the growth-maximising tax rate is a function of exogenous parameters
such as the discount factor (β), the human capital elasticity of output (1−α), the
physical capital elasticity of output (α), the private tuition elasticity of human
capital (ϕ) and the public education elasticity of human capital (µ). Overlooking
one of these variables may cause an overestimation or underestimation of the
benefits of public education.
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3.5.2 Is the Effect of Public Education Overestimated?
The conjecture of over-provision of public education can potentially be
observed in countries in which the public education programme is inefficient.
Levying a high income tax to finance an inefficient public education
programme may distort households’ saving decisions, discourage private
investment and deteriorate the growth rate of economy.
The conjecture reagrding such over-provision may arise for two reasons
which are “the misperception of the government about the households’
preference” and “the misperception of the government about the private
tuition option” that opens to altruistic parents. Due to the first reason, the
government does not realise that parents are altruistic. Therefore, the
government does not take both private tuition and bequests into account in
the households’ preference12. With regard to the second reason concerned in
this paper, the government knows that the parents are altruistic and willing to
give bequests to their children. However, let us suppose that the government
does not realise that private tuition is also possible in a form of a bequest. In
other words, the government misperceives the existence of private tuition as a
technological option for human capital accumulation. We now ask whether the
government will spend more of its budget for public education than the
necessary amount that maximises economic growth.
Although one can easily find that the economy described by Glomm and
Ravikumar (1997) coincides with our model when parents are not willing to
provide private education and bequests to their children, a comparison
between our roots of cubic function (τ∗w) and the growth-maximising tax rate
in their economy (τGR) is extremely difficult due to the complexity of the
roots. Instead, the hypothesis that the government’s misperception concerning
the existence of private tuition will generate the over-provision of public
education is explored in this section. The growth-maximising tax rate of an
economy with only public education (τEw ) is then compared to the
growth-maximising tax rate of an economy with both public education and
private tuition (τ∗w) in order to prove the over-provision analytically.
Proposition 2: The government’s misperception concerning the existence
of private tuition will lead to the overestimation of benefits of public education.
The economy becomes situated in the growth-reducing area of the Armey curve
12An economy in which the government misperceives the households’ preference could be
compared to an economy without altruism; see Glomm and Ravikumar (1997).
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since τEw > τ
∗
w.
Proof : Considering an economy with only public education denoted by
superscript E, such an economy can be obtained from the general model where
the elasticity of human capital with respect to private tuition is equal to zero
(ϕ = 0). The physical capital accumulation and the human capital accumulation
equations can then be written as follows13:
kEt+1 = γ
EAkαt h
1−α
t (3.40)
hEt+1 = Bη
EAµkαµt h
1−αµ
t (3.41)
where
γE =
[(1− τw)(1− α) + α]βα
α(1 + 2β) + (1− τw)(1− α) (3.42)
ηE = τµw(1− α)µ (3.43)
Using a similar process of derivation as in the economy with public education
and private tuition, the growth rate of an economy with only public education
can be deduced from a pair of first-order simultaneous difference equations (3.40)
and (3.41). That is,
(1 + gE) = γEA
[
γEA1−µ
BηE
] α−1
1−αφ
(3.44)
where φ = 1− µ due to the misperception that private tuition can be a part of
human capital accumulation process. To find the growth-maximising tax rate,
the derivative of a gross growth rate (1+gE) is taken with respect to the labour
income tax rate,
∂(1 + gE)
∂τw
=
µ(1 + gE)(1− α)
1− αφ
[
1
τw
− 2α
2β
Ψ
]
(3.45)
where
Ψ = [(1− τw)(1− α) + α][α(1 + 2β) + (1− τw)(1− α)] (3.46)
By setting the value of the square brackets of equation (3.44) equal to zero,
the condition for the growth-maximising (minimising) tax rate can be found
from the roots of the quadratic equation,
f(τEw ) = (1− α)2τ2w − [2αβ + 2(1− α)]τw + 1 + 2αβ = 0 (3.47)
13The derivation of the difference equations is explained in Appendix B.2.1
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which are
τEw1 =
αβ + 1− α− α√β(β + 2(1− α))
(α− 1)2 > 0 (3.48)
τEw2 =
αβ + 1− α+ α√β(β + 2(1− α))
(α− 1)2 > 0 (3.49)
τEw1 < τ
E
w2 (3.50)
To ensure that the roots of the quadratic equation indicate the local
maximum, the second-order derivative of the gross growth rate with respect to
labour income tax is calculated14,
∂2(1 + gE)
∂τ2w
=
µ(1− α)(1 + gE)
1− αφ
[
− 1
τ2w
+
2α2β
Ψ
∂Ψ
∂τw
]
< 0 (3.51)
where
∂Ψ
∂τw
= −{α(1− α)(1 + 2β) + 2(1− τw)(1− α)2 + α(1− α)} < 0 (3.52)
Using the information from (3.51) and (3.52), the roots of quadratic
equation, τEw1 and τ
E
w2, indicates the growth-maximising tax rates for this
economy. Considering the two roots of quadratic equations, the elasticity of
human capital with respect to public education (µ) has no effect on either of
the growth-maximising tax rates. This implies that there is no trade-off
between public education and savings (or with private tuition), as explained
by Blankenau and Simpson (2004). Thus, the growth-maximising tax rates
depend on only the elasticity of output with respect to physical capital (α)
and the discount factor (β).
Unfortunately, the roots of quadratic equation (3.47) cannot be compared to
the roots of cubic function (3.35) due to the complexity of the roots. Therefore,
the shape of the quadratic equation is investigated in the feasible range of labour
income tax between zero and one. The intercept term is equal to 1 + 2αβ when
the labour income tax rate is evaluated at zero (τw = 0). At τw = 1, the value of
the quadratic equation is positive and it is equal to α2. Since the coefficient of τ2w
is always positive and both τEw1 and τ
E
w2 are greater than zero, all the properties
of the quadratic equation indicate that there are two possible scenarios for the
value of the growth-maximising tax rates.
Figure 3.4a demonstrates the first scenario in which both τEw1 and τ
E
w2 are
within the feasible range of zero and one, while Figure 3.4b shows the second
14See Appendix B.2.2 for further calculation.
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scenario that both τEw1 and τ
E
w2 lie outside the feasible range. For τ
E
w1 < 0, we
need
τEw1 =
αβ + 1− α− α√β(β + 2(1− α))
(α− 1)2 < 1 (3.53)
However, this inequality (3.53) cannot hold15. Therefore, it can be concluded
that τEw1 > 1 and τ
E
w2 > 1 since τ
E
w1 < τ
E
w2. In other words, this analytical proof
confirms that both growth-maximising tax rates in an economy that the
government misperconceives of private tuition will be greater than one, as
demonstrated in Figure 3.4b.
(a) Two roots of labour income tax lies within
zero and one range
(b) Two roots of labour income tax lie outside
zero and one range
Figure 3.4: Two Possible cases for the Quadratic Equation
Once the government realised that the growth-maximising tax rates exceed
one, the best response of the government would be to set the labour income
tax rate (τEw ) at 1 or at 100% regarding the feasibility constraint. This corner
15See Appendix B.2.3 for the proof.
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solution can be confirmed by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the local maximum
point. These conditions are
∂(1 + gE)
∂τw
≤ 0, τw ≥ 0 and τw ∂(1 + g
E)
∂τw
= 0
where either the first or the second conditions can be slack. However, the third
condition prevents both ∂(1+g
E)
∂τw
and τw from not being equal to zero. Evaluating
(3.45) at τw = 1 gives:
∂(1 + gE)
∂τw
∣∣∣∣
τw=1
=
µ
1− αφ
{(
αβ
1 + 2β
)αµ
AµB1−α(1− α)1−α+µ
} 1
1−αφ [ 1
1 + 2β
]
> 0
which confirms that, at τEw = 1, the equation does not satisfy the growth-
maximum conditions regarding the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. As a result, the
government is likely to set the tax rate at 100% due to the misperception that the
economy is in the growth-enhancing area. In conclusion, the growth-maximising
tax rate in an economy with only public education is always greater than the
growth-maximising tax rate in an economy with both public education and
private tuition (τEw > τ
∗
w). The overestimation of the benefits of public education
will lead the economy into the growth-reducing area of the Armey curve. Q.E.D
In an impure altruistic economy with only public education, the corner
solution at τEw = 1 can be explained by reasons of resource allocation. The
misperception of the government concerning the existence of private tuition
leads to the exaggeration of the benefits of public education, as it is the only
driver of economic growth. The government will then attempt to draw
resources from unproductive activities, such as bequests, to finance public
spending on education due to a lack of awareness of the option of private
tuition16. With a shortage of funding for private tuition, the aggregate human
capital accumulation may decrease in conjunction with a decline in economic
growth.
The corner solution for the misperception concerning the existence of
private tuition in this model is similar to that in the work of Blankenau and
Simpson (2004), in which private investment in human capital is
unproductive17. They showed that the growth-maximising labour income tax
rate can be greater than one. Although Blankenau and Simpson (2004) did
not mention about the over-provision of public education, their result suggests
16In the economy of Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), parents are selfish; consequently, no
resources are wasted on bequests. This might explain why they have an interior solution for
the growth-maximising tax rate.
17See their Proposition 6 on page 599.
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the possibility that the government may overspend on public education. Thus,
the possibility of the over-provision of public education creates the awareness
for policymakers not to overestimate the benefits of public education.
3.5.3 A Numerical Example
The value of labour income tax that maximises the growth rate depends on
the value of parameters for a particular economy. Therefore, the numerical
calibration is required to provide the growth-maximising tax rate for the
economy in the realistic way.
Figure 3.5: Relationship between Net Growth and Labour Income Tax
The numerical example is constructed based on the value of parameters in
the UK’s economy. The discount factor (β) is commonly assumed to be 0.99 and
the elasticity of output with respect to physical capital (α) is 0.3 (Meeks et al.,
2014). The elasticity of human capital with respect to public education (µ) is
chosen by folllowing the empirical work of Blankenau et al. (2007). In their
paper, the OLS estimation shows that µ is equal to 0.2 when the government
revenue and other fixed effects are taken into account18. According to the work
of Kindermann (2009), the fraction of income spent by parents on their children’s
education is used as a proxy of the elasticity of human capital with respect to
private tuition (ϕ). Since there is a direct utility for altruistic parents from ‘act
of giving’ private tuition, ϕ is set to be 0.3 which is approximately a two-fold
18Blankenau et al. (2007) found that the elasticity of human capital with respect to public
education expenditure varies from 0.128 to 0.201. However, only 0.201 is statistically significant
when considering all fixed effects.
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increase in this paper19. Given this specific set of parameters, the relationship
between the net growth rate (g) and the labour income tax rate (τw) can be
calibrated by MATLAB programme, as demonstrated in Figure 3.520.
The hump-shape curve in Figure 3.5 indicates that the relationship between
the net growth rate and labour income tax rate is a non-monotonic function.
This confirms that the Armey curve does exist and it shares similar features of
the inverted U-shape, as described in Barro (1990). In addition, one may expect
that the growth-maximising tax rate should be between 0.2 − 0.4. To provide
an exact number for the growth-maximising tax rate, a cubic function of labour
income tax is calculated in order to obtain the possible roots.
−0.3905τ3w + 1.5672τ2w − 1.6591τw + 0.4020 = 0 (3.54)
With respect to these parametric values, the roots of equation (3.54) are
0.3451, 1.2168 and 2.4512, as can be seen in Figure 3.6. According to the feasible
range of labour income tax (0 < τw < 1), policymakers should set labour income
tax at rate 34.51% to maximise the long-run growth.
Figure 3.6: Cubic Function of Labour Income Tax
Substituting labour income tax at 34.51% and other parametric values into
the growth equation (3.32), the numerical result confirms that the economy
would reach the highest growth rate at 5.02% if the government were to levy
the labour income tax at 34.51%. Note that the elasticity of human capital
with respect to public education and to private tuition may vary across
19With regard to the parameterisation, Kindermann (2009) set the fraction of income
spending from parents to children to be 0.16.
20The value of growth-maximising tax rates in the wider range of values of µ and ϕ will be
explored in Figure 3.7.
68
countries. Different sets of parameters will definitely produce the different
growth-maximising tax rates.
Figure 3.7: Value of the Growth-Maximising Tax Rates
Contour Figure 3.7 illustrates the value of the growth-maximising tax rate
(τw∗) when the elasticity of human capital with respect to public education
(µ) and the elasticity of human capital with respect to private tuition (ϕ) are
restricted to be less than one (µ + ϕ < 1). Thus, the feasible values of τ∗w is
indicated by contour lines located in a lower triangle area only21. By
decreasing the efficiency of private tuition (ϕ ↓), the growth-maximising tax
rate is increased dramatically if the human capital is highly affected by public
education (µ ↑). Otherwise, τ∗w will be low. In addition, the relationship
between µ and ϕ can be interpreted from this graph. An increase in the
efficiency of public education should be offset by an increase in the efficiency of
private tuition if a country wants to retain the growth-maximising tax rate.
This is a reason why the contour curve is an upward sloping line22.
Accordingly, the relationship between the growth-maximising tax rate and
the efficiency of public education can be easily observed in Figure 3.8a. Given a
constant value for the private tuition elasticity of human capital (ϕ = 0.2), the
growth-maximising tax rate is an increasing function of the elasticity of human
21The growth-maximising tax rate cannot be obtained in the upper triangle area due to the
fact that µ + ϕ > 1 violates the condition of human capital technology, which is assumed to
be a constant return to scale.
22The magnitude of slope depends on the diminishing marginal return of each input to
human capital.
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capital with respect to public education. The economic intuition is simple. As
the human capital is a driver of growth, it is reasonable to increase the tax rate
to finance public education which contributes to the human capital accumulation
process. Conversely, the government should reduce the tax rate when private
tuition is more efficient than public education in terms of increasing human
capital. This argument is also supported by Figure 3.8b, in that the growth-
maximising tax rate is a decreasing function of the elasticity of human capital
with respect to private tuition when the public education elasticity of human
capital remains constant (µ = 0.2).
(a) τ∗w and µ when ϕ = 0.2 (b) τ
∗
w and ϕ when µ = 0.2
Figure 3.8: Relationship between Growth-Maximising Tax and the Elasticity of
Human Capital with respect to Public Education and to Private Tuition
The over-provision of public education is also explored using the numerical
calibration. All the parameters are the same as when we discover the value of the
growth-maximising tax rates in Figure 3.7, except that the sum of the elasticity
of human capital with respect to public education and to private education can
vary within a range of 0 to 0.8 (µ + ϕ ≤ 0.8)23. This is because the over-
provision of public education takes place at the boundary (µ = 0.8 and ϕ = 0)
at which the misperception concerning the existence of private tuition occurs24.
The over-provision of public education can then be observed in Figure 3.9.
Once again, Figure 3.9 shows that the growth-maximising tax rate is an
increasing function of the public education elasticity of human capital, which
23If we were to set the constraint as µ+ϕ ≤ 1, this may violate the over-provision condition.
At µ = 1, it implies that both ϕ and φ are equal to zero. In this case, the government
completely ignores both private tuition and parental education.
24This means that the elasticity of human capital with respect to parental education (φ) is
assumed to be 0.2.
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is consistent to Figure 3.8a. Considering the point that the government
misperceives the existence of private tuition (µ = 0.8 and ϕ = 0), the
government will collect the labour income tax at 1 or 100% which is a corner
solution. Therefore, Figure 3.9 confirms that the over-provision of public
education does exist in this economy.
Figure 3.9: The Over-provision of Public Education
3.5.4 Degree of Substitutability
In this paper, the value of the parameter that refers to the degree of
substitutability between public education and private tuition is assumed be
zero (ρ = 0) since the human capital accumulation has a Cobb-Douglas form25.
However, ρ can vary within a certain range (−∞, 1], which reflects the
substitutability between these two types of education systems (Glomm and
Kaganovich, 2003). Thus, it is interesting to observe how endogenous growth
responds to tax rate when the degree of substitutability is altered, given other
parametric values remain unchanged.
Suppose that the value of the degree of substitutability increases from zero
to one (ρ = 1), this mean that public education and private tuition are perfect
substitutes and the elasticity of substitution approaches infinity (σ → +∞). In
this case, the function of human capital accumulation (3.12) can be rewritten
as
ht+1 = B[aet + bEt]
zh1−zt (3.55)
25At ρ = 0, there is still substitutability between public education and private tuition, as
the elasticity of substitution is equal to one.
71
Following the same process for finding the endogenous growth rate, the gross
growth rate of an economy with a perfect substitution between public education
and private tuition (gp) is
(1 + gp) = γpA
[
(γpA)
1−z
Bηp
] α−1
1−α(1−z)
(3.56)
where
γp =
[(1 + τw(1− α)(2ba − 1)]βα
α(1 + 2β) + (1− τw)(1− α)(1 + 2βz)
ηp =
[
(1− τw)(1− α)z · a
α
]z
z = ϕ+ µ
For simplicity, the share of private tuition and public education on human
capital is assumed to be the same (ϕ = a = 0.3 and µ = b = 0.2), in order for
the economies to be compared. Given the same parameters from UK’s economy
(β = 0.99 and α = 0.3), the relationship between the net growth rate and the
labour income tax rate for both cases are compared in Figure 3.10.
Figure 3.10: Perfect Substitution (gp) vs Cobb-Douglas (g
∗)
Although the Armey curve exists in both economies, Figure 3.10 shows
that only the economy with perfect substitution experiences a negative growth
rate at any level of tax rates. One possible explanation is that the economy
with perfect substitution between public education and private tuition might
suffer from inferior resource allocation. Due to the perfect substitutability,
children may receive the same level of education, but parents are wasting
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resources by making double payment, both directly to private tuition and
indirectly to public education via taxation. While the human capital in this
economy remain unchanged, the process of physical capital accumulation is
distorted by labour income tax. As a result, the growth rate of the economy
declines.
Once the government realises that the quality of education provided by
public and private institutions is identical, our numerical example suggests
that the government should decrease the labour income tax rate and reduce
the subsidy for public education. For this reason, the growth-maximising tax
rate in the economy with perfect substitutability case (25.72%)26 is smaller
than the growth-maximising tax rate in the economy with complementarity
between public education and private tuition (34.51%).
3.6 Public Education: A Necessity
The role of public education was clarified in the previous section. The
government should increase the public education expenditure if it can enhance
the human capital differently from private tuition. If not, public spending on
education should be reduced because labour income tax will distort the
physical capital accumulation process. Nevertheless, the existence of public
education is still required in the economy even though there is a perfect
substitution between public education and private tuition.
In the overlapping generation model, agents are heterogeneous in terms of
income. While the middle-age generation receives income by working, the
young generation has a zero income. Consequently, the inequality in income
distribution between generations is a potential problem in this economy. This
problem could be solved by the intergenerational transfers from parents to
children, in the form of private tuition or bequests (Zilcha, 2003). However,
parents may not willing to offer private tuition to their children since they may
consider their own consumption to be the highest priority (Glomm and
Kaganovich, 2008). According to the empirical evidence in US economy, the
self-interest issue was raised in the work of Ladd and Murray (2001). They
used the econometric model to study the intergenerational conflict in K-12
education and found that the middle-age and the old generations voted
overwhelmingly for a reduction in per-child education spending in 16 states. In
26The growth-maximising tax rate cannot be zero in the perfect substitutability since both
public education and private tuition operate together.
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addition, Poterba (1997) used the panel data to analyse the demographic
structure and political economy of public education across all states in the US
from 1960 to 1990. His findings suggest that an increase in local property
taxes and income taxes to finance K-12 education created tensions for the old
generation. As a result, the elderly were less willing to support elementary and
secondary education.
The income distribution gap and a decline in the investment in children’s
education lead to a reduction in human capital stock and in the growth rate.
To prevent the income distribution gap across generations, the government
should provide public education in order to secure the minimum level of human
capital stock, as well as the growth rate of economy (Eckstein and Zilcha,
1994; Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996; Benabou, 2002). Furthermore, public
education also alleviates the financial burden on households that experience a
free-rider problem (Boldrin, 2005). Once the financial burden is mitigated, the
intergenerational transfers from parents to children improve. This statement is
also supported by the theoretical work of Holter (2015), which studied the
impact of income taxation and public education expenditure on the
intergenerational earning persistence across countries. In his calibrated model,
the number of credit-constrained parents was reduced when the government
subsidises public education. Hence, public education expenditure and income
taxation will have a positive impact on intergenerational earning persistence
because parents can increase the intergenerational transfer to their children.
Without doubt, maintaining the growth rate and providing the equitable
income distribution are justified reasons for the existence of public education.
3.7 Conclusion
The three-period overlapping generations model was employed to characterise
the intergenerational transfers, such as private tuition and bequests from
impure altruistic parents to their offspring. Private tuition is considered as the
complementary input, together with the public education, in the human
capital function. To observe how fiscal policy affect the aggregate economy,
the effect of the labour income tax on macroeconomic variables was studied
first. Despite the disincentive to save or spend on private tuition, the impacts
of labour income tax on the accumulation of human capital and bequests are
ambiguous. Due to this ambiguity, it is suggested that policymakers should
levy an appropriate level of labour income tax to stimulate economic growth in
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the long run.
As indicated in the Armey curve, levying a high labour income tax rate
may lead the economy into the growth-reducing area. Therefore, the
growth-maximising tax rate was investigated to find the appropriate size of the
government in an impure altruistic economy that is driven by both public
education and private tuition. According to the cubic function of labour
income tax, the necessary and sufficient conditions ensure that at least one
value of growth-maximising tax rate lies within the feasible range between zero
and one. The growth-maximising tax rate in an economy with both public
education and private tuition were then compared with the growth-maximising
tax rate in an economy in which the government may misconceive of the
existence of private tuition. The analytical solution illustrates that the
growth-maximising tax rate in the economy with only public education is
equal to 100%, as it is the corner solution for this economy. This corner
solution implies that there is the over-provision of public education when there
is a misperception concerning private tuition. This cautions policymakers not
to overestimate the benefits of public education. In addition, the numerical
example illustrates that an increase in the degree of substitutability between
public education and private tuition will reduce both economic growth and the
growth-maximising tax rate. Thus, the government should minimise the
amount spent on public education. However, this amount should not be zero
since public education maintains the growth rate and enables the equitable
income distribution.
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Chapter 4
Stochastic Productive
Government Expenditure,
Congestion and Economic
Growth
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4.1 Introduction
For the past thirty years, productive government spending has been considered
to be an important factor that enhances long-term growth. Governments can
invest in productive spending for the public good, such as the creation of public
roads, bridges and power plants in order to stimulate economic activities among
economic agents1.
According to the seminal work by Barro (1990), purely public good is
introduced as a productive input into a firm’s production function. With the
non-rivalry and non-excludability properties of the public good2, it can
undoubtedly enhance economic growth when the size of government is
sufficiently small. However, the positive magnitude of growth is reduced
significantly if the non-rivalry property does not hold3. In other words, the
public good may be subject to a congestion.
Although congestion generally refers to a reduction in the capacity of the
public good (G) to be exploited by firms and households, the terminology and
formulae for congestion may vary in the existing literature. For example, Glomm
and Ravikumar (1994) applied congestion to both capital and labour, G =
G˜
(
1
KρLφ
)
, since households may use public infrastructure in an unproductive
way. Turnovsky (1996) defined the congestion of public input as a ratio that was
proportionate to output, G = G˜
Y 1−δ , because an increase in income encourages
households using a great number of public infrastructures. To avoid confusion,
this paper defines congestion by following the papers by Fisher and Turnovsky
(1998) and by Eicher and Turnovsky (2000), which indicated that it is a ratio
describing an individual firm’s use of private capital to aggregate use of private
capital, G = G˜
(
k
K
)1−δ
. Despite the different types of congestion, a high degree
of congestion will significantly reduce the positive impact of the public good on
economic growth in the deterministic endogenous growth framework.
In the stochastic environment, Turnovsky (1999) took a degree of congestion
and a degree of risk aversion into account and discovered two remarkable points.
Firstly, in the presence of a stochastic process of output, the long-run growth
could be enhanced if a degree of risk aversion were sufficiently high. This means
1Unlike chapter 2 in which public capital is a stock variable, productive government
spending in this chapter is defined as a flow variable.
2See Samuelson (1954) for further explanation.
3This paper only considers the rivalry property of the public good. For the non-excludability
property, please see Ott and Turnovsky (2006).
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that the effect of precautionary saving, together with a degree of congestion,
plays a central role in determining the magnitude of growth. Secondly, the
economic growth and the social welfare of a decentralised economy is equivalent
to those of a centrally planned economy when the public good is subject to
proportional congestion. Therefore, the first-best solution can be achieved in a
decentralised economy.
Unfortunately, the model of Turnovsky (1999) is limited in some respects.
One limitation is that the role of government transfer has been ignored. Since
the effect of precautionary saving requires a high income effect, the fluctuation
of government transfer may increase the volatility in households’ income paths.
Consequently, risk-averse households are likely to increase their savings
regardless of the degree of risk aversion. Other aspects are the source of
uncertainty and a number of risks concerned in the stochastic AK model.
According to Turnovsky (1999), a productivity shock causes outputs to follow
the stochastic process and it is a linear function in capital. Thus, households
will only experience capital risks that affect their decision making (Clemens
and Soretz, 2003). Turning a blind eye to the income risk may cause a high
volatility of income. Furthermore, in the stochastic AK setting, the effect of
proportional congestion disappears when the market clearing condition is
applied. This is because decentralised households enjoy an individual share of
the public good in the same way that the planner does. Hence, the solutions
for a decentralised economy and for a centralised economy are identical.
The main purpose of this paper is to overcome the limitations of
Turnovsky’s (1999) work, as described above. In this chapter, the stochastic
AK model is constructed by introducing a random shock to productive
government expenditure that is devoted to the public good subject to
proportional congestion4. In this scenario, the government will decide to use
the deterministic part as public input into firms’ production function and to
use the diffusion part for government consumption and government transfer.
Thus, government transfer will definitely have an impact on households’
income paths and will allow the proportional congestion to determine the
difference between centralised and decentralised economies in a significant way.
The impact of stochastic productive government expenditure on economic
growth is first explored in a decentralised economy. By allowing the
4In fact, a fiscal shock on productive government expenditure is not a new perspective. It
has been used widely in the neoclassical growth framework (Baxter and King, 1993; Turnovsky
and Fisher, 1995), as well as in the new Keynesian literature (Linnemann and Schabert, 2006).
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government transfer, economic growth becomes greater when households are
risk-averse agents. This is because the uncertain income effect induces
precautionary saving. Although the interpretation of precautionary saving is
similar to that in other stochastic endogenous growth models (Clemens, 2004;
Ott and Soretz, 2002), it can be observed that the income effect strictly
dominates the intertemporal substitution effect regardless of the degree of risk
aversion in our case.
In addition, an increase in the growth rate in the presence of stochastic
setting leads to scepticism concerning the existence of an inverted U- shaped
relationship between economic growth and permanent income tax in the
deterministic growth model. If the inverted U-shape does not exist, the
condition for the growth enhancing tax rate may be altered. After
investigating this point, the numerical example shows that such a relationship
disappears when a degree of risk aversion is sufficiently large. Nevertheless, the
condition for growth-enhancing income tax that the marginal benefit of
providing for the public good is greater than the marginal cost remains valid.
With regard to the debate concerning the similarity between centralised
and decentralised economies raised by Turnovsky (1999) in his proportional
congestion case, it has been proved in our model that the solutions of a
decentralised economy will not be the same as the social planner’s outcomes.
Therefore, a decentralised government should employ the first-best fiscal policy
instruments in order to reduce saving and to achieve the first-best welfare
level. Furthermore, the welfare loss in a decentralised economy can be
calculated, and it can be compensated by the variation of the initial capital to
reach the welfare target. Lastly, the trade-off between growth and welfare is
unavoidable in a risky economy. The planner in a risky economy could either
sacrifice the amount of initial capital, or apply the certainty equivalent interest
rate to level off the welfare, as in a riskless economy.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 is the basic
model that characterises the equilibrium of a decentralised economy and the
impact of stochastic productive government expenditure on economic growth.
Section 4.3 discusses endogenous growth and the fiscal policy while the
comparison between centralised and decentralised economies is presented in
Section 4.4. Section 4.5 demonstrates the welfare loss measured by the
variation of the initial capital, and Section 4.6 contains the conclusion.
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4.2 The Basic Model
The impact of stochastic productive government expenditure on economic
growth is analysed through a decentralised economy that has three economic
agents, namely households, firms and the government, in a stochastic
endogenous growth model. The perfect foresight assumption cannot be applied
since the market economy is subject to uncertainty.
4.2.1 Households
The economy is inhabited by a fixed number of N infinitely lived households
and there is no population growth. Each household will supply an inelastic unit
of labour in a period of time (l¯ = 1) and will maximise the expected utility
by smoothing the optimal consumption path. They are identical in terms of
preference, the income received and the initial capital per person. Therefore, the
representative-agent framework can be used to determine the optimal decision
of households. Assuming that the utility function is a constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA), each household will maximise the expected utility
U(c(t)) = E0
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt · c(t)
1−η − 1
1− η dt (4.1)
subject to the budget constraint (4.2)
dk(t) = [(1− τy)R(t)k(t)− c(t)] · dt+ T (t)
N
(4.2)
c(t) ≥ 0, k(t) ≥ 0 (4.3)
where equation (4.3) is a non-negativity constraint for consumption (c) and
capital (k).
The value range of the parameters are chosen based on the literature on
endogenous growth. The value of the discount rate is between zero and one
(0 < ρ < 1), while E0 is an expectation operator at period zero. An inverse
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which is known as the Arrow-Pratt
relative risk aversion, is greater than zero (η > 0) since risk-averse households
want to smooth their consumption path. Note that each household receives a
government transfer ( TN ) and treats it as a lump-sum amount. This lump-sum
transfer will have an impact on the fluctuation of households’ income paths.
After that, they will optimally choose the consumption and saving plans for
their futures.
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By applying the dynamic programming method and Ito’s Lemma, the value
function of individual households can be constructed in the form of a stochastic
Bellman equation5
ρV (k) =
c1−η − 1
1− η − ρV (k) + V
′(k)((1− τy)Rk − c) + 1
2
V ′′(k)
(
T
N
)2
(4.4)
where V (k) is a value function that depends only on the predetermined variable
which is private capital (k)6. Given the rental rate, the optimal consumption
and saving of households are
c−η = V ′(k) (4.5)
V ′(k)((1− τy)R− ρ) + V ′′(k)((1− τy)Rk − c) + 1
2
V ′′′(k)
(
T
N
)2
= 0 (4.6)
In addition, the solution to the stochastic Bellman equation will be
represented as a function form (V (k)) that satisfies the first-order conditions
(4.5) and (4.6) and the transversality condition for the bounded utility (4.7).
lim
t→∞Et[e
−ρtV (k)] = 0 (4.7)
4.2.2 Representative Firms
The representative firms will maximise their profit subject to revenue and cost.
The production function consists of three inputs, namely the inelastic labour (l¯),
private capital (k) and a capacity of individual firm to use the public good (g).
Since the public good may enhance the productivity of labour, the production
function can be written as a labour-augmenting process:
y(t) = Ak(t)α(l¯g(t))1−α (4.8)
where A is a positive constant technology (A > 0) and the elasticity of output
with respect to private capital is between zero and one (0 < α < 1). Since l¯ = 1,
an individual firm’s production function can be rewritten as
y(t) = Ak(t)αg(t)1−α. (4.9)
which is a Cobb-Douglas specification.
5Instead of using a stochastic Bellman equation, one may alternatively apply the
Hamiltinian-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation to solve the problem. The results of both methods
are the same.
6The derivation of value function V (k) is shown in Appendix C.1.1
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The capacity of individual firm to use the public good can also imply that
the public good is subject to proportional congestion. Assuming that the
government invests aggregate productive government expenditure (Gk) in the
public good, each individual firm will receive only a proportionate share of the
public good. Therefore, in this paper, proportional congestion is defined by the
ratio of an individual firm’s usage (k) to the total usage of the public good
(K). Thus, the capacity of an individual firm using the public good (g) will be:
g(t) = Gk(t)
(
k(t)
K(t)
)
(4.10)
Substituting (4.10) into (4.9), the individual output can be written as a
linear function in the individual capital.
y(t) = A
(
Gk(t)
K(t)
)1−α
k(t) (4.11)
Although an individual firm realises the existence of proportional congestion,
the effect of externalities from proportional congestion has never been taken into
account. Consequently, the first-order condition for the profit maximisation is
R(t) = A
(
Gk(t)
K(t)
)1−α
(4.12)
where the wage rate is equal to zero (w = 0) and the rental rate (R) is equal
to the real interest rate (r), as the depreciation rate of capital is assumed to be
zero (δ = 0) for reasons of simplicity.
4.2.3 Government
The government invests aggregate productive government expenditure (Gk) in
the public good and views the use of the public good by individual firms as
productive per capita government expenditure (g = GkN ). However, in the
stochastic setting, this productive per capita government expenditure may be
affected by many random factors. For example, in democratic countries, the
population may vote for more public roads to mitigate the traffic jams7. By
contrast, protesters may take actions against the deforestation required to
build a new power plant. These factors can be considered as fiscal policy
7Park and Philippopulos (2003) revealed that rational voters can alter the reallocation of
resources for public consumption, public investment and redistributive transfer. In addition,
Kaas (2003) argued that sequential voting may generate a larger government size than the
growth-maximising government size.
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shocks that could have a significant impact on a long-run growth8. Thus, a
random shock is introduced into productive per capita government spending
that follows the stochastic process, which is a Brownian motion
dg(t) = γgg(t)dt+ g(t)σdu (4.13)
that is similar to
dg(t) = γg
Gk(t)
N
· dt+ Gk(t)
N
σ · du (4.14)
where γg is a rate of change in g when a diffusion process is equal to zero (σ = 0).
Note that, γgg and g
2σ2 are the instantaneous mean and variance per unit of
time, respectively.
Based on equation (4.13), the generalised theory of stochastic differential
equations developed by Ito and McKean (1964) is employed to explain the
dynamics of productive government expenditure corresponding to the
discrete-time model9. It consists of two parts. The first part refers to the
adjustment of deterministic productive government spending over time, while
the second part is a stochastic process depending on the standard deviation of
productive spending (σ) and a random shock (u). Assuming that du follows a
Wiener process, its disturbances are serially uncorrelated, and are normally
distributed with zero mean and
√
dt standard deviation (du ∼ N(0, dt))10.
After realising the stochastic process, the government instantaneously
decides to invest the deterministic part into the public good and to divide the
diffusion part into two components. The first component is the government
consumption (Gc) and the second component is rebated to households as a
government transfer (T ). Assuming the government budget is balanced each
period, the stochastic aggregate government expenditure can be written as
follows:
dG(t) = γgGk(t)dt+Gc(t) + T (t) (4.15)
8For the empirical testing, please see Gemmell et al. (2011).
9The diffusion of stochastic productive per capita government expenditure is continuous
but not differentiable. Consequently, a differential equation with standard time derivatives is
not applicable when describing the dynamics (Merton, 1990).
10The poisson process is an alternative stochastic process for a random shock. Besides, the
Wiener process was chosen due to the linear relationship between risk premium and a degree
of risk aversion. See Steger (2005) for the comparison.
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where
Gk(t) = τyY (t) (4.16)
Gc(t) = θGk(t)σdu (4.17)
T (t) = (1− θ)Gk(t)σdu (4.18)
when the permanent income tax rate (τy) and the percentage of shock absorption
(θ) are between zero and one.
With regard to equations (4.16) and (4.17), the aggregate productive
government expenditure (Gk) is financed by the permanent income tax
revenue, while the aggregate government consumption (Gc) is subsidised by
the percentage of shock absorption from the diffusion process. This scenario is
consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Ramey (2011) in that there
is a smaller fluctuation in productive government spending than there is in
non-productive government spending. Government consumption will act like a
sponge that absorbs the fiscal shock from the stochastic productive per capita
government expenditure.
4.2.4 Decentralised Economy Equilibrium
In the decentralised economy, the demand for goods is equal to the supply when
the market clearing conditions are imposed.
K(t) = Nk(t), C(t) = Nc(t), Y (t) = Ny(t) (4.19)
Given the initial value of capital (k(0) = k0) and the initial stochastic process
(u(0) = u0), the equilibrium of a decentralised economy is fully described by the
resource allocation path {c(t), k(t)}t≥0, the path of price {R(t)}t≥0 and the path
of government policy {Gk(t), Gc(t), T (t)}t≥0 that solve equations (4.15), (4.16),
(4.17), (4.18), (4.12), (4.5), (4.6), (4.7) and the market clearing conditions (4.19).
By substituting the aggregate productive government expenditure (4.16), the
rental rate (4.12) and the market clearing conditions (4.19) into the households’
optimal choice of saving (4.6), the equilibrium of capital becomes
V ′(k)
(
(1− τy)τ
1−α
α
y A
1
α − ρ
)
+
1
2
V ′′′(k)
[
(1− θ)(τyA) 1αkσ
]2
V ′′(k)
(
(1− τy)τ
1−α
α
y A
1
αk(t)− c(t)
)
= 0
(4.20)
where V ′(k) = ∂V∂k , V
′′(k) = ∂
2V
∂k2
and V ′′′(k) = ∂
3V
∂k3
respectively.
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To obtain the explicit function of V (k), the relationship between
consumption and private capital is needed to be clarified. In fact, such a
relationship can be drawn from the fact that households have a constant
relative risk aversion, while the utility function depends on time-invariant
parameters. Therefore, consumption can be written as a linear function of
private capital11,
c(t) = λk(t) (4.21)
where λ is a constant propensity to consume capital. The constant propensity
to consume capital (4.21) enables us to derive a closed-form solution for the
optimal consumption as a function of private capital12.
λ =
c(t)
k(t)
=
ρ
η
− 1
η
(1− τy)τ
1−α
α
y A
1
α
+ (1− τy)τ
1−α
α
y A
1
α − (1− θ)2(τyA) 2ασ2
(
η + 1
2
) (4.22)
From Equation (4.22), the ratio of consumption to private capital depends on
the variance of productive per capita government expenditure (σ2). This means
that households will take the uncertainty resulting from government transfer into
account in order to smooth their consumption paths. With regard to the fiscal
instruments, the permanent income tax rate will also distort a consumption-
saving decisions. However, a percentage of shock absorption chosen by the
government has a positive impact on consumption. An increase in the percentage
of shock absorption will reduce the fluctuation in government transfer, as well
as the uncertainty. This will allow households to increase their consumption.
4.2.5 Stochastic Productive Government Expenditure and
Expected Growth Rate
The impact of stochastic productive government expenditure on the long-run
growth rate is explored in this section. The expected growth rate of capital can
be derived from productive government spending (4.16), households’ budget
constraint (4.2) and the constant propensity to consume capital (4.22). Using
the fact that a random shock has a zero mean value (E(du) = 0), the expected
growth rate of capital (γk) can be characterised as
γk =
E(dK)
Kdt
= (1− τy)τ
1−α
α
y A
1
α − λ (4.23)
11Clemens and Soretz (2003) explained that the consumption-capital ratio is a constant when
the utility of households is CRRA.
12See Appendix C.1.2 and C.1.3 for derivations.
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where γk depends on the fiscal variable and other exogenous parameters. With
regard to the production function (4.11) and the constant propensity to consume
capital (4.22), the expected growth rate of capital can be considered to be the
expected growth rate of this economy (γ).
γ = γk = γc = γy
Proposition 1: In the presence of stochastic setting, the economy will
experience a higher growth rate than it will in the perfect foresight economy
when the government transfer is allowed and households are risk-averse agents.
Proof : By substituting equation (4.22) into (4.23), the expected growth
rate can be rewritten as a function of time-invariant parameters and fiscal policy
instruments.
γ =
1
η
[
(1− τy)τ
1−α
α
y A
1
α − ρ
]
+ (1− θ)2(τyA) 2ασ2
(
η − 1
2
+ 1
)
(4.24)
According to equation (4.24), the expected growth rate consists of two
components. The first component is the deterministic growth rate in the
literature on perfect foresight endogenous growth, while the second component
is the additional growth rate generated by a diffusion process. The second
component indicates the degree to which the economic growth rate deviates
from its deterministic trend. This deviation depends on the degree of risk
aversion (η). Nevertheless, the negative value of η is ruled out since the aim of
households is to smooth their consumption paths13. Due to the stochastic
process of productive government spending, the economic growth becomes
larger than the growth rate in the perfect foresight endogenous growth model
when the government transfer contributes to households’ income paths. Q.E.D
The economic intuition behind this is the way in which households’ concern
about the risk resulting from stochastic productive government expenditure that
might affect their income paths via government transfer. To prepare for an
uncertain future income, risk-averse households may increase the amount they
save in order to smooth their consumption paths. This kind of saving is known
as precautionary saving, or emergency saving. It is also worth mentioning that
the level of precautionary saving crucially depends on the degree of risk aversion
of households.
The effect of precautionary saving on the long-run growth rate is interpreted
in the same way as it is in the works by Levhari and Srinivasan (1969) and by
13Due to the concavity of the utility function, the marginal utility of consumption should be
decreasing in consumption. Thus, the degree of risk aversion is strictly greater than zero.
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Sandmo (1970). When impatient households are sufficiently risk averse, they
will increase their precautionary saving because they are aware of the uncertain
future income that might affect their future consumption. In fact, there is a
tug-of-war between impatience and uncertainty that can be explained by the
intertemporal substitution and the income effects. On one hand, impatient
households may increase their current consumption against future consumption
in order to attain the maximum amount of happiness in the current period. This
effect is so called the intertemporal substitution effect. On the other hand,
they may decrease the current consumption and increase their precautionary
saving since they are aware of the uncertain future income. This precautionary
saving a result of the income effect. By allowing government transfer to have
an impact on households’ income paths, it can be observed that the income
effect completely dominates the intertemporal substitution effect in this model.
Although the relationship between the degree of risk aversion and economic
growth is indeed similar to that described in other stochastic endogenous growth
models, there are three different features that differentiates this model from
others. Firstly, our source of uncertainty is the stochastic productive government
expenditure that distinguishes this work from the paper by Turnovsky (1999)
and by Clemens and Soretz (2004), which applied the stochastic process to
production technology, and from the paper by de Hek (1999) that required
the stochastic property for knowledge creation. Secondly, the possibility that
the economic growth in the stochastic setting is smaller than the deterministic
growth is ruled out from this model. As the government transfer creates a large
income effect, it dominates the intertemporal substitution effect. This result
is in contrast to the results in the work by de Hek (1999) and by Clemens
and Soretz (2003). In their models, the substitution effect has a potential to
dominate the income effect when the degree of risk aversion is sufficiently low.
Lastly, the concept of risk neutral in stochastic endogenous growth models has
been challenged. For instance, de Hek (1999) and Clemens and Soretz (2003)
defined the terminology of risk neutral that the degree of risk aversion is equal
to one. As η = 1, it can be argued that households still possess the degree
of risk aversion since there is a decreasing of marginal utility in consumption.
Thus, this chapter defines the risk neutral at η = 0, which is consistent with
microeconomic textbooks.
Assuming that households are risk neutral (η = 0), one may suspect that
the expected growth rate (4.24) is still affected by the diffusion process of
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productive government expenditure. The economic explanation for this is a
role of government transfer. Although households are risk neutral, the impact
of government transfer on households’ income paths still exists. Consequently,
the consumption-saving decision is unavoidably affected and the expected
growth rate is changed. This explanation also supports why the income effect
in this model is particularly strong when government transfer and the degree
of risk aversion play a combined role.
4.3 Endogenous Growth and Fiscal Policy
The government levies permanent income tax to finance its productive
spending, whilst government consumption is subsidised by the percentage of
shock absorption from the diffusion process. In this section, the impact of both
fiscal instruments on economic growth is analysed carefully in order to
determine the conditions of growth-enhancing fiscal instruments for this
stochastic economy.
4.3.1 Permanent Income Tax
In the deterministic growth model with productive government expenditure,
the relationship between the long-run growth rate and permanent income tax
is illustrated by the inverted U-shape (Barro, 1990). An increase in permanent
income tax will enhance economic growth only if the marginal benefit of
providing for the public good is greater than the marginal cost. After the
marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefit, the growth rate reduces (Glomm
and Ravikumar, 1997). Nevertheless, comparing only the marginal benefit and
the marginal cost of the public good may not be sufficient to explain the
relationship between economic growth and permanent income tax in the
stochastic environment. Since the level of government transfer is affected by
the diffusion process of productive government expenditure, permanent income
tax that is used to finance such spending will play both direct and indirect
roles in determining economic growth in the long run.
The argument regarding the inverted U-shaped relationship between the
expected growth rate and permanent income tax is firstly explored by a
numerical example. Given the standard set of parameters14, the net growth
14The parametrical values for this calibration are A = 0.8, ρ = 0.0101, α = 0.3, σ = 0.4 and
θ = 0.1, which are the standard numbers in macroeconomic literature (Meeks et al., 2014).
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rate can be plotted as a function of permanent income tax when degrees of risk
aversion vary arbitrarily within a range [1,4]15. Using the MATLAB
programme, Figure 4.1 confirms the existence of the inverted U-shape
relationship when the degree of risk aversion is equal to one (η = 1).
Nonetheless, such an inverted U-shaped relationship will disappear if the
degree of risk aversion is sufficiently large. In the case where η > 1, the growth
rate is strictly increasing in permanent income tax. This means that the
government can arbitrarily increase permanent income tax within (0,1) to
maximise the growth rate.
Figure 4.1: Net Growth Rate as a Function of Permanent Income Tax
As the growth rate is an increasing function of permanent income tax, it
could be explained through the domination of the income effect over the
intertemporal substitution effect. When the degree of risk aversion is high,
households feel insecure about the uncertain future income that might affect
their future consumption and expected utility16. To prepare for this,
households may decide to increase an amount of precautionary saving. Once
the government knows that precautionary saving is positively adjusted by
risk-averse households, permanent income tax can be increased. On one hand,
an increase in precautionary saving will enhance private investment and
economic growth. On the other hand, the extra amount of permanent income
tax revenue can be used to supply greater public good, and thus boost up the
growth rate of economy. With these two effects, the long-run growth rate
increases in the permanent income tax rate if the degree of risk aversion is
15As rational households will smooth their consumption paths, the degree of risk aversion
should be greater than zero.
16With regard to the CRRA utility, the marginal utility is convex in consumption.
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sufficiently high. This is why the inverted U-shaped relationship between
economic growth and permanent income tax disappears17.
The point of intersection of these four curves indicates that the minimum
rate of permanent income tax that should be greater than 0.2127 or 21.27% to
ensure a positive growth rate for this economy. Therefore, the economy will
experience a negative growth rate if the government imposes an extremely low
permanent income tax rate.
The extinction of a famous inverted U-shape creates doubt about the
conditions for the growth-enhancing permanent income tax rate. Does a
condition of a marginal benefit of providing for the public good greater than
the marginal cost thereof still hold in the stochastic growth context? This
doubt leads to Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: The condition for growth-enhancing permanent income tax
rate that the marginal benefit of providing for the public good is greater than
its marginal cost thereof remains valid in the stochastic growth model in which
households are risk-averse agent.
Proof : Differentiating the stochastic growth rate (4.24) with respect to the
permanent income tax (τy) gives us:
∂γ
∂τy
=
1
αη
τ
1−α
α
y A
1
α
[
1− α
τy
− 1
]
+ (1− θ)2τ
2−α
α
y A
2
ασ2
[
η + 1
α
]
(4.25)
where its sign depends on the value of two square brackets. In order to have a
growth-enhancing permanent income tax rate, both square brackets should be
strictly positive. Hence, the necessary conditions are
η > −1 (4.26)
1− α > τy (4.27)
where the necessary condition (4.26) always holds in an economy with rise-averse
households. The second necessary condition (4.27) implies that the growth-
enhancing permanent income tax rate can be achieved when the marginal benefit
of providing for the public good (1− α) is greater than the marginal cost (τy).
This condition is also consistent with the implication of the growth-enhancing
tax rate in the perfect foresight growth model. Given the presence of these two
necessary conditions, Proposition 2 is proved. Q.E.D
17Although the inverted-U shape does not disappear, there is empirical evidence from the
OECD countries that have a high average growth-enhancing tax rate because of the size of
their family are small (De Witte and Moesen, 2010) and they have efficient public policies
(Afonso et al., 2005).
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In the case that the marginal benefit is lower than is the marginal cost,
policymakers may experience a trade-off between the deterministic growth and
its diffusion part while increasing permanent income tax. This is because raising
permanent income tax allows the government to provide more public good,
which will generate a positive diffusion for the stochastic growth rate. Thus, the
government can levy a higher permanent income tax rate as long as the benefits
of government transfer can compensate for the loss of permanent income.
4.3.2 Percentage of Shock Absorption
A percentage of shock absorption is another fiscal policy instrument that can
determine the impact of the stochastic productive government expenditure on
the volatility of income path. To choose an appropriate level for the percentage
of shock absorption, policymakers should first consider how it affects the long-
run growth rate.
Proposition 3: The growth-enhancing condition for the percentage of shock
absorption does not exist when households are risk-averse agents. An increase
in the percentage of shock absorption will reduce economic growth definitely.
Proof: Taking derivative of the stochastic growth rate (4.24) with respect
to the percentage of shock absorption (θ) gives:
∂γ
∂θ
= −(1− θ)(τyA) 2ασ2(η + 1) (4.28)
Based on equation (4.28), the percentage of shock absorption will boost the
stochastic growth rate if, and only if, the degree of risk aversion is below minus
one (η < −1). The low degree of risk aversion implies that households are risk-
lover. They have a motivation to increase consumption today against tomorrow
since they know that the government will rebate the government transfer to
them. Unfortunately, it is impossible to incorporate risk-lover households into
this model because their behaviour violates the assumption of the concavity
of the utility function. For the risk-averse households (η > 0), the stochastic
growth rate will decrease when the government increases the percentage of shock
absorption. Consequently, the growth-enhancing condition for the percentage
of shock absorption does not exist in this economy. Q.E.D
In Figure 4.2, the numerical example confirms that an increase in the
percentage of shock absorption will reduce the long-run growth rate slightly
given the specific set of parameters18. The economic intuition is that an
18α = 0.3, ρ = 0.0101, σ = 0.5, A = 1.5, η = 4 and τy = 0.3
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increase in the percentage of shock absorption will reduce the volatility of
government transfer, as well as of precautionary saving. Therefore, the
expected growth rate will decrease.
Figure 4.2: Net Growth Rate (γ) as a Function of the Percentage of Shock
Absorption (θ)
With regard to Proposition 2 and 3, the policy recommendation is to levy
the permanent income tax rate because it can enhance economic growth in the
long run. By contrast, the percentage of shock absorption should be applied
carefully since it is harmful for growth and the government consumption is
purely waste. Nonetheless, the percentage of shock absorption is a useful fiscal
instrument. The government can use it to determine the impact of stochastic
productive government expenditure via government transfer on the volatility of
households’ income path. This will help a decentralised government achieve its
desired level of the growth rate in the long run.
4.4 Centralised vs Decentralised Economy
In the previous section, it was suggested that policymakers should increase
permanent income tax and reduce the percentage of shock absorption for
growth-enhancing purpose. However, it did not suggest the ways of
implementing both fiscal instruments to achieve the first-best outcomes that
can be obtained as a result of having the benevolent social planner.
Consequently, in this section, the first-best fiscal policy is investigated to
eliminate the wedge between centralised and the decentralised economies.
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4.4.1 Centralised Economy
The social planner will provide the first-best solution for the economy by
internalising households’ degree of risk aversion and the externalities from
stochastic productive government expenditure. Thus, proportional congestion
and government transfer are taken into account. The objective of the social
planner is to maximise a representative household’s utility
U(C/N) = E0
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt · (C/N)
1−η − 1
1− η dt (4.29)
subject to the aggregate resource constraint,
dK(t) = Y (t)− C(t)− dG(t) (4.30)
where the aggregate production function (Y ), stochastic aggregate government
expenditure (dG), productive government spending (Gk), government
consumption (Gc) and government transfer (T ) are
Y (t) = AK(t)αGk(t)
1−α · dt (4.31)
dG(t) = Gk(t)dt+Gc(t) + T (t) (4.32)
Gk(t) = φY (t) (4.33)
Gc(t) = φ
′Gk(t)σdu (4.34)
T (t) = (1− φ′)Gk(t)σdu (4.35)
in which φ and φ′ are fractions that indicate the level of productive government
expenditure and government consumption, respectively. The value function of
centralised economy can be constructed by applying the method of dynamic
programming and Ito’s Lemma:
ρV (K) =
(C(t)/N)1−η − 1
1− η − ρV (K) + V
′(K)[(1− φ)AKαG1−αk − C]
+
1
2
V ′′(K)[(1− φ′)σφAKαG1−αk ]2
(4.36)
After choosing the optimal amount of consumption and saving, the optimal
consumption path and the expected growth rate for a centralised economy can
be written as follows19:
19The derivation is provided in Appendix C.2
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λs =
C
K
=
ρ
η
− 1
η
(1− φ)αφ 1−αα A 1α
+ (1− φ)φ 1−αα A 1α + α
(
(1− φ′)σ(φA) 1α
)2
− 1
2
(η + 1)
(
(1− φ′)σ(φA) 1α
)2 (4.37)
γs =
1
η
[
α(1− φ)φ 1−αα A 1α − ρ
]
+
(
(1− φ′)σ(φA) 1α
)2 · (η + 1
2
− α
) (4.38)
where λs is the constant propensity to consume capital and γs is expected growth
rate in the centralised economy. Then, centralised and decentralised economies
can be compared.
Proposition 4: In contrast to Turnovsky (1999), the stochastic growth rate
in a centralised economy is smaller than it is in a decentralised economy when
productive government expenditure follows the stochastic process and the public
good is subject to proportional congestion.
Proof : To compare a decentralised economy with a centralised economy,
the flow of government expenditure should be the same for both economies.
This implies that the fraction of productive government expenditure is set to
be equal to the permanent income tax rate (φ = τy), and that the fraction of
government consumption is the same rate as the percentage of shock absorption
(φ′ = θ). Therefore, the growth rate of a centralised economy (4.38) can be
rewritten as
γs =
1
η
[
α(1− τy)τ
1−α
α
y A
1
α − ρ
]
+
(
(1− θ)σ(τyA) 1α
)2 · (η − 1
2
+ 1− α
) (4.39)
where γs is the growth rate of a centralised economy.
From equation (4.39) the difference between the stochastic growth rate of
centralised and decentralised economies can be found by subtracting equation
(4.24) with (4.39).
γ − γs = 1
η
(1− α)(1− τy)τ
1−α
α
y A
1
α + α[(1− θ)σ(τyA) 1α ]2 > 0 (4.40)
According to equation (4.40), the expected growth rate of a centralised
economy is smaller than the growth rate of a decentralised economy for two
reasons. Firstly, the deterministic part of the growth rate in a centralised
economy is smaller than it is in a decentralised economy due to the elasticity
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of income with respect to private capital (α). Since the social planner
internalises the externalities from the public good and proportional congestion,
the private capital elasticity of income (α) is taken into account for the
marginal product of private capital. Hence, the rate of return on capital in a
centralised economy is lower than it is in a decentralised economy. Secondly,
the social planner also internalises the effect of the externalities from the
public good and proportional congestion on government transfer. By
considering the public good elasticity of income (1 − α), the social planner
observes a lower fluctuation of income flow. Subsequently, the amount of
precautionary saving in a centralised economy is not too high. This contrasts
with the individual households who treat government transfer as a lump-sum
amount and allow it to have a significant effect on their income paths. As a
result, the diffusion part of the growth rate in a centralised economy is always
smaller than it is in the decentralised one20. Q.E.D
Intuitively, the overestimation of the return on private capital (R) and the
exaggeration of government transfer (T ) contribute to a high volatility of
households’ income in a decentralised economy. With the high volatility of
income, risk-averse households may increase their precautionary saving as
protection against uncertainty. This increases the long-run growth rate
tremendously. By contrast, the social planner has a precise knowledge of the
return on capital and the fluctuation of households’ income by considering all
possible factors. The planner then chooses low levels of saving and growth
rates with a low volatility of income paths to obtain the greatest social welfare.
Furthermore, the numerical result also supports our findings. Given that all
parameters are the same for both economies21, Figure 4.3 confirms that the
growth rate of a decentralised economy is too high compared to the growth
rate in a centralised economy.
The theoretical justification is that a centralised economy can be considered
to be the Arrow-Romer economy that is exposed to both capital risk and to
income risk (Clemens and Soretz, 2003). The (public) capital risk is similar to
a decentralised economy in which the (public) capital risk creates an uncertain
income path for households. However, a centralised economy also experiences
20This result is also consistent to the previous literature in which the public good is subject to
congestion that a degree of congestion reduces the long-run growth rate (Eicher and Turnovsky,
2000).
21Again, we used the standard parametric values in the macroeconomic literature; α = 0.3,
ρ = 0.0101, σ = 0.4, A = 0.8, η = 0.6 and θ = φ′ = 0.3.
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the income risk generated by the factor of income distribution from the public
good (1− α). In other words, income risk is another factor that contributes to
the uncertain amount of income. Due to the risk sharing between both capital
and income risks, the stream of income may be less volatile in a centralised
economy.
Figure 4.3: Comparison of Growth and Permanent Income Tax between
Centralised (γs) and Decentralised (γ) Economies
In our proportional congestion case, the difference between centralised and
decentralised economies is in stark contrast to the work of Turnovsky (1999).
In his work, the marginal product of capital is equal to the average product of
capital when the externalities derived from the public good and proportional
congestion are taken into account. This implies that output is a linear function
of capital on both individual and on aggregate levels. Subsequently, the effect
of proportional congestion on output is vanished completely due to the market
clearing condition22. There is no doubt that, in Turnovsky’s (1999) model, the
decentralised economy simply replicates the centralised economy.
In conclusion, Turnovsky’s (1999) result cannot be generally applied to the
stochastic growth model when the stochastic process is not generated by
output itself and government transfer is not allowed. In the case of stochastic
productive government expenditure, individual firms and the social planner
experience different production technology even though the aggregate
production technology is the same. The social planner encounters the
Cobb-Douglas production technology after internalising the externalities
derived from the public good and proportional congestion. On the contrary,
22See Turnovsky (1999), equation (22) p.558 where δ = 0.
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individual firms observe that output is a linear function of capital regardless of
the externalities. Thus, the outcomes for each economy will never be the same.
4.4.2 The First-Best Fiscal Instruments
In the last section, it was proved that the saving and growth rates in a
decentralised economy is too high when compared to the social planner’s
outcomes. Therefore, fiscal instruments should be used to reduce the amount
of savings and to enhance a level of aggregate consumption, together with
social welfare. To maximise social welfare, the government should apply fiscal
instruments that can imitate the first-best solutions. Due to the fact that
there are two fiscal instruments in a decentralised economy, namely permanent
income tax and the percentage of shock absorption, the first-best fiscal policy
instrument is then explored in this section.
To mimic the first-best world, all the economic variables in the decentralised
economy are adjusted to be the same as those in the social planner’s economy.
Accordingly, the consumption-capital ratio (C/K) and the economic growth
rate (γ) should be the same in both economies. By equating (4.24) and (4.39),
the permanent income tax rate can be written as the implicit function of the
percentage of shock absorption, as follow:
F (τy, θ) = (1− τy)τ−
1+α
α
y +
(
α
1− α
)
(1− θ)2ησ2A 1α = 0 (4.41)
which can be exploited to determine the relationship between the fiscal
instruments. Taking the total differentiation of equation (4.41) with respect to
permanent income tax and the percentage of shock absorption, it can be
observed that permanent income tax has a negative relationship with the
percentage of shock absorption when households have a positive degree of risk
aversion (η > 0).
dτy
dθ
= − 2α
2η(1− θ)τ
1+2α
α
y σ2A
1
α
(1− α) · [(1 + α)(1− τy) + ατy] < 0 (4.42)
Equation (4.42) could be explained by economic intuition. To achieve the
first-best solution, the government is required to raise private consumption and
social welfare levels. An increase in the percentage of shock absorption (θ) will
definitely reduce the volatility (risk) of government transfer (T ). Consequently,
risk-averse households will decrease their precautionary saving and enjoy
consumption. Similarly, the government can encourage private consumption by
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decreasing the permanent income tax rate. A low level of the permanent
income tax rate (τy) is less likely to distort the households’ consumption.
Therefore, the direction of permanent income tax should be the opposite of the
percentage of shock absorption in order to maximise social welfare23.
Although the implication of the fiscal instruments is quite clear, there is a
special case in which the government chooses the percentage of shock absorption
to be the same as the permanent income tax rate. By setting τy = θ = τ in
equation (4.41), the first-best income tax rate (τ) will take the following form:
(1− τ)τ 1+αα = − 1− α
ηασ2A
1
α
(4.43)
which is a function of exogenous parameters (η, α, σ and A). Hence, the
government should consider these parametrical values in the economy before
adjusting the income tax rate to achieve the first-best outcomes.
4.5 Welfare Analysis
4.5.1 Trade-off between Growth and Welfare
In a decentralised economy, the amount of savings and the growth rate are too
high; therefore, social welfare that relies on a level of consumption will be low.
To achieve the first-best social welfare, the optimal amount of consumption in a
decentralised economy should be the same as it is in a centralised economy. This
optimal amount of consumption can be found from the first-order conditions
obtained in both economies
V ′(k) = c−η
V ′s (Ks) =
(
C
N
)−η 1
N
where the subscript ‘s’ refers to the social planner’s economic variable.
Using the fact that the consumption is a proportion of capital (c = λk)
and taking the integral to the first-order conditions, it is clear that the optimal
amount of consumption is determined by the value function of capital in each
economy.
23The opposite will be true if households are risk-seeking (η < 0). An increase in the
percentage of shock absorption leads to the overconsumption. Thus, the government will
reduce the extra amount of consumption by increasing the permanent income tax rate.
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V (k) = c−η · k
1− η (4.44)
Vs(K) =
(
C
N
)−η
· ks
1− η (4.45)
To obtain the same level of consumption and social welfare, the value
function in the decentralised economy should be equal to the value function
from the centralised economy. That is,
Vs(ks) = V (k) (4.46)
which also indicates the same welfare level in both economies.
Substituting equations (4.44) and (4.45) into (4.46) and rewrite them in
terms of the consumption-capital ratio, the condition (4.46) for reaching the
first-best welfare target is illustrated in equation (4.47).
k1−η ·
( c
k
)−η
= k1−ηs ·
(
C
K
)−η
s
(4.47)
Applying the market clearing conditions (K = Nk and C = Nc) and the
definition of a constant propensity to consume (λ) to equation (4.47), the
condition for the first-best social welfare can be specified by a relative amount
of capital ratio.
k(t)
ks(t)
=
[
(C(t)/K(t))s
(C(t)/K(t))
] η
η−1
=
[
λs
λ
] η
η−1
(4.48)
Evaluating equation (4.48) at period 0, the excess amount of capital in the
decentralised economy relative to the centralised economy is alternatively
calculated by the ratio of the constant propensity to consume capital (λ), as
presented in equation (4.49).
k0 − ks,0
ks,0
=
[
λs
λ
] η
η−1
− 1 (4.49)
When the excess amount of initial capital is equal to zero, it means that the
decentralised economy achieves the first-best welfare target. Nevertheless, the
decentralised economy will experience the welfare loss if the excess amount of
initial capital is positive24.
24The idea of welfare loss expressed in term of variation in capital is consistent with the
work of Turnovsky (1999).
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Intuitively, this excess amount of initial capital is caused by a lack of
consideration of the externalities from proportional congestion and the
volatility of government transfer. As a result, households will increase their
savings and reduce consumption because of the uncertain income paths.
Equation (4.49) demonstrates the trade-off between economic growth and
social welfare. To increase the social welfare, the government should
implement a fiscal policy to encourage households to sacrifice the excess
amount of capital and to consume more. A lower savings will result in a
reduction in the growth rate.
This trade-off between growth and welfare contradicts the underlying result
suggested by Barro (1990), in which the same conditions for growth
maximisation and welfare maximisation may be obtained. In the deterministic
growth model, Barro (1990) argued that the utility maximisation problem
coincides the welfare maximisation problem if the following three conditions
hold. Firstly, the households’ utility depends solely on consumption. Secondly,
the utility is bounded. Thirdly, the output elasticity of the public good is
constant. Despite the fact that all three conditions are satisfied in our growth
model with the stochastic process, the fear of uncertainty increases economic
growth but reduces social welfare. In fact, the existence of the trade-off
between growth and welfare is consistent with the paper by Futagami et al.
(1993), which included the stock of productive government expenditure into
the production process in the deterministic growth model, and the paper by
Chatterjee et al. (2003), in which the trade-off occurred in a small open
economy with a pure transfer.
4.5.2 Trade-off between Risky and Riskless Economy
Although the social planner provides the highest social welfare level that could
be possibly obtained, a centralised economy will still experience a welfare loss
due to the volatility of productive government expenditure (σ). By equating the
value function of a riskless economy and the value function of a risky economy
(Vf (Kf,0) = Vr(Kr,0)), the welfare loss in a centralised economy can be also
measured by the excess amount of initial capital in a risky economy,
Kr,0 −Kf,0
Kf,0
=
[
λf
λr
] η
η−1
− 1 (4.50)
where subscript ‘r’ and ‘f’ refer to a risky and a riskless economies, respectively.
λf is obtained from equation (4.37) when σ = 0 and λr = λs.
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From equation (4.50), it can be concluded that the social planner has to
sacrifice the amount of initial capital in a risky economy to reach the highest
social welfare at the same level as it is in a riskless economy25. When the
economy experiences a high volatility of productive government spending, it
will suffer from a substantial loss of welfare. This conclusion is also supported
by the numerical example, as represented in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Welfare Loss (%) Measured by the Variation of Initial Capital
Given the specific set of parameters in standard macroeconomic literature,
the discount rate (ρ) is equal to 0.0101 while the elasticity of output with respect
to capital (α) is 0.3. A constant technology parameter (A) is equal to 0.8.
With regard to the policy instruments, the fractions that indicate the level of
productive government spending (φ = τy) and government consumption (φ
′ = θ)
are set to be 0.3 and 0.1, respectively. The selected value range of degree of risk
aversion (η) is chosen from 2 to 5, based on the work of Brown and Gibbons
(1985)26. In addition, the standard deviation of government expenditure on
economic affairs is used as a proxy for the standard deviation of productive
government spending (σ). It varies from 0.3-0.4 across European countries when
25This is similar to the work of Epaulard and Pommeret (2003), which measured the cost
of welfare from the volatility by the percentage of capital that the representative agent has to
surrender at period 0.
26Brown and Gibbons (1985) applied a method moment of estimator (MME) to measure the
value of relative risk aversion from the aggregate consumption and NYSE data from 1926 to
1981.
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considering at least 12 European countries during 2006-201427. With respect
to all corresponding parameters, Figure 4.4 illustrates the welfare loss when
households’ degree of risk aversion (η) and the standard deviation of productive
spending (σ) vary. The contour curves indicate the welfare loss from the lowest
(south-west) to the highest levels (north-east). This means that an increase in
the volatility of productive spending, together with the degree of risk aversion
will lead to a significant loss of social welfare.
4.5.3 Certainty Equivalent Interest Rate
In a centralised economy, the welfare loss occurs when the economy is subject
to uncertainty caused by the stochastic process of productive government
expenditure. However, the welfare loss can be eliminated in the following three
cases. Firstly, the government spends all the amount of the diffusion parts of
productive government expenditure on the government consumption that is
completely waste (φ′ = 1). Thus, households’ income is not affected by the
volatility of government transfer (T = 0). Second, the volatility of productive
spending will have no impact on growth and welfare when households’ degree
of risk aversion (η) is equal to 2α− 1. Lastly, the social planner may suggest a
certainty equivalent interest rate that covers the volatility of the aggregate
wealth of households from the government transfer. In these three cases,
economic growth and social welfare in a risky economy will be the same as in a
riskless economy.
The certainty equivalent interest rate (rc) can be derived from the optimal
aggregate consumption, the aggregate private capital and the aggregate wealth
chosen by the social planner28. After internalising externalities from the public
good and government transfer, the certainty equivalent interest rate (rc) is:
rc = (1− φ)φ
1−α
α αA
1
α − αη(1− φ′)2(φA) 2ασ2 (4.51)
where rc is also known as the social risk-adjusted after tax return on aggregate
capital accumulation, and αη(1 − φ′)2(φA) 2ασ2 is the risk premium in this
stochastic environment. If the certainty equivalent interest rate is applied to
the economy, it is more likely that households will reduce their precautionary
saving. The welfare loss would then never be incurred in a risky economy.
27According to Eurostat data, the standard deviation of government spending on economic
affairs is smaller when the number of European countries increases. See Appendix C.3 for the
calculation.
28See Appendix C.4 for the derivation.
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4.6 Conclusion
The impact of fiscal policy on economic growth and social welfare was analysed
through the stochastic endogenous growth model. In a decentralised economy,
risk-averse households receive the government transfer that is generated by the
stochastic process of productive government expenditure. Due to the volatility of
government transfer, households will increase precautionary saving against the
uncertain future income. This amount of precautionary saving can be explained
by the domination of the income effect over the intertemporal substitution effect.
As a result, the expected growth rate becomes larger than the growth rate in
the perfect foresight economy.
According to the numerical result, the inverted U-shaped relationship
between economic growth and permanent income tax disappears if the degree
of risk aversion is sufficiently high. The argument that the growth rate is an
increasing function of permanent income tax is justified by a high level of
precautionary saving. However, the necessary condition for the growth
enhancing permanent income tax rate that the marginal benefit of providing
for the public good should be greater than the marginal cost remains valid in
the stochastic context. On the other hand, the growth-enhancing condition for
the percentage of shock absorption does not exist in this economy.
In contrast to Turnovsky’s (1999) findings, the growth rates in centralised
and decentralised economies are not the same. After internalising the volatility
of government transfer and the externalities from the public good subject to
proportional congestion, the social planner experiences the Cobb-Douglas
production technology while individual firms observe the linear production
technology in capital. Due to the exaggeration of capital return and the
volatility of income, the saving and growth rates in a decentralised economy
are too high. Therefore, the first-best fiscal instruments can be used to obtain
the first-best outcomes. The government should decrease permanent income
tax to encourage private consumption, but should increase the percentage of
shock absorption to reduce the volatility of government transfer. To achieve
the same welfare target, a decentralised economy should compensate for
welfare loss by sacrificing the initial capital. Nevertheless, the welfare target in
a risky economy will be lower than the welfare level in a riskless economy.
Accordingly, the social planner can either sacrifice the initial capital to cover
the welfare loss from risks, or apply the certainty equivalent interest rate.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Productive government spending can be considered as a source of endogenous
growth in one economy. This spending may take various forms, such as public
capital, public education and the public good that incorporates with private
capital in the production function. Even though the diminishing marginal
return of each type of capital still exists, the combination of private capital
and public capital will prevent the marginal product of aggregate capital from
having zero rate of return. Despite the fact that an increase in productive
government expenditure undoubtedly raises the output and economic growth,
the magnitude of growth depends on how the government levies the
distortionary taxation to finance its expenditure. A high level of distortionary
tax rate will create a heavy tax burden and distort the households’ decisions.
Therefore, the compensation between the positive effect of productive
government expenditure and the negative effect from distortionary taxation
leads to the different states of economy that have been clarified throughout
this thesis.
As discussed in the second chapter, the government provides public capital
stock that is used in private production function, and levies procyclical
consumption tax to finance public investment in each period regarding the
balanced budget rule. The contribution of this chapter can be characterised by
the feature of consumption tax that depends on the state-contingent variables
and the time-invariant fiscal policy rule. Under certain conditions, it can be
observed that public investment and procyclical consumption tax have a
potential to generate the multiplicity of balanced growth paths (BGPs). Two
BGPs were found from the evidence of a Laffer curve since there were two
intersections of the detrended tax revenue curve and the detrended public
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investment line. Consequently, the economy can converge either to the lowest
BGP or to the highest BGP when the inverse elasticity of intertemporal
substitution and the degree of procyclicality are sufficiently large. As we are
aware of the poverty trap and the aggregate instability, the local stability
properties of the lowest BGP were studied. Assuming that the lowest BGP
was sufficiently close to zero, the sufficient conditions for the local
indeterminacy were carefully derived. Unlike the global indeterminacy case,
the lowest BGP is locally indeterminate if, and only if, the consumption tax is
mildly procyclical. This analytical derivation is also supported by the
numerical example. By choosing a value of exogenous parameters that is
consistent with the sufficient conditions, the numerical example shows that
aggregate instability occurs around the lowest BGPs when a purely extrinsic
uncertainty is introduced and the degree of procyclicality is not too large.
Accordingly, policymakers should implement a procyclical consumption tax
policy with caution. A possible extension of this chapter would be to check the
robustness of the results when relaxing the balanced budget rule and
introducing the public debt as another fiscal policy instrument.
The third chapter demonstrated how public education and labour income
tax affected economic growth in the three-period overlapping generations
model where impure altruistic parents provided private tuition to their
children. The growth-maximising tax rate was explored first, since it could
prevent the economy from entering into the growth-reducing area of the
Armey curve. To determine the growth-maximising tax rate, the steady-state
growth rate was investigated and written as a function of labour income tax.
The first-order derivative of growth with respect to labour income tax is then
calculated to prove the existence of growth-maximising tax rate. By studying
the lower bound and the upper bound of the labour income tax rate within a
feasible range between zero and one, at least one growth-maximising tax rate
was found from the real roots of a cubic function of labour income tax.
Furthermore, the second-order derivative confirmed that the roots of cubic
function satisfied the sufficient condition for the local maximum. Nevertheless,
it is extremely difficult to draw economic intuition from the formula for the
growth-maximising tax rate due to the complexity of the roots.
The second finding of the third chapter was related to the over-provision of
public education when the government misconceived of the ability of parents to
provide private tuition for their children. Once again, the growth-maximising
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tax rate was evaluated in the economy that only had public education system.
When there is a misperception concerning the existence of private tuition, the
growth-maximising tax rate lies outside of its feasible range of value between
zero and one. The corner solution exists, and it implies that the over-provision
of public education arises if the government overestimates the benefits of
public education. Therefore, policymakers should reallocate the funding of
public education carefully by taking private tuition into account. Not only can
this prevent the government from wasting resources on public education, it can
also reduce the distortion created by labour income tax. Finally, it is worth
mentioning that, in this paper, the discount factor and the degree of impure
altruism are assumed to be the same for reasons of simplicity. Thus, the most
direct extension of the second chapter would be to distinguish the degree of
impure altruism from the discount factor in order to study its impact on the
intergenerational transfers and the provision of public education.
In the fourth chapter, the stochastic endogenous growth model was
employed to study the impact of productive government expenditure and fiscal
instruments on economic growth and social welfare. A random shock was
introduced into productive per-capita government expenditure, as it is a source
of uncertainty in this kind of economy. In this scenario, the government would
decide to devote the deterministic parts of productive spending to the public
good that is subject to proportional congestion, and partially transfers the
stochastic part to households. This type of government transfer creates the
volatility in households’ income paths. Given a stochastic setting, the economy
will experience a higher growth rate than it will in the perfect foresight
economy. Since households are aware of the uncertain future income flow, they
will increase their precautionary saving to smooth their consumption paths.
Thus, in our case, the income effect strictly dominates the intertemporal
substitution effect. Moreover, the difference in the growth rates also challenges
the concept of the inverted U-shaped relationship between economic growth
and permanent income tax. Although the numerical example shows that the
inverted U-shaped relationship disappears when the degree of risk aversion is
sufficiently large, the condition of growth-enhancing permanent income tax
remains valid. However, there is no growth-enhancing condition for the
percentage of shock absorption regarding the concavity of the utility function.
In contrast to Turnovsky’s (1999) work, the existence of the difference
between centralised and decentralised economies can be demonstrated via the
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difference in growth rates. In the case of proportional congestion, the growth
rate of a centralised economy is always smaller than the growth rate of a
decentralised economy. The theoretical justification for this difference is the
way that the social planner internalises the externalities from the public good
that is subject to proportional congestion, but individual households and firms
do not. Therefore, the social planner will choose a small growth rate that
reduces the volatility of households’ income streams in order to obtain the
highest level of social welfare. Due to the difference between the economies, a
decentralised government has an opportunity to employ the first-best fiscal
instruments to achieve the first-best welfare target. To increase private
consumption as well as social welfare, the government should reduce the
permanent income tax rate, but increase the percentage of shock absorption.
With regard to the welfare analysis, the magnitude of the welfare loss in a
decentralised economy can be measured as an excess amount of the initial
capital when compared to a centralised economy. This excess amount of the
initial capital also indicates that the trade-off between economic growth and
social welfare is unavoidable. In addition, the trade-off between risky and
riskless economies in terms of social welfare can be illustrated by the variation
in the initial capital. When the degree of risk aversion and the volatility of
productive spending are large, a risky economy will suffer greatly from a loss
of social welfare.
These three chapters justified the role of productive government
expenditure and taxation as sources of endogenous growth in an economy.
However, policymakers should apply the fiscal policy to enhance economic
growth with caution, since it could lead to the multiplicity of balanced growth
paths, aggregate instability, the over-provision of public education and the
reduction of social welfare. Furthermore, the policy implications in the entire
thesis has been suggested by considering the assumptions of the new classical
school of thought, such as the rational expectation, and the flexibility of price
and wage. Thus, our policy recommendations may not be applicable to an
economy in which nominal rigidity occurs.
The limitation of this thesis can be categorised according to three main
factors. The first factor is the assumption of a constant return to scale
technology (CRTS) which is a knife-edge in this study. The property of a
constant return on aggregate capital ensures that one economy will have a
constant endogenous growth rate over time. However, the production
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technology may exhibit the increasing-return-to-scale (IRTS), or non-convex
technology, as described by Romer (1986) and by Lucas (1988). Thus, the
effect of productive government expenditure on economic growth in an
economy with an increasing return on aggregate capital has been left for future
work. The second factor is the lack of empirical evidence testing for the policy
recommendations. As Solow (1994) criticised the endogenous growth model for
being very ‘un-robust’, it may not be applicable to the empirical evidences
across countries in which the constant return on aggregate capital may not
occur. Therefore, another possible extension of this research is to have a
robustness check of our policy suggestions. The final factor is the government’s
balanced budget rule, which is employed throughout all the chapters in this
thesis. The criticism of the balanced budget rule is that a government may not
balance its budget in each period since the economy is more painful during the
economic downturn. For this reason, the constraint of the government
balanced budget rule should be relaxed, or applied with caution.
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Appendix A
A.1 Further details on how to obtain the system
(2.13)-(2.14)
Equation (2.13) can be obtained as follows. Combining the firms’ FOC with the
intertemporal budget constraint of households and rewriting it in a form of new
variables, x ≡ gk and y ≡ ck , leads to:
k˙
k
= Ax1−α − δ − (1 + τ)y = Ax1−α − δ − (1 + τcxη)y
where the last equality is based on the fact that τ = τcx
η. Similarly, the
government budget constraint can be rewritten as follows:
g˙
g
= τyx−1 − δ = τcyxη−1 − δ
Since x˙x =
g˙
g − k˙k , it must be that
x˙
x
= (τcx
η−1 + 1 + τcxη)y −Ax1−α
With regard to equation (2.14), the steps to obtain it are the following.
Combining the Euler equation with the firms’ FOCs and rewriting it in a form
of new variables leads to
c˙
c
=
1
σ
(
αAx1−α − δ − ρ− τ˙
1 + τ
)
From the fiscal policy (2.12), we have that
log(1 + τ) = log(1 + τcx
η) ⇒ τ˙
1 + τ
=
τcηx
η
1 + τcxη
x˙
x
Substituting this last expression into the Euler equation and considering that
y˙
y =
c˙
c − k˙k , it gives
y˙
y
=
1
σ
[
αAx1−α − δ − ρ− τcηx
η
1 + τcxη
x˙
x
]
− [Ax1−α − δ − (1 + τcxη)y] .
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A.2 Further details on the proof of Proposition 1
A.2.1 Conditions for T˜ (0) ≥ δ
With regard to the conditions which emerge from imposing T˜ (0) ≥ δ, it can be
observed that
T˜ (0) = τcA
τcΓα−1 + Γα−η + τcΓα
≥ δ
Note that, the denominator is always strictly positive so we may rewrite the
inequality as
τc[A− (Γα−1 + Γα)δ] ≥ δΓα−η
Since Γ =
(
δ+ρ
αA
) 1
1−α
, it follows immediately that
A− (Γα−1 + Γα)δ > 0 ⇔ A > δ
1−α(δ + ρ)
[(1− α)δ + ρ]1−ααα ≡ A
Assuming A > A, then T˜ (0) ≥ δ if and only if
τc ≥ δΓ
α−η
A− (Γα−1 + Γα)δ ≡ τ c
where τ c > 0. On the other hand, the case 0 < A ≤ A is not admissible since it
implies that T˜ (0) ≥ δ only if Γ or δ are negative for any positive values of τc.
A.2.2 Existence of (at most) a critical point for T˜ (γ)
Second, T˜ (γ) has a unique critical point. In fact, it can be shown that
dT˜
dγ
=
dT˜
dx∗
· dx
∗
dγ
=
−Aτc dx∗dγ x∗α−1
[τcx∗α−1 + x∗α−η + τcx∗α]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
[τc(α−1)x∗−1 +(α−η)x∗−η+τcα]
and therefore
dT˜
dγ
= 0 ⇔ τc(α− 1)x∗−1 + (α− η)x∗−η + τcα︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡g(x∗)
= 0
Now, there exists always a unique positive root xˆ of g(x∗) = 0. This is a
direct consequences of the following arguments. First, the function g(x∗) is not
continuous in x∗ = 0 and has a critical point at x• =
(
η(α−η)
τc(1−α)
) 1
η−1
. Second,
lim
x∗→+∞ g(x
∗) =

(τcα)
− if η > α
(τcα)
+ if 0 < η < α
+∞ if η < 0
and lim
x∗→0+
g(x∗) = −∞ always
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Combining this information, there is always the case that g(x∗) intersects the
x∗-axis only once. Since x∗ is a one-to-one function of γ, we can confirm that a
unique critical point γˆ of T˜ (γ) can be found in the extended domain γ > − δ+ραAσ .1
Therefore, T˜ (γ) has at most a critical point in the domain γ ≥ 0.
A.2.3 Additional conditions for the case of σ < 1
Proposition 1 has been proved for the case that the inverse elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is strictly greater than one (σ > 1). However, in the
case of σ < 1, it is possible to show that a unique BGP can arise by adding
two following conditions2:
a) σ > 1− ργ for a bounded utility
b) σ > α for c0 > 0
Proof of condition a): From the CRRA utility function and the definition
of BGP, the utility function can be written as:
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt · (c0e
γt)1−σ − 1
1− σ dt (A.1)
Executing the integral and omitting the constant part, the attainable utility is
obtained as follow:
U =
c1−σ0
(1− σ)(ρ− γ(1− σ)) · e
−(ρ−γ(1−σ))t (A.2)
To have a bounded utility, ρ−γ(1−σ) should be positive which means that the
value of σ is:
σ > 1− ρ
γ
(A.3)
which is consistent to the condition a)3.
Proof of condition b): According to the intertemporal equilibrium, the
households’ budget constraint can be written as:
k˙
k
= A
(g
k
)1−α − δ − (1 + τ)( c
k
)
(A.4)
1In fact, looking at equation (2.16) we have that γ → − δ+ρ
αAσ
as x∗ → 0+
2The case of σ = 1 was proved in the paper by Giannitsarou (2007) in which a unique
steady state was found.
3This condition also satisfies the transversality condition:
lim
t→+∞
k0
c−σ0 (1 + τ)
· e−(ρ−γ(1−σ))t = 0
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Using the definition of BGP and the fact from the consumption tax function,
equation (A.4) will be
γ = A
(g
k
)1−α − δ − (1 + τc (g
k
)η)( c
k
)
(A.5)
Evaluating the Euler equation; c˙c =
1
σ
[
αA
( g
k
)1−α − δ − ρ], at the BGP, we get
g
k
=
[
σγ + δ + ρ
αA
] 1
1−α
(A.6)
Substituting (A.6) into (A.5), the ratio of consumption to capital is
c
k
=
(σ − α)γ + (1− α)δ + ρ
α(1 + τ•)
(A.7)
where τ• = τc
[
σγ+δ+ρ
αA
] η
1−α
. Suppose that this economy initially starts on the
BGP, the initial value of consumption and the initial value of capital should
satisfy the equation (A.7) always. Given a positive value of the initial capital
(k0 > 0), the initial value of consumption (c0) will be
c0 =
[
(σ − α)γ + (1− α)δ + ρ
α(1 + τ•)
]
k0 (A.8)
From equation (A.8), the initial value of consumption is positive (c0 > 0) if, and
only if, σ > α. Therefore, the condition b) is proved.
Combining conditions a) and b) with the conditions from Proposition 1, a
unique BGP exists in the case of 0 < σ < 1 when all the following conditions
are satisfied:
A > A, τc > τ c, σ > 1−
ρ
γ
and σ > α (A.9)
where the additional conditions; σ > 1 − ργ and σ > α, are always respected
since we assume that σ > 1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Given the properties of the function T˜ (γ) found in Proposition 1, two BGPs
exist as long as the following two conditions hold:
a) δ − ε ≤ T˜ (0) < δ, for any ε > 0 sufficiently small real number;
b) dT˜ (γ)dγ
∣∣∣
γ=0
> 1
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In fact, condition a) means that the curve T˜ (γ) is slightly below the straight
line γ + δ at γ = 0 but it is steeper for condition b). Therefore, the curve must
intersect the straight line twice since T˜ (γ) is continuous, has a unique critical
point and limγ→∞ T˜ (γ) = 0+.
Step 1 – Parameters Conditions for a) to hold. Using the same
argument of the proof of Proposition 1, it can be proved that for any given
ε sufficiently small positive constant we have that T˜ (0) ≥ δ − ε if A > A(ε)
and τc ≥ τ c(ε) where τ c(ε) ≡ (δ−ε)Γ
α−η
A−(Γ−1+1)Γα(δ−ε) , A(ε) ≡ (δ−ε)
1−α(δ+ρ)
[(1−α)δ+ρ+αε]1−ααα ,
τ c(ε) ≤ τ c and A(ε) ≤ A with equality when ε = 0, as shown in Appendix
A.4.1. In the same Appendix, we also show that  ≡ τ c − τ c(ε) and ε are
infinitesimals of the same order.4
Based on previous results, it is also the case that T˜ (0) < δ if A > A and
τc < τ c. Summing up, condition a) always holds if
A > A and τ c(ε) = τ c −  < τc < τ c.
Step 2 – Parameters Conditions for b) to hold. Taking into account
Appendix A.2.2, we have that
dT˜ (γ)
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=0
> 1 ⇔
−Aτc dx∗dγ
∣∣∣
γ=0
Γα−1
[τcΓα−1 + Γα−η + τcΓα]2
[τc(α−1)Γ−1+(α−η)Γ−η+τcα] > 1
Given that dx
∗
dγ
∣∣∣
γ=0
= σΓ
α
α(1−α)A , the last inequality can be rewritten as follows:
τc
σ
α(1−α)Γ
−1
[τcΓ−1 + Γ−η + τc]2
{τc[(1− α)Γ−1 − α] + (η − α)Γ−η} > 1 (A.10)
Then, condition b) holds as long as this inequality is satisfied. Clearly, the
inequality is never satisfied if the term inside the curly brackets is negative. To
avoid that, we look for condition on τc such that
η − α+ τc[(1− α)Γ−1 − α]Γη > 0 (A.11)
We need to distinguish two cases.
Case 1 : (1 − α)Γ−1 − α > 0 which is indeed the case when A > A¯ ≡
δ+ρ
(1−α)1−ααα .
5 In this case, (A.11) implies
τc >
α− η
[(1− α)Γ−1 − α]Γη ≡ τ¯c
4The infinitesimals have the same order if their speed of convergence toward zero is the
same. This is indeed shown in Appendix A.4.1.
5This last inequality and the value of A¯ can be found easily by combining (1−α)Γ−1−α > 0
with the definition of Γ given in Proposition 1.
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Once this inequality is imposed, it follows that (A.10) holds as long as σ > σ.
Subsequently, condition b) in case 1 is satisfied when
A > A¯, τc > τ¯c and σ > σ.
Case 2 : (1 − α)Γ−1 − α < 0 which is indeed the case when A < A¯. In this
case, (A.11) implies
τc <
α− η
[(1− α)Γ−1 − α]Γη ≡ τ¯c
Once this inequality is imposed, it follows that (A.10) holds as long as σ > σ.
Then, condition b) in case 2 is satisfied when
A < A¯, τc < τ¯c and σ > σ.
Step 3 – Combining Steps 1 and 2. The following inequalities are
proved in Appendix A.4.2:
• A < A¯ always;
• if A > A¯ and η > η then τ¯c < τ c;
• if A < A¯ and η > η then τ¯c > τ c;
Taking into account these results, both conditions a) and b) - case 1 holds if
A > A¯, η > η, τ c −  < τc < τ c, and σ > σ. (A.12)
On the other hand, both conditions a) and b) - case 2 holds if
A < A < A¯, η > η, τ c −  < τc < τ c, and σ > σ. (A.13)
But then, it follows immediately that conditions a) and b) hold when (2.21) is
satisfied. Once again, if the condition η > η is replaced by η > α, the result of
case 1 remains unchanged since equation (A.11) is respected for any choices of
τc.
A.4 Further details on the proof of Proposition 2
A.4.1 Details for step 1
We prove that A ≥ A(ε) by contradiction. Suppose that A < A(ε) then it
follows that
A ≡ (δ + ρ)δ
1−α
[ρ+ (1− α)δ]1−ααα <
(δ + ρ)(δ − ε)1−α
[ρ+ (1− α)δ + αε]1−ααα ≡ A(ε).
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Simplifying these expressions, the inequality boils down to −ε(ρ+ δ) > 0 which
is clearly impossible since ε, δ, ρ are positive.
We prove now by contradiction that τ c ≥ τ c(ε). Suppose that τ c < τ c(ε), it
then follows that
τ c(ε) ≡
δ − ε
A− (Γα−1) + Γαδ >
δ
A− (Γα−1) + Γαδ ≡ τ c
After the simplification, the inequality boils down to −εA > 0 which is clearly
impossible due to the positive value of ε and A.
Finally, we want to show that  ≡ τ c − τ c(ε) and ε are infinitesimals of
the same order. To do so, we need to show that limε→0
τc−τc(ε)
ε is a positive
constant. Since the argument of the limit has the indeterminate form 00 , the
Hopital’s rule is then applied and we find that
lim
ε→0
τ c − τ c(ε)
ε
= lim
ε→0
−τ ′c(ε) =
Γα−ηA
[A− (Γ−1 + 1)δΓα]2 > 0.
A.4.2 Details for step 3
We want here to show that A < A¯. In fact,
A < A¯ ⇔ δ
1−α(δ + ρ)
[(1− α)δ + ρ]1−ααα <
δ + ρ
(1− α)1−ααα ⇔ ρ > 0.
Moreover, we want to find conditions such that τ c < τ¯c. Taking into account
the parameters’ restrictions, we observe that,
τ c ≡
δΓα−η
A− (Γ−1 + 1)Γαδ <
α− η
[(1− α)Γ−1 − α] Γη ≡ τ¯c (A.14)
From Appendix A.2.1, we know that A > A implies A− (Γ−1 + 1)Γαδ > 0; let
us first focus on case 1, i.e. A > A¯ and then (1 − α)Γ−1 − α > 0, condition
(A.14) holds if and only if
η < η ≡ ραA
A− (Γ−1 + 1)Γ∗αδ ≡ η
On the other hand, on case 2, i.e. A < A¯ and then (1 − α)Γ−1 − α < 0,
condition (A.14) holds if and only if η > η. Combining these results leads to
the last two inequalities listed in step 3 of Proposition 2.
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A.5 Further details on det(J) and tr(J)
A.5.1 Determinant of Jacobian matrix (det(J))
From the system of differential equations, the determinant of Jacobian matrix
can be found from its components: a, b, c and d.
det(J) = ad− bc
Recall the value of a, b, c and d, the determinant of Jacobian matrix (det(J))
is written as
det(J) = a · y∗
(
1 + τcx
∗η − b
σ
· τcη
x∗ + τcx∗
)
− b · y∗
[
−
(
1
σ
(1− α)(σ − α)Ax∗−α + τcη
x∗1−η + τcx∗
· a
)
+ τcηx
∗η−1y∗
]
Rewriting component a as a function of b gives:
a = [η(b− x)− τcx∗η] y∗x∗−1 − (1− α)Ax∗1−α
Substituting a into the equation, the determinant of Jacobian matrix can be
rewritten in term of b.
det(J) = y∗
(
τcx
∗η−1y∗(η − 1− τcx∗η)
)
− (1− α)Ax∗1−αy∗
(
1 + τcx
∗η − bx∗−1 − bα
σ
x∗−1
)
Extracting b out, det(J) will be
det(J) = y∗
(
τcx
∗η−1y∗(η − 1− τcx∗η)
)
− (1− α)Ax∗1−αy∗
(
−τcx∗η−1 + α
σ
(τcx
∗η−1 + 1 + τcx∗η)
)
Using the fact from BGP, it must be that
y∗ =
Ax∗1−α
τcx∗η−1 + 1 + τcx∗η
Fractioning y∗ out and do some algebraic manipulations, the Jacobian
determinant can be obtained as follows:
det(J) = y∗2x∗2η
{
τcx
∗−1[(1− α)τcx∗−1 − ατc + (η − α)x∗−η]
}
− y∗2x∗2η
{
(1− α)α
σ
(τcx
∗−1 + x∗−η + τc)2
}
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A.5.2 Trace of Jacobian matrix (tr(J))
The Trace of Jacobian Matrix (tr(J)) can be calculated from the summation of
the diagonal components of Jacobian Matrix.
tr(J) = a+ d
That is,
tr(J) = (τc(η − 1)x∗η−1 + τcηx∗η) · y∗ − (1− α)Ax∗1−α
+ y∗
[
1 + τcx
∗η − 1
σ
· τcη
x∗1−η + τcx∗
· b
]
Extracting b out gives:
tr(J) = (τc(η − 1)x∗η−1 + τcηx∗η) · y∗ − (1− α)Ax∗1−α
+ y∗
[
1 + τcx
∗η − 1
σ
· τcη
x∗1−η + τcx∗
(τcx
∗η + x∗ + τcx∗η+1)
]
Adding and Subtracting (1 − α)[τcx∗η−1 + 1 + τcx∗η]y∗ on the right hand
side, the value of tr(J) will be
tr(J) = y∗
[
τc(η − 1)x∗η−1 + τcηx∗η − 1
σ
τcη
x∗1−η + τcx∗
(τcx
∗η + x∗ + τcx∗η+1)
]
+ (1 + τcx
∗η)y∗ − (1− α)Ax∗1−α + (1− α)(τcx∗η−1 + x∗ + τcx∗η)
− (1− α)(τcx∗η−1 + x∗ + τcx∗η)
Using the fact that x˙x = 0 on the BGP, the trace of Jacobian Matrix can be
rewritten as follows:
tr(J) = y∗{τcx∗η[(η − 2 + α)x∗−1 + η + α] + α}
− y∗
{
1
σ
· τcη(τcx
∗η−1 + 1 + τcx∗η)
x∗−η + τc
}
A.6 Proof of Lemma 1
From step 2 of Proposition 2, we know that (1− α)Γ−1 − α > 0 if, and only if,
A > A¯. Based on that, condition i) and ii) hold immediately.
On the other hand, tr(J) < 0 if the sum of the first two terms within the
curly parenthesis is negative:
x∗ητc
[
(η + α− 2)x∗−1 + η + α]+ α < 0 (A.15)
Clearly, this never happens if the term in the square brackets is positive.
Therefore, let us consider the case when it is negative. This is indeed possible
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when, for example, −α < η < 2− α and Γ < 2−η−αη+α . The last condition can be
rewritten in terms of A by taking into account the definition of Γ and leads to
A > Aˆ. Under these assumptions on the parameters, the inequality (A.15) is
respected when τc > τˆc, and therefore tr(J) < 0.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
To have local indeterminacy, it requires that det(J) ≥ 0. We begin combining
the conditions on the parameters (A, η, τc, σ) which guarantee the sign of the
determinant with those for multiple BGPs. From step 3 of the proof of
Proposition 2, we know that A < A¯ and therefore the resulting condition on A
for having det(J) ≥ 0 and multiple BGPs is A > A¯. Accordingly, the
conditions on τc and η must hold for having multiple BGPs since det(J) ≥ 0
independently on their values. Finally, we have σ > σ. Considering all
conditions of the parameters, we observe
A > A¯, η > α, τc = τ c, and σ > σˆ (A.16)
We now need to combine these inequalities with the conditions for having
tr(J) < 0. Let us begin with the condition on A. It is obvious that A >
max{A¯, Aˆ} where Aˆ > A¯ if η > α. In fact, it can be shown that
Aˆ ≡ δ + ρ
α
(
η + α
2− η − α
)1−α
>
δ + ρ
α
(
α
1− α
)1−α
≡ A¯ (A.17)
which is satisfied as long as η+α2−η−α >
α
1−α . It is indeed always the case when
η > α; the condition for det(J) > 0. Additionally, the level of technology should
be positive (Aˆ > 0). Therefore, η+α2−η−α will be positive if −α < η < 2− α.
Moving to the conditions on τc, we have τc ≤ τ c for global indeterminacy
and τc > τˆc for local indeterminacy. Taking into account the definition of τˆc and
τ c we have that
τˆc ≡ α
Γη[Γ−1(2− η − α)− η − α] <
δΓα−η
A− (Γ−1 + 1)Γαδ ≡ τ c
After some simplifications, it emerges that such inequalities lead to
αA < −δΓα [Γ−1(η − 2) + η]
and solving for η, we obtain that
η <
αA(δ − ρ)
δ(αA+ (δ + ρ)Γα)
=
δ − ρ
δ(1 + Γ)
≡ η◦ (A.18)
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here the last equality is obtained by dividing both sides of the right hand side
of the inequality by αA and using the definition of Γ.
Regarding all conditions on η, it is restricted with respect to condition A.13,
A.16 and A.18. Let us consider the case ρ→ 0+; in this case η → 0+ and then,
by continuity, we have that ∃ > 0 : ∀ρ ∈ (0, ). Consequently, the resulting
condition on η that α < η < 2−α definitely satisfies conditions A.13 and A.16.
To place η◦ between α and 2− α, α < η◦ leads to another condition for A;
A >
(δ + ρ)δ1−α
[(1− α)δ − ρ]1−ααα ≡ A
• (A.19)
Comparing Aˆ and A•, it can be easily shown that
A• ≡ (δ + ρ)δ
1−α
[(1− α)δ − ρ]1−ααα <
δ + ρ
α
(
η + α
2− η − α
)1−α
≡ Aˆ (A.20)
Assuming ρ < δ, this inequality is equivalent to
η > α · δ + ρ
δ − ρ
which clearly implies η > α, as ρ → 0+. Finally, combining the resulting
inequalities together with a sufficient condition (σ > σ) leads to a condition
(2.27).
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Appendix B
B.1 Economy with both education systems
B.1.1 Local maximum condition
The local maximum condition for the labour income tax rate (τw) can be derived
by taking the second-order derivative of the steady state growth rate (1 + g∗)
with respect to τw.
∂2(1 + g∗)
∂τ2w
=
(1− α)
1− αφ ·
{(
∂Ω
∂τw
+
∂Λ
∂τw
)
+ (Ω + Λ)
∂(1 + g∗)
∂τw
}
. (B.1)
where ∂(1+g
∗)
∂τw
is given from the first-order condition (3.34).
Simplifying equation (B.1), we will get the second-order condition that
indicates whether it is a local maximum or a local minimum
∂2(1 + g∗)
∂τ2w
=
(1− α)(1 + g∗)
1− αφ ·
[
∂Ω
∂τw
+
∂Λ
∂τw
+
(Ω + Λ)2(1− α)
1− αφ
]
(B.2)
which depends on the value of the square bracket.
B.2 Economy with misperception of private tuition
B.2.1 The model setup
In this economy, the government misconceives of the existence of private tuition.
Therefore, the human capital accumulation function consists of only two inputs;
public education (Et) and parental education (ht)
hEt+1 = BE
µ
t h
µ+φ
t (B.3)
where it can be compared with (3.13) when ϕ = 0. Despite the misperception
of government, the optimal choices of households remain unchanged. Thus,
equation (3.16), (3.17), (3.18) and (3.19) are still valid for this analysis.
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At the equilibrium, the decision of giving bequests is affected by changing
in the rental rate and the wage rate. The amount of bequests is determined by
bEt+1 =
1
2
· [α− (1− τw)(1− α)]A(kEt+1)α(hEt+1)1−α. (B.4)
Substituting the market clearing condition (st = kt+1), the adult and old
constraints into (3.16), the Euler equation can be rewritten as
(1 + rt+1)(1 + β)kt+1 = β(1 + rt+1)[(1− τw)wtht + bt] + bt+1. (B.5)
Substituting (3.9), (3.10) and (B.4) into (B.5), it can be shown that the future
physical capital is a function of current income
kEt+1 =
[(1− τw)(1− α) + α]βα
α(1 + 2β) + (1− τw)(1− α)y
E
t (B.6)
which is represented in equation (3.40). For the human capital function, it can
be found by substituting the government budget constraint (3.11) and the wage
rate (3.10) into (B.3). The future human capital is also a function of current
income
ht+1 = Bτ
µ
w(1− α)µ(yE)µ (B.7)
which is the same as equation (3.41).
B.2.2 Local maximum condition for the economy with only
public education
Considering the first-order derivative of gross growth rate with respect to the
labour income tax rate, the necessary condition for the local maximum (or the
local minimum) can be obtained by setting the first-order derivative at zero
∂(1 + gE)
∂τw
=
µ(1 + gE)(1− α)
1− αφ
[
1
τw
− 2α
2β
Ψ
]
= 0 (B.8)
where µ(1+g
E)(1−α)
1−αφ > 0 due to the constraint of parameters. Therefore, the
square brackets should be equal to zero to make equation (B.8) holds.
1
τw
− 2α
2β
Ψ
= 0 (B.9)
Taking the second-order derivative of the gross growth rate with respect to
the labour income tax rate gives:
∂2(1 + gE)
∂τw
=
µ(1− α)(1 + gE)
1− αφ
[
− 1
τ2w
+
2α2β
Ψ
∂Ψ
∂τw
]
+
µ(1− α)
1− αφ
[
1
τw
− 2α
2β
Ψ
]
∂(1 + gE)
∂τw
(B.10)
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The second term on the right hand side of equation (B.10) is eliminated by
using the fact from the necessary condition (B.8). Thus, the sufficient condition
for the local maximum is finally obtained
∂2(1 + gE)
∂τ2w
=
µ(1− α)(1 + gE)
1− αφ
[
− 1
τ2w
+
2α2β
Ψ
∂Ψ
∂τw
]
(B.11)
which is similar to equation (3.51).
B.2.3 Proof of the over-provision of public education
Considering the growth-maximising tax rate in the economy that has only
public education (τEw1), it can be proved by the contradiction that this
growth-maximising tax rate lies outside the range of zero and one. Setting τEw1
from (3.48) to be less than one gives:
αβ + 1− α− α
√
β(β + 2(1− α)) < (α− 1)2. (B.12)
Expanding (B.12) and cancelling the same variables in both sides, we get
β + 1− α <
√
β(β + 2(1− α)) (B.13)
where β(β+2(1−α)) is always greater than zero due to the positive parametrical
values. Since both sides are positive, squaring both sides does not alter the sign
of inequality in (B.13).
(1− α)2 + 2(1− α)β + β2 < β2 + 2(1− α)β
Rearranging the terms, the inequality expression becomes
(1− α)2 < 0
which is impossible due to α ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the value of τEw1 is proved by
the contradiction such that τEw1 is greater than one (τ
E
w1 > 1).
Since τEw1 < τ
E
w2, it can be concluded that both growth-maximising tax
rates lie outside the range (0,1). Therefore, the best feasible tax rate that the
government should levy is at 1 or at 100%. In other words, the economy has a
corner solution when the government aims to maximise the growth rate in this
economy without considering the existence of private tuition.
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Appendix C
C.1 Decentralised economy
C.1.1 Value function
Considering the value function from the Bellman equation gives:
V (k, t) = max
c
{
U(c, t) +
1
1 + ρdt
· E(t)V (k, t+ 1)
}
(C.1)
Multiplying by 1 + ρdt in both sides, the Bellman equation will be
(1 + ρdt)V (k, t) = max
c
{(1 + ρdt)U(c, t) + E(t)V (k, t+ 1)} (C.2)
Since the utility is CRRA function (4.1) and (dt)2 ≈ 0, (C.2) is rewritten as
ρdtV (k, t) = max
c
{U(c, t) + E(dV )} (C.3)
Using the Taylor’s expansion up to second order, it implies the application
of Ito’s Lemma.
dV =
∂V
∂t
dt+
∂V
∂k
dk +
1
2
∂2V
∂t2
(dt)2 +
1
2
∂2V
∂t2
(dk)2 (C.4)
Due to the fact that (dt)2 ≈ 0, it can be shown that
dV =
∂V
∂t
dt+
∂V
∂k
dk +
1
2
∂2V
∂t2
(dk)2 (C.5)
Substituting equation (4.2) into (C.5), it becomes
dV =
∂V
∂t
dt+ V ′(k)
[
((1− φ)Rk − c) dt+ T
N
]
+
1
2
V ′′(k)
[
((1− φ)Rk − c)2 (dt)2
]
+
1
2
V ′′(k)
[
2 ((1− φ)Rk − c) dt · T
N
+
(
T
N
)2] (C.6)
where T = (1− θ)Gkσdu.
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Using the fact that (dt)2 ≈ 0, dt · du ≈ 0 and (du)2 = dt, equation (C.1.1)
can be rewritten as
dV =
∂V
∂t
dt+ V ′(k)
[
((1− φ)Rk − c) dt+ (1− θ)Gk
N
σdu
]
+
1
2
V ′′(k)
[
(1− θ)Gk
N
σ
]2
dt.
(C.7)
Taking the expectation, the mean of a random shock is equal to zero (E(du) = 0)
regarding the Wiener process.
E(dV ) =
∂V
∂t
dt+ V ′(k) [((1− τy)Rk − c) dt]
+
1
2
V ′′(k)
[
(1− θ)Gk
N
σ
]2
dt
(C.8)
Substituting equation (C.8) and the CRRA utility function into (C.3) gives us:
ρdtV (k, t) = max
c
{∫ ∞
0
e−ρt · c(t)
1−η − 1
1− η dt+
∂V
∂t
dt
+ V ′(k) [((1− τy)Rk − c) dt] + 1
2
V ′′(k)
[
(1− θ)Gk
N
σ
]2
dt
} (C.9)
Dividing by dt and using the fact that V (k, t) = e−ρtV (k), we get
ρV (k) =
c(t)1−η − 1
1− η − ρV (k) + V
′(k) [((1− τy)Rk − c)]
+
1
2
V ′′(k)
[
(1− θ)Gk
N
σ
]2 (C.10)
which is known as the stochastic Bellman equation.
C.1.2 Ratio of productive government expenditure to private
capital
The government will devote all productive government expenditure to the public
good which is financed by the permanent income tax rate (τy). Recall that
the aggregate productive government expenditure (Gk) is proportional to the
aggregate income (Y ).
Gk = τyY
Substituting out Y by using the production function gives us:
Gk = τyAK
αG1−αk (C.11)
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Dividing equation (C.11) by K, the ratio of productive government expenditure
to private capital will depend on the permanent income tax rate (τy), the capital
elasticity of income (α) and the constant technology (A).
Gk
K
= (τyA)
1
α (C.12)
This means that the the ratio of productive government expenditure to
private capital can be treated as a constant, as described in the paper by
Barro (1990).
C.1.3 Derivation of optimal consumption
According to the optimal amount of consumption (4.5) and the constant
propensity to consume capital (4.21), the first-order condition of consumption
can be rewritten as
V ′(k) = (λk)−η (C.13)
which implies
V ′′(k) =
−η(λk)−η
k
(C.14)
V ′′′(k) =
η(η + 1)(λk)−η
k2
(C.15)
Substituting equation (C.13), (C.14) and (C.15) into the first-order condition
of capital (4.6) gives:
(1− τy)R− ρ− η [(1− τy)Rk − c] + η(η + 1)
2
[
(1− θ)
(
Gk
N
)
σ
]2
= 0 (C.16)
Substituting rental rate (4.12), the market clearing condition and the ratio
of aggregate productive government expenditure to private capital (C.12) into
(C.16) and dividing by η, the closed-form solution for the equilibrium
consumption is obtained, and it is determined solely by capital. Indeed, one
can observe that the consumption-capital ratio is a constant in this stochastic
economy.
c(t)
k(t)
=
ρ
η
− 1
η
(1− τy)τ
1−α
α
y A
1
α
+ (1− τy)τ
1−α
α
y A
1
α −
[
η + 1
2
]
[(1− θ)(τyA) 1ασ]2
(C.17)
where c(t)k(t) =
C(t)
K(t) since C = Nc and K = Nk.
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C.2 Centralised economy
The social planner will maximise households’ utility
U(C/N) = E0
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt · (C/N)
1−η − 1
1− η dt (C.18)
subject to the resource constraint, which can be written as a form of the
stochastic aggregate capital accumulation
dK = [(1− φ)AKαG1−αk − C] · dt+ [(1− φ′)σφAKαG1−αk ] · du (C.19)
where φ and φ′ are the fraction of productive government expenditure and
government consumption, respectively.
Applying the Ito’s Lemma and following the same step of derivation that is
used for analysing the decentralised economy, the stochastic Bellman equation
will be
ρV (K) =
(C(t)/N)1−η − 1
1− η − ρV (K)
+ V ′(K)[(1− φ)AKαG1−αk − C]
+
1
2
V ′′(K)[(1− φ′)σφAKαG1−αk ]2
(C.20)
The social planner will optimally choose the amount of aggregate
consumption and of capital for the economy. Then, the first-order conditions
for the optimal consumption and savings are
1
N
(
C
N
)−η
= V ′(K) (C.21)
− ρV ′(K) + V ′(K)(1− φ)αA
(
Gk
K
)1−α
+ V ′′(K)
(1− φ)A(Gk
K
)1−α
·K − C +
(
(1− φ′)σφA
(
Gk
K
)1−α)2
αK

+
1
2
V ′′′(K)
[
(1− φ′)σφAKαG1−αk
]2
= 0.
(C.22)
Assuming that the aggregate consumption is proportionate to the aggregate
private capital (C = λsK) and using the fact from the first-order condition of
consumption (C.21), the optimal ratio of consumption to capital will be
λs =
C
K
=
ρ
η
− 1
η
(1− φ)αA
(
Gk
K
)1−α
+ (1− φ)A
(
Gk
K
)1−α
+
[
α− 1
2
(η + 1)
]
·
(
(1− φ′)σφA
(
Gk
K
)1−α)2
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Substituting out the ratio of productive government spending to private
capital by using the government budget constraint (Gk = φY ), one can observe
that the consumption-capital ratio (λs) is a constant value
λs =
C
K
=
ρ
η
− 1
η
(1− φ)αφ 1−αα A 1α
+ (1− φ)φ 1−αα A 1α +
[
α− 1
2
(η + 1)
]
·
(
(1− φ′)σ(φA) 1α
)2
which is similar to equation (4.37).
Taking the expectation operator into stochastic capital accumulation (C.19)
and using the fact that C = λsK and Gk = φY give us:
EdK = [(1− φ)φ 1−αα A 1αK − λK]dt
Dividing by Kdt, the expected growth rate of a centralised economy will be
γs =
EdK
Kdt
=
[
(1− φ)φ 1−αα A 1α − λs
]
Substituting λs into this equation, the growth rate of a centralised economy
becomes
γs =
1
η
[
(1− φ)φ 1−αα αA 1α − ρ
]
+
(
(1− φ′)(φA) 1ασ
)2 · (η + 1
2
− α
)
which is indeed represented in equation (4.38).
C.3 Volatility of productive spending
In Figure 4.4, the welfare loss is calculated when varying the degree of risk
aversion (η) and the standard deviation of productive government expenditure
(σ). Since it is difficult to find the data on productive government spending, we
decide to use government spending on economic affairs as a proxy for productive
government expenditure. This data is then collected annually between 2006
and 2014 from Eurostat. As we aware of the unit of measurement, government
spending on economic affairs is calculated as a percentage of GDP.
For the calculation of the standard deviation (σi), we employ a simple
formula in a statistic textbook;
σi =
√∑2014
t=2006(Xit − X¯)
N
(C.23)
where Xit refers to the annual data. Each country and time period are denoted
by i and t, respectively. X¯ is the mean value of Xit, and N is a number of
observations.
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Table C.1: Standard Deviation of Productive Spending in European Union
Spending on economic affairs as a percentage of GDP
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 σi
EU (28) 4.2 4.1 4.6 4.9 5.1 4.5 4.7 4.3 4.2 0.344
EU (25) 4.2 4.0 4.6 4.9 5.1 4.4 4.7 4.3 4.2 0.362
EU (19) 4.4 4.2 4.4 5.0 5.4 4.6 4.9 4.5 4.4 0.381
EU (15) 4.4 4.1 4.4 4.9 5.3 4.5 4.8 4.5 - 0.372
EU (12) 4.4 4.1 4.4 4.9 5.4 4.5 4.8 4.4 - 0.405
• EU (12) includes Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and The United Kingdom.
• EU (15) is EU (12) plus Austria, Finland and Sweden.
• EU (25) is EU (15) plus Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
• EU (28) is EU (25) plus Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia.
Table C.2: Standard Deviation of Productive Spending in European Countries
Spending on economic affairs as a percentage of GDP
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 σi
Belgium 5.3 5.5 6.0 6.7 6.8 7.4 7.7 6.9 7.0 0.822
Denmark 3.1 2.9 2.8 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.7 3.5 3.6 0.308
France 4.5 4.3 4.5 4.9 5.1 4.8 5.0 4.9 5.1 0.289
Germany 3.5 3.3 3.6 4.0 4.8 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.3 0.462
Greece 3.8 4.3 5.7 5.4 4.5 4.1 6.7 15.0 3.7 3.549
Ireland 3.7 3.9 5.5 6.8 25.4 7.4 3.2 2.7 3.2 7.148
Italy 5.1 4.2 4.0 4.7 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.2 0.355
Luxembourg 4.8 4.1 4.0 4.7 4.5 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.5 0.278
Netherlands 4.1 4.2 4.4 5.4 5.2 4.8 4.5 3.8 4.2 0.528
Portugal 4.3 4.2 4.6 4.8 6.4 4.4 3.8 3.8 6.9 1.106
Spain 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.7 5.8 5.7 7.9 4.5 4.4 1.030
UK 3.1 3.0 5.2 4.4 3.4 3.0 3.5 3.1 3.0 0.773
From table C.1, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the standard
deviation of productive government expenditure varies from 0.3-0.4 when
taking the countries in European Union into account. However, it can be
observed that the volatility of productive spending reduces if the number of
European countries increases. In table C.2, the standard deviation of
128
productive government spending for each European country is also calculated.
It is obvious that government spending on economic affairs is very volatile in
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. One possible explanation is that
governments of these countries may attempt to strengthen the economy after
the 2008 financial crisis by increasing government expenditure.
C.4 Derivation of certainty equivalence
The social planner has a precise knowledge that the aggregate wealth of
households is affected by the volatility of government transfer. Thus, the
planner will carefully choose the optimal consumption and saving paths while
keeping the volatility of aggregate wealth of households less volatile.
After taking government transfer into account (T ), the planner may suggest
households to invest in either bond (B) or capital (K). Therefore, the constraint
on accumulated wealth will be
dW (t) = dB(t) + dK(t) (C.24)
where
dB(t) = rbB(t)dt (C.25)
dK(t) = [(1− φ)rkK(t)− C(t)]dt+ T (t) (C.26)
T (t) = (1− φ′)φAK(t)αGk(t)1−ασdu (C.27)
in which rb is the return on bond and rk is the return on capital. Due to
equations (C.25), (C.26) and (C.27), the constraint on accumulated wealth can
be rewritten as
dW (t) = [rbW (t) + ((1− φ)rk − rb)K(t)− C(t)] · dt
+ (1− φ′)φAK(t)αGk(t)1−ασ · du.
(C.28)
Considering the utility function that is subject to the aggregate wealth
constraint (C.28) and applying the Ito’s Lemma, the stochastic Bellman
equation will be
ρJ(W ) =
(C/N)1−η − 1
1− η − ρJ(W )
+ J ′(W )[rbW + (1− φ)rkK − rbK − C]
+
1
2
J ′′(W )
[
(1− φ′)φAKαG1−αk σ
]2 (C.29)
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Next, the social planner optimally chooses the amount of aggregate
consumption and capital. The corresponded first-order conditions are
1
N
(
C∗
N
)−η
= J ′(W ) (C.30)
K∗ = − J
′(W )[(1− φ)rk − rb]
J ′′(W )α
[
(1− φ′)φA
(
Gk
K
)1−α
σ
]2 (C.31)
and the optimal allocation of wealth can be found from
J ′(W )[rb − ρ] + J ′′(W )[rbWt + ((1− φ)rk − rb)K − C]
+
1
2
J ′′′(W )
[
(1− φ′)φA
(
Gk
K
)1−α
σ
]2
K2 = 0
(C.32)
Substituting equation (C.31) into (C.32), the optimal allocation of wealth
can be rewritten as
J ′(W )(rb − ρ) + J ′′(W )[rbW + ((1− φ)rk − rb)K∗ − C∗]
+
1
2
(−J ′(W )
J ′′(W )
)2 ((1− φ)rk − rb)2[
α(1− φ′)φA
(
Gk
K
)1−α
σ
]2
 J ′′′(w) = 0. (C.33)
Assuming that the function of the optimal consumption, the optimal capital
and the optimal bond are proportionate to wealth, the equilibrium allocation
becomes
C∗ = µW (C.34)
K∗ = nW (C.35)
B∗ = (1− n)W (C.36)
where n is a fraction of capital investment and µ is a proportional to consume
capital. Substituting (C.34) and (C.35) into (C.33), the optimal condition for
wealth is obtained.
J ′(W )(rb − ρ) + J ′′(W ) [rbW + ((1− φ)rk − rb)nW − µW ]
+
1
2
(−J ′(W )
J ′′(W )
)2 ((1− φ)rk − rb)2[
α(1− φ′)τyA
(
Gk
K
)1−α
σ
]2
 J ′′′(w) = 0 (C.37)
With regard to the optimal condition of consumption (C.30) and (C.34), the
second-order and third-order conditions of J(W ) can be calculated.
J ′′(W ) = − η
WN
(µW )−η (C.38)
J ′′′(W ) =
η(η + 1)
W 2N
(µW )−η (C.39)
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Substituting equation (C.30), (C.38) and (C.39) into (C.37) and dividing it by
η, the optimal wealth condition (C.37) can be rewritten as
rb
η
− ρ
η
− rb − ((1− φ)rk − rb)n+ µ
+
1
2
(
η + 1
η
) ((1− φ)rk − rb)2
η
[
α(1− φ′)φA
(
Gk
K
)1−α
σ
]2
 = 0 (C.40)
One can find the value of proportional to consume capital (µ) by substituting
equations (C.30), (C.38) and (C.39) into (C.33), and then dividing by η.
µ = −rb
η
+
ρ
η
+ rb +
((1− φ)rk − rb)2
ηα
[
(1− φ′)τyA
(
Gk
K
)1−α
σ
]2
− 1
2
(
η + 1
η
) ((1− φ)rk − rb)2
η
[
α(1− φ′)φA
(
Gk
K
)1−α
σ
]2

(C.41)
Substituting out µ in equation (C.40) out by using (C.41) and using the fact
that Gk = τyY give us:
[(1− φ)rk − rb]n = ((1− φ)rk − rb)
2
ηα[(1− φ′)(φA) 1ασ]2
. (C.42)
However, in this paper, there is only the investment in capital. Therefore,
K∗ = W ∗ and n = 1. Consequently, the certainty equivalence return interest
rate (rc) becomes
rc = rb = (1− φ)rk − ηα[(1− φ′)(φA)
1
ασ]2. (C.43)
Replacing rk by the marginal rate of return to capital (4.12) and using the fact
that Gk = φY again, the explicit function of the certainty equivalent interest
rate will be
rc = (1− φ)φ
1−α
α A
1
α − αη(1− φ′)2(φA) 2ασ2 (C.44)
which is similar to equation (4.51).
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